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To the ones we lost too soon.
May eternal light shine on them
till all our swords are plowshares
and the nations learn war no more.
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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE:
REPERTOIRE PARALYSIS, LOCALIZED DIFFUSION,
AND EMOTIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN DE-ESCALATION
David Christian Sorge
Randall Collins
Guobin Yang
The essays in this dissertation apply a micro-first sociology of violence to three topics operating at several different timescales–decades, years, days, and minutes.
The first paper considers the evolution of collective violence over fifty years. This study asks
whether the emergent nature of violence prevents violent forms of contention from evolving
as quickly as others. Using a custom algorithm, I matched entries in a database of ethnoreligious violence in India with source articles from the Times of India archive. I categorized
and counted the verbs in these articles, and the same verbs in a random sample of 10,000
articles from the same time period. I find that verbs related to violence show more stability
than verbs related to other forms of collective action.
The second paper considers two processes of diffusion–a years-long process of violence diffusion constituting a wave of ethno-religious violence in India from 1977 to 1992, and a
days-long process of diffusion where one incident of collective violence may spark others.
I use an event-history framework and a recently-developed GIS data crosswalking procedure to compare demographic, electoral, economic, and diffusion variables across India at
the level of parliamentary constituencies. The large- and small-scale diffusion variables are
strong predictors of violence. In particular, diffusion patterns are consistent with regionallanguage media as a vector for violence, with uptake more likely where the majority group’s
economic or demographic dominance is less pronounced.
ix

The third paper considers a thirty-minute process of de-escalation after a gunman threatened
to commit a school shooting. Using audio and video recordings along with a memoir, I
analyze how the school bookkeeper, acting as hostage and negotiator, convinced the gunman
to surrender. The turning point resulted from two emotional processes, one bolstering the
bookkeeper, the other exhausting the gunman. These processes created an opening for
processes of deliberation, identity repair, and rapport-building to proceed.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of a set of three essays. Each is an outgrowth of what I describe
in this introduction as an integrated sociology of violence. Each essay explores the what an
integrated sociology of violence has to offer other subfields with an interest in violence–social
movements, ethno-religious violence, and crisis negotiation. Each essay also demonstrates a
concern with dynamic processes related to violence, at several different timescales. The first
essay considers how the situationally emergent nature of violence affects the evolution of
collective action repetoires over a fifty-year time period, the second considers how diffusion
processes affect the likelihood of ethno-religious violence at time-scales of around a week,
while the third looks at the interplay of language, expectations, and emotion over the course
of a 30-minute de-escalation.

1.1. Toward a unified sociology of violence
Violence takes place in a striking number of contexts–within families and romantic relationships, in schools, in places of business, in places of recreation, in contests over territory
between gangs, militias, paramilitaries, and nation-states, and more. The questions of how
and why violence takes place were of interest to earlier generations of proto-sociological and
sociological thinkers, of course, from Hobbes, Marx, and LeBon, through Durkheim, Weber,
and Simmel, and on to Coser, Parsons, and Smelser, but many of these earlier studies did not
have so broad a base of empirical research to draw on, drew heavily on myths and stereotypes
related to violence, or overgeneralized from explanations of a few types of violence producing
accounts of violence that have not stood up well to greater scrutiny. Rule’s summary, while
focused primarily on forms of “civil violence” – riots, rebellions, and revolutions – provides
a useful overview of the history of sociological theorizing of violence up to the early 1990s
(Rule 1989).
With the rise of mid-range theory in sociology, the field of sociology as a whole grew rapidly
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but quickly fragmented into a wide variety of subfields. The tendency for studies to focus on
just one or a few types of violence heightened, usually categorized by institutional context.
Until around 2007, those wanting to study whether anything at all can be said about violent
phenomena generally would have been left to navigate a massive web of loosely connected
subfields spanning Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, Criminology, and Psychology
(among others), picking up a smattering of statistics on homicide in one place, a few studies
of recent wars in another, some views on frustration and aggression elsewhere. Of course,
there were a few exceptions during this period. Johan Galtung (1969) attempted it as part of
defining the field of Peace Studies, but used such broad definitions of “peace” and “violence”
that they became virtual synonyms for “justice” on the one hand and “inequality” on the
other. Charles Tilly (2003) was a bit more successful, bringing various forms of collective
violence into a single politically-oriented analytic frame, but even his work produced more
a taxonomy of violence than a clear answer to the “how” and “why” questions that demand
explanation.
Since 2007, however, there has been a renewed interest in gathering findings from across
the different subfields to search for features and patterns that recur and vary systematically
across a range of violent phenomena. Between 2007 and 2009, Heitmeyer and the other
founding editors of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence laid institutional
foundations for greater interdisciplinary cooperation (2007), and three key studies of violence
that drew from a variety of forms and cultures emerged in quick succession: Randall Collins’
Violence: A Microsociological Theory (2008), Michel Wieviorka’s Violence: A New Approach
(2009), and Mark Cooney’s Is Killing Wrong? (2009). Two subsequent works also deserve
consideration as foundational to the newly unified sociology of violence–Alan Page Fiske
and Tage Rai’s Virtuous Violence (2014), which serves as a psychological complement to
Cooney and Black’s abstract Pure Sociological approach, while Siniša Malešević’s The Rise
of Organized Brutality (2017) adds a crucial historical dimension. Three central findings
have emerged from this integrated, empirically informed approach to studying violence across
contexts: (1) violence is strongly situationally emergent (2) violence is governed by moral2

emotional dynamics embedded in longer-term relational networks, and (3) in the long term,
the “civilizing process” has tended to cultivate, not suppress violence.
1.1.1. Violence is strongly situationally emergent
In his book considering the changes that have taken place in violence since the 1960s, Wieviorka began the work of deconstructing the first myth, arguing that at least since the 1960s,
classical paradigms focused on confrontations between labor and capital or based on the
state and its supposed monopoly on legitimated violence could no longer account for the
common varieties of violence. Violence, he argues, is better understood from a more microlevel standpoint–an understanding of the subjectivities of those who commit violent acts
(Wieviorka 2009). But the argument that shatters most macro-structural approaches to analyzing violence comes from Collins’ observation that while odious conditions are widespread
and potential justifications for violence abound, violence itself is rare, localized, and usually
engaged in tentatively and incompetently. By centering the corporeal and emotional experiences of violence, Collins demonstrated that confrontation provokes a great deal of tension
and fear not only in the victim, but in the attacker. When violence does take place, it tends
to follow five basic patterns:
1. Attacking the (situationally) weak
2. Audience-oriented, staged “fair” fights
3. Confrontation-avoidance through deception
4. Confrontation-avoidance through absorption in technique
5. Confrontation-avoidance through remote violence (Collins 2008, 2009).
1.1.2. Violence is governed by moral-emotional dynamics embedded in longerterm relational networks
If confrontational violence is emotionally difficult, why do people engage in it at all? While
older theories have vacillated between characterizing violence as a bestial holdover or sub-
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conscious urge to be tamed by the laws of society (Freud 2010, among others) or a rational
way of accruing wealth or escaping domination by others (Fanon 2005; Hobbes 2017, among
others), a more convincing set of studies suggests that for the most part, people are motivated to pursue violence by their moral convictions.
The unified body of work on why violence takes place centers socially-situated morality–the
patterns of moral action and evaluation that may be deduced more consistently by observing
patterns of violent action than by listening to hypothetical discussions of what would be right
or wrong to do in a given circumstance. Black (1976; 1998) and Cooney (1998; 2009) argue
that violence is primarily a moralistic “self-help” form of social control, while Fiske and Rai
argue that “people are morally motivated to do violence to create, conduct, protect, redress,
terminate, or mourn social relationships with the victim or with others” (Fiske and Rai
2014:6). These approaches recognize that asking whether violence is rational or irrational is
often the wrong question; asking about social hierarchies and local moral cultures is more
productive. Moreover, describing the motivations for violence in moral terms is theoretically
fortuitous. Following Jasper (2018), we may think of moral commitments as one end of a
continuum of feeling-thinking phenomena, on which reflex emotions like confrontational
tension and fear are also represented. Doing so allows us to reconnect moral arguments to
embodied motivation and energy, and consider when, how, and what moral commitments
may generate sufficient emotional energy for a person to overcome the widespread human
aversion to confrontational violence, while also considering the tactics the same person might
use to avoid confrontation.
1.1.3. In the long term, the “civilizing process” has tended to cultivate, not
suppress violence
A commonly held view of violence, that it represents a vanishing vestige of a bygone era, has
also come in for serious challenge. Authors both academic (Elias 2000) and popular (Pinker
2012) have trumpeted the global decline of violence. Malešević, building on and extending
work by Michael Mann (Mann 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013) points to a historical picture is
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not nearly as rosy. While certain forms of grisly punishment and interpersonal violence are
not as common as they were in past centuries, these tendencies are dwarfed by the growth
of organized violence over the longue durée, in a pattern that Malešević argues reflects the
bureaucratization of coercion, the competitive spread of ideologies from points at the top of
distinct social organizations, and attempts via ideology to connect small-group solidarity to
a bureaucratic framework (Malešević 2017).

1.2. Dynamic processes at varying time-scales
The primary task of a science (at least according to one interpretation of Peircian pragmatism) is to offer usable explanations for surprising phenomena (Swedberg 2015:98). Historically, in the sociological discipline this has often involved the search for covering laws
of the form if a then b, drawing off of Humean accounts of constant conjunctions (Hume
2003, 2011). While a compelling framework, such accounts run into increasing difficulty the
more we examine the degree to which one event is like another. This type of questioning
has been particularly important in historical sociology, where, for example, the successes
and failures of earlier revolutions inform those seeking both to foment and to suppress later
revolutions (a complication discussed by Skocpol 2015). In response to this, a twin focus
on processes and causal mechanisms has begun to take on greater prominence in the social sciences. At a meta-theoretical level, pragmatists like Andrew Abbott (Abbott 2016)
and critical realists like George Steinmetz (Steinmetz 2004) have pressed for sociologists
to keep in mind the constantly changing nature of social reality, and the reality that any
given event is the result of competing causal mechanisms, with causal mechanisms often
showing greater consistency over time than outcomes–a point of view that comes curiously
close to that of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts (see Schegloff 1987). In the
field of social movements, Tilly and colleagues were early adopters of this frame, working
to translate their theories about riots, revolutions, and wars into theories about processes
like threat and opportunity attribution, organizational appropriation, innovation, diffusion,
and escalation (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), while relational sociologists (Fuchs 2001;
White 2008) and sociologists studying organization (Effler 2010; Summers-Effler 2007) have
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advanced theories about how moments of relative, repetitive order–cycles of routine activity,
institutions, organizations–can arise, stabilize, then ultimately disintegrate out of the swell
of potentially flows of experience and adaptation.
A full engagement with these theoretical and meta-theoretical arguments is beyond the scope
of an introduction like this one–it would quickly become a monograph of its own. It will
suffice for present purposes to note that an additional commonality between the papers in
this dissertation is a recognition of the constant flows of change and an assumption that
more often it is stability that needs to be explained than flux. Each paper concerns itself
with trying to pick out processes and mechanisms related to the creation, stabilization, or
disintegration of patterns of violence. As Collins has noted, (Collins 2020), these patterns
may take place at a variety of different time scales, ranging from micro-scale rhythms that
take place in a matter of tenths of a second to larger scale patterns of social change at the
levels of minutes, hours, days, months, years, decades, centuries, even the longue durée of
human history.

1.3. How the integrated sociology of violence can inform other subfields
As noted above, each of the empirical chapters brings findings from what I have termed the
integrated sociology of violence back into conversations in subfields where more specific types
of violence are studied. Here I summarize the papers with an emphasis on their connections
to the micro-first general sociology of violence described above.
1.3.1. Micro-sociological features of violence make ethno-religious violence more
akin to an emergent phenomena than an evolving repertoire
The first paper draws from Collins’ demonstration that the robust connection between confrontation and tension/fear constrains effective violence toward pathways that involve strong
emotional domination (pathway 1), audience support (pathway 2), or (c) confrontationavoidance (pathways 3-5). I contrast this view of violence as a constrained and emergent
phenomenon with Charles Tilly’s evidence that social movement tactics, conceived of as
performances drawn from repertoires, are in a constant state of flux. Using computational
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text-analysis methods, I offer a first test of whether the degree of constraint that the dilemma
of confrontational tension/fear imposes causes violent forms of contention to evolve more
slowly than other forms of collective action over the course of a 50 year period in India.
More specifically, I track whether verbs related to violence increase, decrease, or show no
discernable change, as compared to four other categories of verbs, using both a vetted set of
articles about ethno-religious violence, and a set of 10,000 randomly selected articles from
the Times of India. I argue that the special set of micro-situational constraints on violence
constrain the evolution of a repertoire of violence, relative to other forms of collective action,
and cultural change more broadly.
1.3.2. Approaching ethno-religious violence as a moral-emotional phenomenon
yields better explanations than treating it as primarily political or economic
The second paper draws from the moral-emotional and organizational sets of explanations
for violence. Bringing together electoral, socio-economic, and demographic data at an unprecedented level of granularity, I use event history analysis to compare explanations for
where and when ethnoreligious violence happens in India. I compare arguments related
to electoral competition, group-level economic inequality, demographic balance, and diffusion. I argue that the evidence presented is most consistent with ethno-religious violence
as violence in service of a social heirarchy taken to be moral by those carrying out violence
(an argument advanced by Fiske and Rai), with acts of violence triggering the spread of
conflict-inducing narratives through state-level press outlets that are capable of triggering
violence for a short time before losing relevence. Here diffusion ends up playing out at two
time-scales–a macro-level process of diffusion beginning in 1977 and climaxing in 1992 that
corresponds to an organized political campaign, and meso-level processes of diffusion at the
scale of a few days.
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1.3.3. Changes in emotional dominance can lead to non-violent outcomes even
where violent ones are expected
The third paper is a micro-sociological case study of de-escalation. I study a 30-minute
confrontation between a gunman who invaded an elementary school and a school employee
who managed to successfully convince the gunman to lay down his weapons and surrender
to the police. I analyze the case with reference to a substantial body of literature on crisis
negotiations, which has tended to deal well with issues of outcome negotiation, facework, and
rapport-building, and more recent micro-sociological work on violence and its prevention,
which centers the role of emotions. I identify several turning points in the interaction, the
most prominent of which relates to a change in situational emotional dominance. I trace a
process of positive emotional self-entrainment that empowers the employee to intervene in
the situation, and a process of emotional collapse through violent confrontation that exhausts
the gunman, leaving him open to the employee’s intervention. I argue that the employees
emotional dominance and the shooter’s emotional collapse open the way to the subsequently
successful processes of deliberation, identity repair, and building solidarity through banal
interaction, leading to a non-violent resolution.

1.4. A Micro-first approach to violence yields better explanations even at
larger scales
Violence is a micro-sociological phenomenon before it is a macro-sociological one. Despite
impressions to the contrary created by the exceptional “tellability” of stories involving the
danger of death or bodily harm, violence is a rare social phenomenon, often absent even
in circumstances where we might expect it. Understandings of violence that prioritize the
situational and emotional dynamics of violence, then the bureaucratic structures that render
it more effective and the moral principles used to justify it will enable us to produce more
coherent explanations of larger scale violent phenomena.
The three papers in this dissertation underscore these points. The first paper shows one
macro-scale feature of violence which can be predicted from its micro-scale features, but
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not the other way around. Understanding that violence is subject to a special set of socioemotional constraints leads us to expect that the forms of collective violence will evolve
much more slowly than other forms of collective action. The second shows that focusing on
collective violence as a product of emotionally and morally charged narratives yields a more
accurate account of its distribution than structural variables linked to macro-scale explanations for violence. The third paper, meanwhile, shows how micro-sociological variables, in
this case shifts in situational emotional dominance, can produce non-violent resolutions to
situations where even the participants expect violence.
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CHAPTER 2
Ethno-Religious Unrest in India: Emergent Phenomenon or
Evolving Performance?
‘The “history” of violence is, therefore, almost always about context–about everything
that happens around violence. The violence itself is taken as “known.” Its contours and
character are simply assumed; its forms need no investigation.’
Gyanendra Pandey (1992:27)

The comparative study of ethno-religious collective violence rests on the problematic simplifying assumption that “riots” represent a more or less homogenous phenomenon. If pressed,
most will admit a certain ridiculousness to this idea–each “riot” is a unique event, with
unique trigger, narrative, actors, and backdrop. Yet for those who have experienced or read
accounts from more than one of these events, it is difficult to escape a sense of familiarity, an
insinuation that there may be a common script underlying events widely separated in time
and place (Kakar 1996:40; Tambiah 1997:x). A large body of contemporary work on ethnic
unrest implicitly takes this bet, and has focused primarily on explaining where and when
unrest happens. But this elides the question what actually happens during the episodes
categorized as “riots”, and whether “what actually happens” has remained stable over time.
By contrast, there is a general consensus in the social movement literature that the forms
and contents of protest evolve over time, as a function of both environmental factors and
the internal history of movement organizers and participants. Which of these approaches
makes the most sense when studying ethnic violence–to treat “riots” as emergent phenomena in the way that comparative methods generally take for granted (for example, Bohlken
and Sergenti 2010; Jha 2008; Mitra and Ray 2014; Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004)? Or
does it make more sense to treat them as products of an evolving repertoire, as do many in
the social movements literature (for example, Crossley (2002); Johnston (2018); Traugott
(1993); Wada (2016); Wang and Soule (2016))?
Since repertoires theoretically vary across space as well as time, this article focuses on one
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series of violent events that has become central to the field: the case of Hindu-Muslim violence in India. India’s Hindu-Muslim unrest has become paradigmatic (Chandra 2001)
partly because India’s multi-axial diversity, persistent full-suffrage democracy, largely independent judiciary, and free press have rendered this and other conflicts more accessible for
study than virtually any other site in history (Guha 2017:xxvi). In this paper, I analyze
“communal riot” narratives from the Times of India produced between 1950 and 2000. Using new computational approaches to text categorization and natural language processing,
I gather a corpus of articles discussing unrest nominally between Hindus and Muslims, sort
and categorize the verbs used in these articles, and track changes in verb usage in these
articles. In the process, I identify a largely stable core set of “riot” actions, with a few areas
of change over the half-century. Breaking these verbs down further, I find that there has
been more change in the verbs relating to responses to violence than in verbs associated
with specific forms of violent action, and that the verbs related to violent action and its
immediate context change much less than verbs related to collective action more broadly
conceived.

2.1. “Unrest”, “Riots”, “Pogroms”: Terminology for Collective Violence
We must pause briefly to attend to a matter of terminology before proceeding further. There
is a lively debate over what to call the events that this paper is considering, a discussion
on which the findings of this paper may have some bearing. Most works have proceeded to
call refer to these events as “riots,” (Berenschot 2012; Horowitz 2001; Wilkinson 2009), but
as social historians studying political contention have pointed out, the terms chosen to refer
to the violence carry inescapable political connotations. The term “riot” has historically
been connected to a contemptuous ascription of chaos, unlawfulness, and irrationality to
a gathering, often described as a “crowd” or “mob,” with participants imagined as lower
in social or economic status than the speaker/writer (Rude 2005; Seligman 2011; Sugrue
2009). Several other terms have been used in the contexts of violence by the disempowered
in the West, including “uprisings”, “rebellions” or “revolutions” by those sympathetic to the
cause, or “civil disorders”, “unrest”, or “disturbances” by those striving for more neutral,
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social scientific-sounding terms (Abu-Lughod 2007; Seligman 2011; Sugrue 2009:334).
In the South Asian context, the objections to the term “riot” are similar, but the alternatives are quite different. Brass objects to the term “riot” on the grounds that for many, it
calls up an image of more-or-less symmetrically mobilized crowds, an image largely at odds
with ethnographic reports and eyewitness accounts (Brass 2006:2–4, 34). Though he does
not focus specifically on terminology, Pandey highlights the fundamental epistemological
framework that the term “riot” activates. He highlights in detail the controlling narrative of
violence the British authorities developed through the colonial period involved framing these
incidents as a “problem of law and order,” one used to justify intervention by the colonial
state (Pandey 2012:120).
The primary alternatives to “riot” in this case are “pogrom” and occasionally “genocide”
(Berenschot 2020; Brass 2006; Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012; Ghassem-Fachandi 2012). Considering incidents from the early colonial period, Pandey offers a few other alternatives by
examining framings applied to similar events by those outside the state structure. For example, in a local landlord’s chronicles that Pandey cites, an incident between local Hindu
and Muslim communities was interpreted as a problem of the honor of the locality (Pandey
2012:120). This analysis is particularly useful in its ways of de-centering the colonial state
from the problem. The terms “pogrom” and “genocide,” used primarily to refer to more
recent forms of collective violence, both highlight the predominant pattern in which disempowered groups, Muslims in particular, are victimized by groups claiming to speak for
more powerful groups, (in India, this means those speaking on behalf of a unified “Hindu”
identity, despite the historical novelty and contentiousness of this identity). Both also indict the police and other state forces as complicit in the violence, invoking the state not as
peacemaker, but as troublemaker.
I am sympathetic to the arguments for labeling these events pogroms. In depth accounts
of events in Uttar Pradesh (Brass 2003) and Gujarat (Berenschot 2012; Ghassem-Fachandi
2012) make it clear that many of these incidents are best categorized as pogroms. But is this
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true of all of the events under consideration? This is precisely the question this paper poses:
to what degree are all these events, which social scientists have treated as sufficiently similar
units for comparative analysis, the same kind of thing? As we will discuss in more detail
below, Pandey suggests that there has been a movement over time from emergent low-level
violence between small groups which might be thought of as ritualistic street fights, toward
organized, state-aided massacres, even forms of ethnic cleansing (Pandey 1992:46). This
question cannot be decided a priori, and by the end of this analysis, the answer this article
presents is only partial, as it only considers actions and tactics, not participants’ subjectpositions, group sizes and organizational dynamics, or the power-relations that contextualize
these actions and tactics. Even if this larger project were in view, many of the incidents under
study are described in such sparse detail that little can be ascertained except that something
out of the ordinary happened, usually resulting in police intervention, and possibly some
number of injuries or deaths (see the section on texts below for further discussion of the
contents of the texts under study).
Given the length of the time period under study, the relative paucity of detail available on
some cases, and the study’s necessary openness to the possibility of change in the events
under study over time, labelling all the incidents under study “pogroms” would seem to
require speculation beyond the available data. In the interests of appropriately representing
the level of information under analysis here, I have preferred the more general terms “unrest”
or “ethno-religious violence”

1

in the remainder of the article that follows.

1

This categorization too should be viewed with some suspicion, since it presumes something about attackers’ motivations or relations between attackers and their victims that can often only be guessed from
the text under study. Nonetheless, the set of events I analyze here was originally gathered with a view to
including Hindu-Muslim violence with a view to excluding many other forms of violence that bear important similarities–violence against other religious minorities, like Sikhs or Christians, or violence targeting
members of one particular jati or collection of jatis spring to mind. This is a difficulty that this study
necessarily inherits from the other studies on which it builds. Previous researchers seeking to set the bounds
their own studies have, in my view, relied too heavily on the common-sense definitions of “communal violence” that have been circulating in upper-class, English-speaking discourse in India for a fair bit of its
history. This has necessarily led them to speculate about the identities and motivations of those producing
the actions to which the sparsest texts ostensibly refer. This idea was sufficiently uncomfortable to those
initially collecting the data that they (a) included columns labeled “PROBABLE_C” (“Probability”), with
categories “Definite Case”, “Devotees at Temple”, “Intra-community”, “Local Quarrel”, “No”, “No reference to
H-M violence”, “Sovereignity Issue”(sic), “Yes”, “Yes-Strong Likelihood”, “unlikely”, and “yes”, (b) included a
column labelled “RELIABILIT” (“Reliability”), given numerically on a 5-point scale in the dataset, and (c)
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2.2. Comparative Studies of Unrest: India and Beyond
India’s ethno-religious violence has been sustained at a nearly continuous, relatively low
level for at least the last 50 years, with occasional waves of convulsive violence. The most
systematic list of events, and currently the most widely used, is that collected by Ashutosh
Varshney and Steven Wilkinson based on a close reading of the Times of India for the
years 1950-1995 (Varshney and Wilkinson 2006). Comparison with a variety of other data
sources, including parliamentary reports, annual reports of the Minorities Commission, court
records, the report of the second Indian Police Commission, and official inquiries into specific
episodes of unrest revealed that “The Times of India includes virtually all the riots cited
in these other sources, and lists many other riots that they ignore.” (Wilkinson 2004:249).
This database has been expanded by Mitra and Ray (Mitra and Ray 2014) and by Bhalotra,
Clots-Figueras, and Iyer (Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer unpublished manuscript). The
overall picture of unrest painted by this dataset is one of a large wave of violence during the
1980s and early 1990s, with an otherwise continuous series of around 15 events per year.
Most comparative studies of violence in India since 2002 have used this dataset, and focused
on explaining when and where these episodes of unrest occur. The explanations advanced
cluster into broadly electoral, economic, and civic/institutional arguments. Based in part
on this dataset, Wilkinson has argued that ethno-religious unrest occurred mainly in areas
that had closely-fought, two-party elections in which the government was not dependent
on a minority vote, resulting in little incentive for the government to suppress this kind
of unrest (Wilkinson 2004). Alongside this, Iyer and Shrivastava have found incentives for
at least certain parties to promote unrest–they found that unrest occurring in the leadup to an election increased the vote share of the BJP, India’s largest Hindu nationalist
party, by 5 to 7 percentage points (Iyer and Shrivastava 2015). Dhattiwala and Biggs found
provided an in-depth accounting of their judgements, which mostly rested on contemporary categorization
of the incident as “communal” or on reported precipitating events (see Wilkinson 2004:257–60). While this
study inherits these difficulties along with the dataset, this article’s focus on actions and tactics is intended
as a step toward redefinition that enables us to find commonalities between these events and others that
draw on a similar vocabulary of violence.
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similar results in their analysis of violence during the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat
(Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012). Complementary analyses by Brass (Brass 2003; Brass 2004)
and Berenschot (Berenschot 2012, 2020) have argued that a relational network in which
“social workers” facilitate an exchange of social services from political elites for votes from
poor voters during peacetime (see (Thachil 2014)) is sometimes used to mobilize explosive
violence against minorities.
Economic explanations have focused on the potential for economic growth to increase or
suppress violence in different areas. Mitra and Ray have argued that increased consumption
by minority groups correlates with increases in future religious conflict, while increases in
consumption by majority groups either has no effect or tends to decrease future religious
conflict (Mitra and Ray 2014), while Bohlken and Sergenti have argued that during the
“wave” of unrest between 1982 and 1995, states that experience high economic growth had
less unrest (Bohlken and Sergenti 2010).
Varshney’s study, which contrasted starkly with prior work on ethno-religious unrest, highlighted the remarkable granularity of the phenomenon. Varshney observed that 45% of
deaths during episodes of unrest occurred in just eight cities with a strikingly consistent history of violence. Based on a comparison of three of these cities with demographically similar
counterparts that did not regularly experience ethno-religious unrest, Varshney argued that
a lack of strong inter-religious civic connections differentiated “riot-prone” cities from peaceful ones (Varshney 2002). Jha has similarly argued that institutions born from pre-colonial
inter-religious economic interdependence suppress ethno-religious unrest in cities where one
might otherwise expect it to take place (Jha 2008). Meanwhile, Verghese has noted that
ethno-religious violence has been more common in the parts of India that were under indirect
British domination–the former Princely States–than in those areas that were under direct
British control, while inter-caste violence has been greater in areas that were under direct
British control. He attributes this to the legacy of British policies that promoted religious
neutrality and caste discrimination, as compared to Princely State policies that promoted
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inter-caste solidarity and religious discrimination (Verghese 2016).
Despite their differences, these studies are largely united by their interest in the contexts of
unrest and their relative indifference to its contents. This contrasts with the growing trend
in the study of unrest elsewhere in the world towards disaggregating episodes of unrest and
ethnic violence, making internal as well as cross-case comparisons, and considering what can
be learned from the patterns observed. The trend is not a new one, of course; it is the same
art evident in the work of George Rudé, Eric Hobsbawm, and E. P. Thompson (Hobsbawm
and Rudé 1969; Rude 2005; Thompson 1971), as well as in the work of Ranajit Guha (Guha
1983), Shahid Amin (Amin 1995), Gyanendra Pandey (Pandey 2012), and others in the
Subaltern Studies group.
Horowitz’ work, notable for its breadth and depth, centers the rhythms of episodes of unrest
and the patterns visible among targets and perpetrators, before proceeding to examine
contextual variables–the occasions, social and geographic environments, and effects of ethnic
collective violence. He synthesizes this information into the argument that four variables
best explain the emergence of what he calls “deadly ethnic riots”: (1) a hostile relationship
between two ethnic groups, (2) a response to events that arouses rage, outrage, or wrath
in one of these groups, (3) a sense of justification for killing, and (4) an assessment of
reduced risks of violence (Horowitz 2001:524). Jack Katz’ naturalistic analyses of the unrest
after the 1992 verdicts acquitting the police officers who beat Rodney King has particularly
underscored the latter two phenomena, albeit with attention primarily directed to looting
and arson than killing. He lays out ways in which individuals facing an incipient situation
of anarchy form “folk-sociological” assessments of their own invisibility as an individual
(and thus safety from accountability) and the justifiability of others’ actions (and thus the
justifiability of joining in) (Katz 2015, 2016). Roberta Senechal de la Roche’s investigation
of the 1908 Race Riot in Springfield Illinois likewise highlights the importance of the sense
of justification, indeed of a sense that by killing and burning, participants were acting as
agents of justice (Senechal de la Roche 2008).
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Similar analyses have been undertaken for more recent episodes of unrest as well, taking
advantage of data from police reports, electoral rolls, lists of those killed during the unrest,
hospital records, court verdicts, and interviews to break down episodes of unrest into finer
grained events and to locate them in space. This method has helped to uncover new evidence
for the importance of deprivation and disorganization as a major factor in the London Riot
of 2011 (Kawalerowicz and Biggs 2015), the importance of geographic proximity despite
readily available media coverage in the diffusion of the 2005 French Riots (Bonnasse-Gahot
et al. 2018), as well as the importance of impulses toward enhancing religious segregation
(Field et al. 2008) and of potential avenues of retreat (Dhattiwala 2019) in determining
target choice in Ahmedabad during the 2002 Gujarat Riots. While within-episode variation
has received fruitful attention, relatively little work has considered variation in the forms of
collective violence over time. However, there are good reasons to ask what, if anything, has
changed over time, as the next section will address.

2.3. Collective Violence as Evolving Performance
Few if any of the phenomena of interest to social scientists are truly static. Abbott summarizes this perspective concisely: “Change is not something that happens occasionally to
stable social actors. Change is the natural state of social life. Stability is a creation or,
more often, a linguistic mirage. There are no ‘social movements.’ There is nothing but
social movement” (Abbott 2016:2). But some processes are quick, some are slow, and slower
and quicker processes exercise constraints on each other, giving rise to temporarily stable
phenomena like whirlpools in a flowing stream (Summers-Effler 2007). The subfields of sociology and political science focused on political contention are among the areas where a
perspective built around change has become central particularly following the publication
of McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow’s Dynamics of Contention (McAdam et al. 2001).
Throughout his oeuvre, but most centrally in his final work, Tilly noted a slow-moving
process of change at work underneath the quick-moving world of political contention. Beneath the marches, sit-ins, police actions, and political maneuvering, he noticed a seeming
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regularity he identified as the “repertoire” of performances available to those making political claims. When examined over a longer period, however, this seeming regularity shows
signs of change–modifications to performances, new performances like strikes or demonstration marches being added to the repertoire, old performances like charivari or rough music
dropping out Tilly (2008). While Tilly has suggested that the most important changes are
those that come about through relatively slow and incremental changes in use (Tilly 2008),
McAdam has argued that changes in the repertoire are likely to be causes of sharp increases
in movement activity (McAdam 1983), and Tarrow has similarly suggested that innovations
are most likely at the beginnings of protest waves (Tarrow 2011:203–4). In a study based on
the Dynamics of Collective Action dataset of protests mentioned in The New York Times between 1960 and 1995 Wang and Soule have explored the question of innovation at the level
of social movement organizations embedded in an organizational field. Wang and Soule
operationalized two varieties of tactical innovation–novel combinations of tactics and the
emergence of “new” tactics–in this case tactics that had not been observed in protest events
in the previous 3 years. They found that novel combinations of tactics were associated with
multi-issue protests, and that events with peripheral claims tended to introduce new tactics
(Wang and Soule 2016).
If, then, the repertoire of political contention changes but does so slowly, is this also true of
the narrower set of contentious performances usually categorized as “ethnic riots”? Horowitz
is uncharacteristically quiet on the subject, besides providing ad hoc accounts of a few cases
in which recurrent ethnic unrest ceased (Horowitz 2001:497–509), and speculation that a
change in attitudes toward violence and nationalism around World War II is responsible
for the general disappearance of ethnic unrest in the US and Western Europe (Horowitz
2001:560–65).
A likely place to find answers to this question is in the work of the social historians of South
Asia. However, this area of scholarship has primarily been concerned with the (collective)
actors, and only secondarily with their actions. In particular, there is a long-running contro-
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versy over the degree to which episodes of unrest before the 1920s can accurately be thought
of as confrontations between Hindus and Muslims, since mobilization and targeting often
took place along much narrower and more flexible lines of solidarity and conflict. In general,
the method has been to treat “the symbolic behavior of the crowd, as discerned through the
judicious interpretation of administrative accounts . . . [as] historical ‘text’ ”, attempting
to work from this ‘text’ back to the nature of the social and cultural systems in which they
were created (Freitag 1989:17). By the end of the British Raj, accounts of the incidents
of unrest between communities fell roughly into two views. One treated the phenomenon
of communalism in India as age-old, flowing “from the essential character of peoples of India; and [affecting] more or less the whole population, with only a few enlightened, liberal,
western-educated men and women being truly free from the communal spirit” and another
that recognized the problem as “of recent origins, as the outcome basically of economic
and political inequality and conflict, and as the handiwork of a handful of self-interested
elite-groups (colonial and native), with the mass of the people remaining largely unaffected”
(Pandey 2012:11). While what Pandey calls the “racist-essentialist” view has few explicit
defenders in academic discourse, historians have sparred about the origins of the conflicts
that were later reinterpreted as antecedents to “communal rioting”. Some have emphasized
the origins of this conflict in the conditions of colonial rule and knowledge-making (Pandey
2012), while others have attempted to trace the origins of these identities and disputes to
the pre-colonial era (Bayly 1985; Prior 1993; Talbot 1995).
The history of ethno-religious violence may be briefly summarized in five phases:
2.3.1. Local Assertions of Power: 1819-1920
Whether the events that took place in this period ought to be considered alongside later
events has been up for historical debate. All parties to the debate agree that violence took
place; it is the meanings of the violence, the identities of the attackers and their targets, and
by extension, the degree to which the patterns of participation and description reveal more
everyday forms of social structure that are debated. Among the proximal triggers for these
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episodes of violence were contestations over the construction, demolition, and desecration of
spaces used for religious ritual, localized claims about rights, obligations, and slights, and
in the period from the 1880s forward, an attempt by reformist groups to put a halt to cow
slaughter
Sandria Freitag argues that these violent events, along with religious processions, protests,
and many other forms of public collective action involved contesting relations of power
between groups under circumstances where Colonial powers had excluded local groups from
participation in the state, and removed the state from the sphere of public collective action,
leaving public space as the most prominent arena in which powers and privileges could be
contested.[Freitag (1989), p. xii; Freitag (1992)]2 . Pandey’s analysis, focused on a variety
of violent incidents in the less-urbanized Bhojpuri-speaking areas of Eastern UP and Bihar,
argued that “What was involved in all such cases was the denial by a traditionally privileged
or ‘superordinate’ classes [sic] of a ‘history’ that was claimed as their own by the ‘subordinate’
class” (Pandey 2012:155); in so doing he draws parallels between the attitudes of the colonial
regime and of local elites. Across the broad sweep of the 19th century, he tracks a process
by which revivalists and activists attempted to combine local community solidarities into
larger scale “Hindu” and “Muslim” solidarities, with middling success. Meanwhile, early
nationalist mobilizers attempted to forge a vision of a nation made up of its broad religious
communities (Pandey 2012). Given that these processes of forging large scale “Hindu” and
“Muslim” solidarities and political identities was still ongoing, the question of whether these
were Hindu-Muslim riots reads as an anachronistic attempt at post-hoc recategorization.
2

The relative silence in the existing literature regarding the contents of violence is not entirely surprising.
In the same essay in which Pandey decries the absence of attention to “the violence itself”, he suggests
reasons for this in the form of candid reflections on the difficulty of gathering data in situations where
official records are sometimes destroyed, perpetrators have an incentive to maintain silence, and victims’
accounts are predominantly framed in appeals for aid or justice, or censored in an effort to avoid further
violence, to avoid re-experiencing trauma, or any number of other motives (Pandey 1992). Veena Das has
reflected on these and additional issues related to the difficulties of investigating collective violence, especially
the intersections of collective violence with gender in the forms of abduction or sexual assault (Das 2006).
This study is, of course, not exempt from these problems, being dependent for its information on what
journalists were able to gather and editors were willing to publish, presumably on a tight deadline.
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2.3.2. Mass Mobilizations and Contested Visions of Nationalism: 1920-1946
The 1920s saw significant changes as the urban poor of North India, spurred by economic
changes during and after the first world war began to play a larger role in politics. Low-caste
Hindus, many of whom had been tenant farmers, found themselves displaced by population
pressures and sought work in bazar towns and cities that had grown around a mostly highercaste commercial class (Gooptu 2001:192–94). Simultaneously, Muslim artisans and service
workers found their trades disrupted by increased manufacturing, expanding trade networks,
and the loss of patronage by a rapidly shrinking Muslim gentry, resulting in economic displacement, dependence on financier-merchants or impoverishment (Gooptu 2001:254–61).
Both groups found themselves competing for social status in an arena dominated by a Hindu
commercial class that expressed power through religious patronage (Gooptu 2001:196–97,
261; see also Bayly 1983). In this context, low-caste Hindu groups sought to improve their
status (and consequently their employment opportunities) by claiming a martial history,
increasingly participating in wrestling and competitive martial arts groups, and claiming
the role of an army defending Hindu traditions by marching with swords, spears, and other
weapons in increasingly numerous and elaborate processions (Gooptu 2001:196–221). Poor
urban Muslims contested for status by articulating a history as respectable artisans, by
drawing on metaphors of Muslim decline, mourning, struggle, and martyrdom that had become current among Muslim reformers, and by increased participation in public displays of
inner religious emotion, devotion to the Prophet and Islamic symbols, spiritual ecstasy, and
mystical experience centered in processions and public meetings (Gooptu 2001:244–86).
In this same post-war context, anti-colonial mass mobilization began with coordinated programs of civil disobedience organized by the Indian National Congress and the All India
Khilafat committee–the former a nationalist cause with links to Hindu reformist organizations (Pandey 2012:254–58), the latter a response of Indian Muslims to what were perceived
as humiliating terms imposed on the Ottoman Caliph after World War I (Minault 1982).
The mutually supporting movements drew from a vocabulary of Indian nationalism that
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took religious communities as a given and aimed to build an explicitly consociational state
(Pandey 2012:234). During this mobilization, a violent rebellion took place on the Malabar
coast in southwest India that lasted from August to December of 1921. The movement grew
partly out of resistance by local Mappila cultivators to rising land rents imposed by local
Namboodiri and Nair landowners, whose pre-colonial right to grant permission to tenants
to farm the land in exchange for a share of the crops was re-interpreted by the East India
Company as absolute ownership of the land. This resistance, directed both at the colonial
government and at the landlords had taken the form of a long series of minor attacks and
revolts over the previous century, coordinated by local Muslim leadership and expressed in
the language of jihad and shahidi. The call for resistance to the British Government issued
by the Khilafat movement was taken by local leadership as an occasion for a much larger
attack on both colonizers and landlords, a campaign that lasted for four months. The event
was reported in the Indian and international press as a conflict between Muslims and Hindus, with reports of stressed extreme violence and claims that forced conversions had taken
place. While some of the Khilafat leaders congratulated the Mappila forces, the Indian National Congress sought to distance themselves from the violence. The attacks, interpreted in
North India as a shocking breach of faith between Muslims and Hindus, led to a heightened
sense of suspicion and threat between groups mobilizing for Hindu and Muslim solidarity
(Dale 1975; Panikkar 1993a; see also Ambedkar 1940).
In the wake of these shocking events, a process of counter-escalation set in. Groups mobilizing for Hindu solidarity and reform like the Arya Samaj and Hindu Sabhas launched
campaigns for sangathan (“organization”), including the establishment of increasingly assertive “self defense” groups made up largely of members of the low-caste urban poor, and
shuddhi (“purification”), a movement for the conversion (or, according to its proponents,
reconversion) of Muslims to Hinduism or incorporation of lower castes into the caste hierarchy. Muslim leaders called for a counter-mobilization of tanzeem (“organization”) and
tabligh (“propagation of religion”), movements that took shape as neighborhood-level selfdefense organizations in which poor urban Muslims played a prominent role. Armed martial
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displays in festival processions took on an increasingly confrontational and menacing tone,
and in a number of cases, violence broke out between groups mobilized on lines of religious
solidarity (Gooptu 2001:223–43, 286–314). Claims to increasingly limited housing and land
in cities were staked through the setting up of shrines, mosques, or temples, the removal or
damage of which was taken by defense groups as sufficient provocation for counter-attack
(Gooptu 2001:314–20). The net result was a sharp increase in urban unrest mobilized on
lines of religious identity (see figure 2.1 from Bhavnani and Jha 2014 below), particularly
widespread from 1923 to 1927, but with consistently high levels of violence through the beginning of World War II, even during the ultimately successful Civil Disobedience campaign
for increased democratic reforms from 1930-34 (Bhavnani and Jha 2014).

Figure 2.1: Hindu-Muslim Collective Violence, 1900-1949
(Figure 3 from Bhavnani and Jha 2014:15, based on data from Jha 2013 and Wilkinson
2005b)
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2.3.3. Partition and Population Exchange: 1946-1950
The start of the Quit India movement in 1942 marked a sharp change in the focus of popular
mobilization in India. Broad based movements for Indian independence, which had won a
considerable expansion of democracy in 1935, continued into World War II. With Japan’s
entry into the war, the British government offered independence in return for Indian support.
Not trusting that the promise would be kept, the Congress party announced a wide-ranging
non-violent protest pressuring the British to “Quit India” in August 1942. Within hours
of the protests’ beginning, the British government carried out a synchronized action across
India, arresting 60,000 members of the Congress organization, including all of its national
leaders. The movement almost immediately turned violent, resulting in over 300 separate
incidents of police violence during that year alone (Bhavnani and Jha 2014; Bhavnani and
Jha 2018; Jha 2021). In the wake of this violence, ethno-religious violence dropped to
the lowest level seen since 1923, and only resurged after the war as it became increasingly
clear that the British would depart India. After the war, violence between Hindus and
Muslims became intimately bound with the process of negotiating the post-Colonial order.
Peace between Hindu and Muslim communities was largely maintained up to the failure of
negotiations over the Cabinet Mission’s settlement plan in June 1946–a proposal that would
have resulted in the creation of a federated but undivided new state (Khan 2008).
Partition-related violence proceeded in roughly 5 movements: Direct Action Day in Calcutta
in August 1946 (Das 1992:168–71; Khan 2008:63–66; Talbot and Singh 2009:68–70), responsive pogroms in rural Bengal, Bihar, Garhumkteshwar, and Punjab in October 1946 - March
1947 (Brass 2006:20; Das 1992:197; Khan 2008:68–76, 83–85; Talbot and Singh 2009:70–76),
post-boundary-award ethnic cleansing in Punjab with related, smaller-scale violence across
the subcontinent from August - November 1947 (Ahmed 2017; Brass 2006:21–56; Khan
2008:128–42; Talbot 1995:77–82), accession violence in Hyderabad and Kashmir from October 1947 through January 1949 (Khan 2008:98–99, 188; Pandit Sundarlal, Qazi Abdul
Ghaffar, and Maulana Abdulla Misri 1948), and tit-for-tat pogroms in East and West Ben-
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gal in February and March 1950 (Khan 2008:190–92; Talbot and Singh 2009:82–83). A full
accounting of these events is beyond the scope of this paper, but there is a broad consensus
that the violence that took place between 1946 and 1950 drew on the established repertoire
of collective violence, but was qualitatively different from all that had gone before (Brass
2006:11–12; Lambert 2013:242–43; Talbot and Singh 2009:66; see also Ahmed 2017; Khan
2008, who call the partition violence ethnic cleansing to distinguish it from other forms of
ethno-religious violence).
Talbot and Singh note five distinctives of the partition violence that distinguish it from
earlier forms of Hindu-Muslim violence (Talbot and Singh 2009:66), while other sources
confirm and elaborate these points.
1. The context was one of imminent decolonization and imperial departure; rather than
local status competitions in a religious register, all the violence that took place had
some reference to the question of Pakistan–when and whether it would be created, and
where its boundaries would be. The first movement, the Great Calcutta Killings, were
designed to pressure Congress negotiators into accepting the demand for Pakistan’s
creation (Khan 2008:66–67), while the later movements oriented mostly toward shaping
where the border might fall (movements 2 and 4), and concentrating populations on
one side or the other of the border (movements 3 and 5) (Brass 2006:21–29).
2. The forms of violence were oriented toward ethnically cleansing a territory, rather
than asserting a status hierarchy with past and future neighbors. Entire villages were
destroyed or forced to leave for the other side of the border (Brass 2006:38–40), while
forced conversions were widely reported (Khan 2008:69)
3. Violence was committed not just in the public sphere, but included the private sphere,
with women and children targeted at previously unseen levels. Homes, rather than
just businesses, shrines, temples, or mosques were targeted Talbot and Singh (2009).
Women in particular were targeted, dehumanized and treated as into symbols of the
honor of their communities. Attackers abducted women and girls, raped them, cut off
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their breasts or noses, carved slogans into their bodies (living and dead), forced them
to parade naked through the streets, humiliated them for as a weapon, for sport, or
for vengeance (Brass 2006:50–52; Khan 2008:133–35; Talbot and Singh 2009:68). Men
killed women and children from their own families to prevent the stain on their honor
if they should be raped or forcibly converted (Brass 2006:41–42, 48; Khan 2008:133;
Talbot and Singh 2009:64–65).
4. The violence was more intense and sadistic than previous forms of violence. In addition
to the violence against women already noted, Brass informs us that “though some guns
or bombs were available, the predominant methods used were cutting and axing of
people to bits or burning them alive. Those cut and axed were thrown into canals or
wells, the bodies of those burned alive left to smolder in the ruins of their homes and
huts. Babies were split apart by the legs and impaled on spears. Groups of people
of both sexes and all ages were tied together and set on fire to burn to death slowly
while the perpetrators and those in hiding could hear their moans, groans, and shrieks”
(Brass 2006:43). There were reports of “the disembowelling of pregnant women, the
slamming of babies’ heads against brick walls, the cutting off of victims’ limbs and
genitalia and the display of heads and corpses” (Talbot and Singh 2009:67). Gangs
on several occasions held up trains and killed occupants on the basis of their religious
identities (Brass 2006:32; Khan 2008:147–48).
5. Partition violence involved a high degree of planning by paramilitaries and participation by state agents like police, soldiers, civil servants, and railway officials. While
armed groups were a feature of the earlier forms of violence, Punjab, where the worst
violence took place, was an area from which the Indian Army recruited heavily, drawing on the colonial theory of “martial races.” After World War II, Punjab was filled
with demobilized veterans, some of whom played an important part in organizing the
violence (Brass 2006:36; Jha and Wilkinson 2012; Khan 2008:131–32). Meanwhile, violent gangs were aided by rulers of nearby princely states, as well as by ordinary state
agents working for the railways or ration shops (Khan 2008:136–37), and the erstwhile
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Indian Army which might have been called in to keep the peace was undergoing a
partition of its own (Khan 2008:113–17).
Despite these differences, or rather because of them, Partition has come to play an important role in subsequent incidents of ethno-religious unrest. Partition violence has remained a benchmark by which more recent events are judged as “the worst since 1947”
(Pandey 1992:33), and a resource for rumor, polarization, and the extremes of violent action
(Ghassem-Fachandi 2012:83–92; Kakar 1996:25–40).
2.3.4. A Punctuated Lull: 1951-1977
During the period from 1951 to 1977 violence reported in the newspapers as “communal”
persisted through the period of Congress dominance in India’s central government, but at
much lower levels than than the periods preceding it, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. Jaffrelot
suggests that rates of violence remained low during this period because the Hindu nationalist movement was dependent on the image of a threatening Muslim “other”, an “other”
now missing since most of the relatively well-off Muslims of North India had emigrated to
Pakistan, leaving a Muslim community that was relatively politically and economically powerless. Additionally, Jaffrelot argues that Hindu political parties were hampered by close
links to the RSS, a militant Hindu nationalist organization that first mobilized in the competitively religious environment of the 1920s, but which was first banned, then stigmatized
after one of its former members assassinated Gandhi. Finally, Jaffrelot argues that a policy
of “vigilant secularism” carried out by Nehru and Indira Gandhi (prior to the Emergency)
helped to keep Hindu nationalism in check, and with it ethno-religious unrest (Jaffrelot
1999).
2.3.5. The Ayodhya Wave: 1978-1992
After the Emergency, much of this calculus changed. The RSS’ participation as an underground resistance to Indira Gandhi’s Congress paved a way out of exile for the organization,
which grew rapidly both during and after the Emergency (Jaffrelot and Anil 2021:445).
Meanwhile, increasing Muslim wealth from remittance networks and connections to Gulf
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States made it easier for Hindu nationalists to portray Muslims as threats, while Indira
Gandhi and her successor Rajiv Gandhi turned away from Nehru’s “vigilant secularism” in
favor of more overt Hindu symbolism (Jaffrelot 1999). This provided an opening for the
Hindu nationalist movement, which organized a massive and highly successful campaign for
the “restoration” of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, where it was claimed the Mughal emperor
Babur had built a mosque, the Babri Masjid on the site where the god Ram was born. Processions formed an important part of the campaign’s repertoire as early as 1984 (Jaffrelot
1999:363), as did a 1989 campaign to gather sanctified bricks from across India for use in
rebuilding the temple (Jaffrelot 1999:383–403). In 1990, a major escalation of the campaign
revolved around a rath yatra (“chariot pilgrimage”) undertaken by Hindu nationalist politician L. K. Advani. The pilgrimage, which he undertook in a Toyota decorated to look like
a chariot, began in Gujarat, and followed a winding path toward Ayodhya. Serious unrest
consistently followed in the wake of the processions (Jaffrelot 2009), and the processions
were eventually suppressed. However, a renewed effort in 1992 resulted in the demolition of
the mosque, and widespread violence across India. The high-profile debate over the temple
helped bring the Hindu nationalist BJP party to power in 1998.

Figure 2.2: Hindu-Muslim Collective Violence, 1950-2000
(based on data from Varshney and Wilkinson 2006 and Mitra and Ray 2014)
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During this period, Paul Brass argues that in Meerut City and Aligarh (as well as in other
unrest-prone cities in North and West India), an “institutionalized system of riot production”
developed over time, (in Aligarh somewhere between 1960 and 1980) (Brass 2003; Brass
2004). This system involves a substantial division of labor including most crucially the
roles of the “fire tender” who “keeps the embers of communal animosity alive by bringing
to the notice of the politicians, the authorities, and the public situations that are known to
be sensitive in the relations between Hindus and Muslims”, and the “conversion specialist”,
usually a political person, who “[turns] a merely local incident or a public issue affecting the
two communities into one with riot potential by inciting a crowd and giving a signal to the
specialists in violence to let loose the violent action”. Brass notes also the introduction (or
possibly re-introduction) of confrontation over sacred spaces as a routine in a repertoire of
violence (Brass 2004:4845).
2.3.6. The New Punctuated Equilibrium: 1993-Present
After the destruction of the Babri Masjid, ethno-religious unrest declined significantly. While
equivalent statistics to those presented above are not available for the post-2000 period, there
seems to have been a return to relative equilibrium, punctuated by a few episodes of extreme violence. The most prominent of these are the pogroms that broke out in Gujarat
in 2002. Violence broke out after a train car carrying volunteers returning from Ayodhya
caught fire near to a Muslim neighborhood. The event was quickly interpreted as an attack
by Muslims, and with the tacit permission of then Chief Minister Narendra Modi and apparent cooperation by the police, groups of armed Hindus attacked several neighborhoods
across Ahmedabad and triggered additional violence across the state of Gujarat (Berenschot
2012; Dhattiwala 2019; Ghassem-Fachandi 2012). Twelve years later, as Narendra Modi was
leading an unusually individualized bid to become Prime Minister, another large-scale outbreak of violence took place, this time in the Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts of Uttar
Pradesh, an area that had seen substantial inter-religious political cooperation through the
Bharatiya Kisaan Union. Here, concerns related to inter-religious marriage were converted
into the pretext for wide-ranging violence against the Muslim minority (Singh 2016). In the
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most recent high-profile incident, efforts by the Modi-led BJP government to offer citizenship to non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan or Bangladesh produced massive protests. These
were answered by counter-protests that borrowed significant elements from the repertoire of
ethno-religious violence in Delhi in February of 2020.
In sum, in the historical work on ethno-religious violence in India, there has been much
discussion of the emergence, stabilization, and transformation of collective consciousness
and identities. By contrast, discussion of the emergence, stabilization, and transformation
of the forms of action that characterized the conflicts has tended to take a back seat. It is the
changes in the actions, rather than the actors that I hope to foreground, with the idea that
identifying actors is more useful for the making of moral claims than preventing imminent
violence 3 , while understanding patterns of action can open new lines for the prevention of
violence with little regard to the identities of its perpetrators (see (Collins 2008, 2019) for
some of the initial steps in this direction.)

2.4. Two Sketches of a Repertoire of Collective Violence
Serendipitously, two scholars working near the beginning and end of the time period under
study here have provided sketches of the repertoire of South Asian “communal riots”. The
first comes from a 1951 dissertation by sociologist Richard D. Lambert, which remained unpublished until 2013, while the second comes from a comparative anthropological exploration
of South Asian ethnoreligious violence by the anthropologist Stanley Tambiah. Lambert’s
study includes a section where he catalogs the causes of inter-religious unrest between 1936
and 1938 (Lambert 2013:113–26), and a concluding section in which he attempts to summarize patterns from the events he analyzed, primarily cases of unrest between 1920 and 1950,
though he includes a few nineteenth century cases as well (Lambert 2013:234–45). Tambiah
likewise provides two sketches of repertoires, one focused more directly on crowd violence
(Tambiah 1997:230–43), the other on intersections between crowd violence and democratic
practice (Tambiah 1997:258). Combining categories from the lists in each work and dis3

Though as Brass argues, careful investigation of responsibility and assignment of blame to contemporary
participators in incitement to violence can be helpful in the prevention of future violence (Brass 2003:15)
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aggregating based on the descriptions and examples given by each author allows a partial
matchup and comparison between the repertoires reported by each of these observers. This
comparison is represented in Table 2.1, below.
In comparing these repertoires, it is immediately clear that there is a core set of interactions that has remained the same over the decades. This core centers on rumors, incendiary
speeches, provocative defilements of sacred spaces and objects, voter obstruction, activation
of patronage/alliance networks, scattered murders and assaults, marches (whether demonstrations, rallies, or ritual processions), arson and demolitions. Of course, we cannot draw
any firm conclusions from the absences in this table–neither author claims to offer an exhaustive catalog, and a wider perusal of the literature quickly reveals other common elements
shared by the events of the late 1980s and 90s and those of the 1920s and 30s. Yet the
absences are at least suggestive of movement in the repertoire to accommodate new technological conditions–the appearance of categories for motor cavalcades and the destruction
of vehicles, and the increased prominence of the media as a vector for incendiary messaging
rather than pamphlets or posters.

2.5. The Keyhole of Crowd Violence
As the comparison between Lambert’s and Tambiah’s sketches of the “communal riot” repertoire has shown, the assumption that there is a more-or-less stable core phenomenon of collective violence is not an empirically implausible one. On a theoretical basis too, we might
expect unrest to have a slower-changing repertoire than other forms of collective action,
since the key differentiating factor between riot-like events and other collective actions is
violence. As Randall Collins has argued, “Some background conditions may be necessary or
at least strongly predisposing [for violence], but they certainly are not sufficient; situational
conditions are always necessary, and sometimes they are sufficient, giving violence a much
more emergent quality than any other kind of human behavior.” (Collins 2008:20). If the
core phenomenon of collective violence is strongly emergent from situational or psychological factors, it would make sense to expect situational factors to predominate over long-term
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Lambert’s and Tambiah’s Repertoire Sketches
Source

Actions

Both Sources

rumors of violations, aggressive, boasting, or insulting speeches, defiling a
place of worship, sacred text, or image, voter obstruction during elections,
activating networks of alliance/patronage/protection, scattered murders and
assaults, demonstration marches and rallies, ritual processions, destruction of
buildings, arson

Lambert 1951
only

retaliation for animal grazing on wrong property, playing music near Mosques,
funeral processions, cow slaughter, building near religious sites, competing
land claims for places of worship, black-flag protest against a candidate,
duelling flag-raisings, travelling through an area forbidden to outsiders,
looting, hiring criminal muscle, escalation of small brawls, crowd
confrontations with 30 ft. gap, collecting funds for weapons, training personnel
for riot duty, coordinating one-sided relief efforts, evenly-matched groups
fighting, assaulting local minorities, assaulting mixed/border neighborhoods,
expulsion from neighborhoods, expulsion from residences, forced conversion,
extortion of money, abduction, government condoning of violence, strategic
placement of people, distributing inflammatory leaflets/posters, creation of
“defense” parties, attack on minorities by government forces

Tambiah 1996
only

calls for national strikes, stoppage of transport services, closing of bazaars and
shops, deadly collisions between marchers and police, distributing money,
liquor, etc., motorized cavalcades, destruction of vehicles, media amplification
of rumors, bomb-throwing, hate mail
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changes as explanations for variation in violent action, constrain the processes of innovation
and adaptation that characterize contentious politics more generally (McAdam 1983). In
one of the few studies that has addressed this question directly, Cerezales found a continuity in the patterns of siege, attack, ransacking of premises, and burning property between
Portugal’s tax revolts of the 1840s and the anti-communist violence of the 1970s (Cerezales
2017).
Collins has pointed out that in attempting to commit violence, people encounter the recurrent dilemma of confrontational tension/fear. That is to say, most threatened violence fails
to materialize or is performed incompetently because confronting another person face-to-face
in violation of the rituals of interaction and solidarity-building that predominate in everyday
interaction produces a great deal of tension and fear observable in people’s heart rates, trembling, body postures, and facial expressions. When people do commit violence, it is usually
via one of five situational pathways around this dilemma: (1) attacking the situationally
weak, (2) audience-oriented staged and controlled fair fights, (3) confrontation-avoiding by
remote violence, (4) confrontation-avoiding by deception, and (5) confrontation-avoiding by
absorption in technique. (Collins 2008; 2009:11).
Meanwhile, turning our attention specifically to violence in crowd situations, Anna Nassauer
has highlighted pathways by which peaceful protests in the US and Germany transformed
into violent events. In all cases, violence followed incursions into the opposing group’s space,
in combination with either (1) loss of control through police mismanagement, (2) offense
marked by signs of escalation and property damage, (3) or missing information marked by
signs of escalation and problems in communication between protesters and police (Nassauer
2018b). In a finer-grained analysis, Nassauer notes several additional patterns. Firstly, that
violence erupts, when it does, after an interactional phase in which tension and fear increase.
Secondly, that when violence does break out, it tends to break out between one and three
hours after the beginning of the demonstration. And thirdly, that when violence breaks
out, it tends to be after one of three types of triggering moment: (1) breaking-up of lines,
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(2) being outnumbered, or (3) falling down (Nassauer 2016). Studying video evidence from
the Arab Spring, Isabel Bramsen has highlighted four pathways into violence: (1) attacking
from behind, (2) attacking the outnumbered, (3) attacking from a vehicle, (4) attacking from
afar/above, (5) attacking at night (Bramsen 2018). Raheel Dhattiwala’s work on violence
during the 2002 Ahmedabad pogrom adds a spatial dimension to these situational analyses,
noting that more serious violence occurred in Muslim neighborhoods that lacked effective
escape routes for attackers (Dhattiwala 2019).
Notably, the patterns of violence that Nassauer, Bramsen, and Dhattiwala describe are all
consistent with Collins’ broad finding that the ct/f dilemma structures violence by forcing
it into a limited number of tension-reducing pathways–in these cases through variations on
attacking the situationally weak (pathway 1) and confrontation-avoiding by remote violence
(pathway 3).
Of course, even if the forms of violence are tightly constrained, this does does not completely
rule out the innovation and diffusion of techniques of violence, as Collins has pointed out
(Collins 2011). Klusemann has documented this process in detail, noting that while assassinations occasionally emerged as innovative social movement tactics in Russia, these did not
meet the organization-building needs of those competing for power, whereas in Germany
and elsewhere, a pattern of violence in which paramilitary groups would break up rival’s
meetings emerged as a strategy that helped increase a sense of participation and bolster
faction membership (Klusemann 2010a).

2.6. Looking for Change
The danger of any method is that one may find only what one started out looking for, and
nothing more. However, because it is easier to explain stasis in dynamic terms than change
in static terms, the appropriate research strategy is to look for change, and to do so in
different parts of the phenomenon of interest.
This paper deals primarily with variation at what Charles Tilly has called the “action” level,
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the most basic level at which analysis of a repertoire of contention generally takes place 4 .
Where in the episodes of unrest should we look for change? The literature reviewed earlier
offers a few claims which may be treated as hypotheses. One of the most interesting comes
from Pandey 1990, who wrote,
Sectarian violence in the 1980s appears to have taken on new and increasingly horrifying
forms. Recent strife between people belonging to different denominations has not been
restricted to pitched battles on the streets or cloak-and-dagger attacks and murders in
side lanes, which were the chief markers of earlier riots. The worst instances of recent
violence . . . have amounted to pogroms, organized massacres in which large crowds
of hundreds, thousands, and even, in places, tens of thousands have attacked property
and lives of small, isolated, and previously identified members of the ‘other’ community.
(Pandey 1992:46)

This raises the possibility that the techniques of violence have shifted over time in a direction
that favors greater violence, leading us to expect increases in the level of organization and
seriousness of violence reported. This is particularly interesting in light of what has already
been said about the recurring dilemma of ct/f –that it constrains the types of violence that
are possible, making innovation in this area more difficult than in other kinds of interaction.
Freitag’s study of collective violence in early 20th century India suggests an additional
area of focus. She finds that between 1900 and 1940, there was a shift in the forms of
collective action employed in public celebrations, festivals, and protest marches–the kinds
of gatherings that under some circumstances (but not all) developed into collective violence
(Freitag 1989). The techniques of gathering, marching, and focusing attention associated
with these collective actions are often necessary but not sufficient conditions for the kinds
of collective violence we have in view, and the ways in which people are gathered, march, or
focus their attention in such a public performance may make moments of acute confrontation
more or less likely. We might say that collective violence is embedded in collective action
4

Tilly suggests distinctions between four possible levels of uniformity at which learning could occur:
(1) actions (“learning to cheer, march, smash, shoot, and run away”), (2) interactions (“cheering your own
group’s leader occurs differently from cheering a national hero”), (3) performances (“street marches and
infantry skirmishes”), and (4) repertoires (“learning more or less simultaneously to meet, march, picket,
pamphlet, and petition”). (All quotations in this paragraph are from (Tilly 2008:17)). Analyses addressing
the interaction and performance levels are here left for future analysis.
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in the sense that collective action of some sort is what regularly takes place in the minutes
and hours immediately prior to an outbreak of collective violence. Thus, if collective action
is undergoing rapid innovation and change, perhaps these changes will carry over into either
qualitative or quantitative changes in collective violence when it breaks out.
With respect to the wave of violence from 1980 to 1993, other authors have shown that
religious nationalist parties introduced a series of new religious processions related to the
campaign to tear down a Mughal-era mosque and build a temple in Ayodhya, the mythical
birthplace of the god Ram (Assayag 1998). These hypotheses indicate that it is important for
us to measure changes in verbs associated with collective action alongside those associated
with collective violence. If these hypotheses are correct, we would expect to see substantial
change in this category of verbs.
Two other categories of verbs emerged from the data as significantly associated with articles
about “communal riots”. The first was discussions of the aftermath of unrest–the number
killed, injured, the amount of damage or the appearance of an area in the wake of violence.
Given the direct causal linkage between acts of violence and aftermath, it seems reasonable
to expect that the discussions of aftermath would change at a pace that more closely approximates changes in violence than changes in collective action as a whole, or changes in
the repertoires of everyday life.
The second category had to do with responses to violence. Besides the use of violence in
response to violence (police firing on a crowd of people throwing stones, to use an example
that recurred frequently in the articles under study), several other responses were common:
local authorities might impose a curfew, fellow citizens might raise funds for victims, local
officials might call for reinforcements, leaders or members of parliament might call for peace.
Given that these responses are generally not confrontational, and therefore not subject to
the constraints of avoiding or surmounting the ct/f dilemma, it seems reasonable to expect
movement in this area to be less closely bound to the pace of change of violence, and more
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closely bound to the pace of innovation in the area of non-violent collective action5 .
The remaining verbs which did not show as clear an association with violence, collective
action, aftermath descriptions, or responses to violence are used here as a proxy for the rate
of change in the environment of violence. These verbs are labelled below as “general” verbs.
To summarize, we might return to Summers-Effler’s image of the flow of interaction, loosely
structured into open systems moving at different speeds, that can, by their linkages, constrain
each other. We might picture these as flows embedded in other flows, like areas of quickerand slower-moving current in a stream.
We might then think of the techniques of collective action–the repertoire of techniques for
gathering, marching together, and coordinating the focus of attention in service of a public
performance–as one such open system. We might then think of the repertoire of collective
violence as another such system, embedded in the system of collective action and constrained
by it, because the techniques of collective action are necessary for the production of collective
violence. We might expect some reverse constraint of collective violence on the system of
collective action more broadly, in the sense that planners of collective actions may attempt
to foresee and forestall the conditions under which violence might break out (or foresee
and ensure those conditions, if they aim to provoke collective violence). However, because
collective action does not provide sufficient conditions on its own for collective violence to
break out, the linkage between the two is asymmetrical: collective action constrains collective
violence to a much greater degree than collective violence constrains collective action.
We might then turn our attention to the other two categories. The immediate aftermath of
violence, while not a system per se, is tightly causally linked to the violence, so we would
expect it to change little faster than the violence that causes it. In fact, if we conceptualize
violence as means of causing harm to another person (and while this is insufficient as a
conceptualization of violence, it is certainly a necessary part of such a conceptualization),
we might expect the aftermath, as the intended ends of violence to show even less variation
5

Isaac (2019) provides an example of social movement tactics designed as responses to violence.

37

than violence, conceived of as the means to that end.
Actions that we think of as responses to violence are also constrained by violence precisely to
the degree that those engaging in these actions think of their actions as responses. With no
violence, the same actions could be taken, but not responsively. Putting out a general call
for peace is possible under any circumstances, but is unlikely unless a recent threat to peace
has occasioned a call for peace. Similarly, responses are often constrained by the aftermath
of violence, to the degree that the actions are responsive: taking care of the unhoused (as
one example among many) is possible under any circumstances, but taking caring of victims
whose homes have been destroyed is only possible downstream from a system that destroys
homes.
We can then imagine a large stone in the middle of these embedded streams: a system
moving so slowly that it disrupts these other flows, slowing them to the degree that they
are constrained by it. In this case, the slow-moving system is the recurrent dilemma of confrontational tension/fear. This dilemma, that face-to-face confrontation makes the effective
enactment of violence impossible without situational/emotional domination, audience support, or confrontation-avoiding techniques, thus far holds true across all domains in which it
has been examined. This would indicate that the degree to which this dilemma is changing
is currently imperceptible, so we may for all practical purposes think of it as a fixed point.
From here, the image resolves into the familiar one of a rock in a stream, with the current of
the stream going slowest immediately adjacent to the obstacle, and currents further outward
slowed to lesser degrees, until at a certain distance, the interference from the obstacle makes
little difference at all.
Thus we may imagine the situation in Figure 2.3, below, where the recurrent ct/f dilemma
occurs in the middle of flows associated with collective action right at the point when
collective violence threatens to occur. The dilemma most heavily constrains the production
of violence, which in turn constrains the aftermath of violence, which in turn constrains the
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responses to violence, which in turn constrains collective action downstream from the event.
This is, admittedly, a highly abstract and metaphorical treatment of what is, fundamentally,
a profoundly visceral phenomenon. And it need not be adopted wholesale. The fundamental
argument is this: the seemingly consistent fact that people are bad at violence, specifically
to the degree that they attempt it as face-to-face confrontation, makes innovative forms of
collective violence less likely than innovation in other forms of collective action. This is the
idea that this paper aims to test.

2.7. Measuring Culture with the Times of India
The first step was to locate relatively comparable information about the things that happen
during so-called “communal riots”, and a means of comparing them to other changes taking
place in the same society during the same period. For this, I turned to a old staple of the
discipline, the newspaper of record; in this case the digitized archive of the Times of India.
Using this archive offered several important advantages. Most importantly for a study
looking for long-term changes in a repertoire, it offers temporal depth and continuity, since
the Times of India has been in print since 1838. Specifically positioned as an All-India
newspaper, it also offers geographic breadth, useful for studying a phenomenon that has

Figure 2.3: Expected differences in the rate of change of patterns of action
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national range, though this form of violence is particularly endemic in a smaller number of
cities (Varshney 2002). The current standard dataset for studies of ethno-religious unrest
in India, the Varshney-Wilkinson dataset of Hindu-Muslim violence was originally derived
from reading the Times of India and coding for various variables of interest to the dataset’s
authors. This dataset thus simultaneously represented two key resources: an extensive, inpractice list of the events usually intended by other researchers studying “ethno-religious
violence” or “communal riots”, and an index I could use to find a large sample of articles
describing these events across an extended time period. Meanwhile, as India’s flagship paper
of record, the Times of India carries a wealth of other information about events of political,
economic, and cultural importance.
It is important not to discount the tradeoffs associated with using the Times of India as a
source. Using newspapers and other media reports to construct event datasets has a long
history in sociology and political science as a tool for studying protest, unrest, and other
forms of political contention (Hutter 2014), but investigations critical of the practice have
identified a number of biases and distortions that are introduced by the use of newspaper
data (Demarest and Langer 2019; Earl et al. 2004; Hutter 2014; Myers and Caniglia 2004;
Ortiz et al. 2005; Weidmann 2015, 2016). In particular, there is a tendency for coverage
to skew toward (a) larger and more damaging events (Earl et al. 2004; Hutter 2014), (b)
events from large cities, the city where the newspaper is published, and cities with a wire
service (Danzger 1975; Mudgal 2011; Myers and Caniglia 2004), and (c) protests addressing
topics that are currently deemed topical (Hutter 2014; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996).
However, as Demarest and Langer point out, in addition to coverage-related biases, there are
biases introduced in the process of reporting (Demarest and Langer 2019). They note that
even the “hard facts” like the number of participants, the number of fatalities, or the location
of an episode of violence are contested and sometimes prove to be reported unreliably when
triangulated against other data sources–police reports, NGO sources, interviews, or other
news sources–often depending on the interests of the sources consulted in order to gather
the facts (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015; Demarest and Langer 2019:10; Raleigh et
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al. 2010; Sundberg and Melander 2013; Weidmann 2015). This is in addition to questions of
framing, where media sources presentations of protestors frequently varies with its ideological
profile (Demarest and Langer 2019:10).
Given the focus of this paper on the “what happened” over the “where” and “when” aspects
of reports, it is more important to consider the reporting biases of the Times of India than
its coverage biases. Getting some sense of the connection between the news stories and
the events the stories ostensibly describe requires some consideration of the ways in which
violent events–themselves communicative interactions–are “translated” 6 and transformed in
the process of translation. Fortuitously, there exists an ethnography of newspaper journalism
in India focused primarily on English language newspapers in Delhi and their Hindi- and
Urdu-language affiliates, based on fieldwork in the early 1990s, just as the unrest associated
with the campaign to demolish the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was coming to an end(Peterson
1996). This study identifies several of the stylistic features that predominate in the Times’
institutionalized writing style, and situates them in a broader narrative of what journalists
think of themselves as doing in their work. In a passage that is worth citing at some length,
Peterson recounts being present as the specific translation process we are considering took
place:
I was in the offices of an English daily when Muslim and Hindu residents of the Daryaganj district in Delhi broke into violence in January 1992. Before any details were
known, the defining frame “communal violence” invoked a whole set of pre-established
routines and practices which efficiently generated a story in time for a looming deadline
The first report came in from Press Trust of India (PTI) around three o’clock, with the
first of the day’s deadlines only two hours away. I was interviewing a senior editor when
his assistant entered and said tersely, “there is violence in the walled city.” The senior
editor turned off his computer–which was in word processing mode–and rebooted it in
order to access the PTI feed, making exasperated noises about the slowness of the machine. The PTI report revealed that violence between two “communities” had occurred
(and was continuing), sparked by vandalism of a “place of worship” and reported police
and government response, including plans to impose a curfew in the area. The story
offered few clues as to which groups were involved, or about “who did what to whom.”
In writing this way, the PTI reporter is following a standard set of writing practices employed by journalists across India for representing social violence through standardized
euphemisms. These writing habits are guided by the logic of responsibility. The specific
logic involved categorizes riots as pathologies on the social body which can spread if not
6

I am grateful to Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi for this suggesting this language/metaphor for the process.
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contained. The press must inform people of such events but at the same time, it must
avoid inciting additional riots. The most common writing practice for achieving these
ends is to produce sterile, unspecific representations of events. When it is reported that
persons of one community assaulted persons of another community, or that a place of
worship has been vandalized, readers outside the affected communities are informed that
violent events have occurred but because they do not know which communities were
the aggressors and which the victims, they cannot–so the theory goes–project feelings
engendered by such events onto similar tensions in their own regions. Although the
news services tend strongly to employ this approach, many newspapers chafe under its
strictures. The deictic nature of news demands facts as markers that the discourse was
produced by engagement with the events described.
This was certainly true in the editorial offices of this English daily. The senior editor
made a disgusted noise as he turned away from his computer screen. He pushed an
intercom button and his assistant entered with a printout of the PTI story.
“Don’t run this until I’ve talked to [the editor],” the senior editor said. “Who is there?
I want to talk to him.” The assistant nodded and left the room. A moment later the
telephone rang. It was the reporter assigned to the beat.
Senior editor: “So, what’s going on? [pause] A masjid? Which one? [pause] But which
masjid? What? That one? Hm. Who started it? [pause] What’s happening now?
[pause.]”
Hanging up the phone he told me, “both a masjid and a temple. No one is sure which
happened first, but now groups are roaming the street.”
With nothing more to do personally with the story, the senior editor resumed our
interview. Nearly an hour later, the assistant entered with another printout, the latest
“flash” from PTI. The Senior editor spent perhaps ten minutes rewriting the lead and
meddling with the copy. Then he handed it back to the subeditor.
“There. This will have to do for the Dak edition. But I want to see the bromide.”
It was five o’clock. The senior editor headed for dinner. As I walked out with him,
we met the reporter covering the story coming in. We chatted for a few minutes. The
reporter told us that there had been confrontations, with both sides claiming to have
retaliated for vandalism of their places of worship by the other community. The police
were floating a theory that a monkey may have performed the initial vandalism. The
reporter was on his way in to discuss the information in detail with the chief reporter.
The city (final) edition I received the next morning had as a banner headline, “The
monkey did it” and took as its lead the police theory that a monkey had entered a
Masjid during the night and torn pages from the Quran, scattering them on the floor.
In an area tense from the recent Ayodhya riots, which had polarized Hindu/Muslim
resentments throughout the country, the Muslim community had read in the vandalism
the expected attack by the Hindus and had retaliated by vandalizing a neighboring
mandir–so the theory went. The story described the government and police response
to the riots: a strict curfew on the area and pleas for mutual tolerance.
What is interesting to observe here is the way in which dealing with unusual events, like
riots, has become routinized. Very little communication is required between the senior
editor and his assistant to arrange for the remaking of the entire front page. Once the
event has come in pre-framed as “communal violence in Daryaganj” the entire apparatus
of the newspaper knows what to do with it. The senior editor does not need to ask
if a reporter is there, only which one; he knows someone will be. The presence of the
reporter, however, raises for the newspaper the problem of responsibility. What is the
newspaper to write in order to avoid the blandness of the PTI report and yet to avoid
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any suggestion of promoting communal conflicts? Of several options, the newspaper
chose to make as its lead the police theory. In the theory, the agency of the initial act
of vandalism from the communities involved to a natural act, and to imply that the
communities reacted in inappropriate ways. this allows the newspaper to report on the
riots responsibly–that is, define them as a social pathology–while still including details
and descriptions the PTI story lacked. (Peterson 1996:112–14)

Peterson argues that the discourse and practice of the news in India was governed by a
“logic of responsibility”. He writes, “The logic of responsibility argues that news texts are
essentially performative, with the power to affect social action. Because of this, those social
actions which produces news texts must be performed in responsible ways, producing news
that will not disrupt the development of India” (Peterson 1996:70). He argues that “Indian
journalism, organized by the logic of responsibility, generally follows a diagetic style, marked
specifically by paraphrasis and a preference for the use of indirect speech, and by the use
of euphemism” (Peterson 1996:82). Opposing “diagetic” to “memetic” styles of journalism,
he notes that in Indian newspapers, there is a preference for describing events and what
people said about events, rather than reproducing the speech of witnesses or experts word
for word, as is more common in American journalistic styles. The Indian journalistic style
is paraphrastic, in that it emphasizes clarifying restatements, emphasizing editorial voice
and the storytelling aspect of journalism over its reporting aspect (Peterson 1996:72). The
preferred style prefers indirect quotations, assuming that readers will find actual quotations
“dull as dishwater” (Peterson 1996:84).
Peterson notes that “the ultimate symbol of this [orientation toward a responsibility to the
nationalist homogenizing project], cited by journalists and readers, is the possibility that
irresponsible journalism will spark a riot” (Peterson 1996:72). It is here that Peterson notes
that euphemism becomes an important part of the newspaper’s style. He notes that “The
need for the press to inform the public requires that acts of violence be reported. The need
of the press to educate the public–that is, to guide them through the process of becoming
a homogeneous modern nation–requires that the press avoid offering information that could
be appropriated by readers to fan communal tensions in their regions” (Peterson 1996:87).
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In practice this means replacing specific nouns and adjectives (“Hindu”, “Muslim”, “Tamil”,
“masjid ”, “mandir ”) with categoric terms (“community”, “place of worship”), replacing signs
related to specific groups with ones that can be construed as “national,” adding to the
general trope of communal violence as a pathology to be addressed by national development
carried out by the state and aided by the press. Peterson notes that there is resistance to
this practice, with dissenters arguing that this “ ‘concealment of facts’ does more harm than
good by creating open texts into which readers can project their own hatreds and fears”
(Peterson 1996:88–89).
Two other points from Peterson’s ethnography are relevant to describing the Times of India’s
positionality, which necessarily informs the positionality of works that rely on it as a source.
First is the existence of a “news net” – a network of relationships that generates experiences
that can be construed as newsworthy events. Interviews, commentaries, press briefings, and
information from police or political activists all serve as reliable sources of content. Peterson
writes, “After an event like the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in 1992, with
its subsequent riots nation-wide, coverage seems dense as if journalists are covering every
possible aspect of the situation. In fact, the net is producing news as it always does; the
sources which journalists rely on to produce a steady supply of news have become focused
on the Ayodhya event so that it becomes a rhetorical device for focusing on the same basic
issues. Thus, the ream of stories about splits between dissidents and the center within
the Congress party continues under the guise of stories about how dissidents within the
Congress party are splitting with the center over the handling of the Ayodhya dispute”
(Peterson 1996:115).
The second is the Times’ position by virtue of being an English language paper. As the
former imperial language without ties to a specific territory or community in India, English has become a prestige language associated with the project of national unity. As
the dominant language in the Anglophone world system, it serves as a medium by which
technological, political, economic, and social characteristics of other countries can be re-
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ceived and imitated, in the pursuit of an idealized “modernity”. These associations give
English newspapers higher prestige, which translates to higher ad revenue, greater political
influence, larger staff, and higher salaries for English newspapers despite generally smaller
circulation numbers than Indian-language newspapers (Peterson 1996:218–21). By contrast,
Indian languages are “treated as more genuinely creative, more expressive but less precise”
than English (Peterson 1996:207), and the reach of Indian language newspapers is treated as
exercising political power through reaching, and teaching the “masses” (Peterson 1996:221).
As one consequence of these social positions, “In English there is a greater emphasis on
‘informing’–built upon an assumption that one’s fellow readers are also members of an educated elite–and in the language press on ‘educating’ ” (Peterson 1996:222). An additional
consequence is that for many, the “best” English is thought to have “a leisurely style . . .
erudite and a little boring” (Peterson 1996:208).
These characteristics of the English language national press–the logic of responsibility, the
easy-to-hand frame of “communal trouble”, the prevalence of euphemism, the reliance on a
news net, a diagetic style, and the meanings and prestige ascribed to English–have important
consequences for this study. The sense of responsibility not to provoke further violence and
the construal of “good” English as mild, dispassionate language would lead us to expect
the specifics of violence to be discussed only rarely and in general terms. The use of an
easy-to-hand frame and of well-practiced euphemisms suggest that by the time experiences
have been translated into news stories, some flattening will have taken place, resulting in
an amplified illusion of sameness as articles are compared. Journalists’ reliance on a “news
net”, as well as the default position of English as a “national” language should lead us to
expect an emphasis on state and police perspectives, while the practice of diagetic journalism
reduces the pressure for journalists to include a range of other perspectives. We can expect
these stylistic features to bias the coverage toward a more static view of violence, potentially
obscuring the kinds of changes this study seeks to document.
The one counter-pressure that offers some hope of capturing variation over time is the sense
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of a responsibility to inform, which Peterson describes as stronger in the English language
press than in the Indian language outlets. In the incident described above, this manifests
in the editor’s dissatisfaction with the PTI copy, and the inclusion of at least a few more
details in the story, though the accuracy of those details could reasonably be questioned.
In this dilemma of motivations, it is not clear just how often the responsibility to inform
overcomes the pressures toward blandness. If it does so with sufficient regularity–at least a
few times per decade–a large number of texts may still allow us to capture some meaningful
variation. If the euphemisms and frames so dominate the text that we are left with little
beyond the PTI report version of the story, the results will be less reliable. We may get a
bit more traction on this question by examining a few sample articles from the collection
being considered here, but even this can at best assuage some doubt, it cannot ultimately
answer the epistemological skeptic. Before proceeding to an analysis of a few sample texts,
however, I offer a brief description of how this collection of texts was selected.

2.8. Locating Unrest-Related Articles
Testing whether the repertoire of violence (or, more skeptically, the repertoire for the textual
representation of violence) has changed more or less quickly than repertoires for other types
of activity (or their textual representations) required gathering two distinct samples from the
universe of articles published by the Times of India between 1950 and 2000. The first sample
was a theoretical sample, designed to capture all articles associated with the phenomenon
under study, and a random sample, designed to allow comparisons between the rate of
change of repertoires associated with violence and the rate of change of other repertoires
of collective action and everyday life. The difference is one of resolution: the theoretically
sampled dataset allowed a fine-grained analysis of changes in the techniques of violence,
and was better able to detect changes in the repertoire of ethnoreligious unrest. This set
of articles was thus ideal for examining changes in the Violence, Aftermath, and Response
categories, but was not able to accurately represent variation in forms of action outside of
that purview. The random sample, by contrast more accurately represent changes in the
repertoire of collective action that are more temporally removed from violence, or changes
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to the repertoires of everyday life.
Selecting the random sample was relatively easy. Using a list of each of the articles published by the Times of India between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 2000, I used the
sample function from python’s pandas library to draw 10,000 articles from the list without
replacement.
Drawing the theoretical sample was a much more involved process. In order to maintain
definitional consistency with other studies of ethno-religious unrest in India, I began with
the Varshney-Wilkinson dataset of Hindu-Muslim violence, which covers events from 19501995, and with Mitra and Ray’s extension of this dataset from 1995 to 2000. This dataset
was originally derived from reading the Times of India and coding the variables that were of
interest to the original authors. However, the variables in the dataset did not include much
detail about the actions associated with each event. In order to reclaim this information, I
needed to match the entries in the dataset to the associated articles.
In order to this, I began with the machine-readable archive of the Times of India from ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Using metadata filters, I selected news and editorial articles
that were published within a window of 2 days before and 7 days after the dates listed in
the original dataset as the onset date of violence, the last reported date of violence, and
the dates on which the dataset noted that articles appeared. This strategy allowed me to
account for situations in which the original dataset contained minor inaccuracies regarding
the onset date and duration of unrest. Following this initial filter, I used a text-search of
the article contents to find articles that mentioned any of the locations connected to the
entry in the original dataset. After these initial sieves, I implemented a machine-assisted
method for distinguishing articles that were actually related to unrest from other articles
that matched the earlier filter criteria. I began by hand-sorting the articles from 1950, and
using these results to train the supervised models for the next year.
I implemented two different supervised machine learning models to sort these articles. The
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first model proceeds from an intuition that articles about unrest are holistically different from
articles unrelated to unrest. I used the results from 1950 to train an xlnet Transformer
classifier as implemented in the simpletransformers wrapper around the huggingface
transformer model. I used this model to classify the articles from the next year by their
similarity in the language model to the unrest-related articles in the training year, classifying
them as likely unrest-related.
The second model proceeds from the opposite intuition, that individual sentences can identify a particular article as unrest-related or not. To follow through on this instinct, I took
the initially unpunctuated articles from the ProQuest database, inferred sentence divisions
using Ottokar Tilik’s Punctuator2 API, split the 1950 articles on sentence boundaries, then
trained a Gibbs DMM short text topic model on the dataset, assigning a topic to each
sentence. I then selected combinations of one to three topics that minimized false negative classification of articles while providing reasonably low numbers of false positives for
the training set. This involved some subjective judgment, and may have resulted in a few
missed articles. I then classified the articles in the prediction set–initially the articles from
1951–based on whether or not a sentence in a given article was classified as one of the
topics chosen in the earlier step. These articles were then classified by the model as likely
unrest-related.
I then went through all the articles classified by either model as likely unrest-related manually, providing a final judgment of which articles did or did not contain accounts of unrest,
and connecting them to the entries in the original database. Once the articles from 1951
were hand classified, I used these articles as a training set, repeating the process for the next
year. In cases where a single year did not provide an adequately sized training set, I added
prior years until the training set had more than 500 classified articles. In this case, since
1951 had relatively few episodes of unrest listed in the original dataset, I used articles from
both 1950 and 1951 to train the models that provided initial classification for the articles
from 1952. I iterated this process until I had sorted through each year from 1950 to 2000.

48

(I chose these two models based on experimentation with several different models using a
hand-coded version of the models for 1986. The transformers-based model gave me the lowest number of false-negatives, while the DMM-based model gave me the lowest number of
false-positives of the models I tried. For further details on these experiments, please contact
the author.) In the end, I was able to match 93.6 percent of the entries from the dataset
with at least one newspaper article (1193 matched out of 1274 total). This resulted in a set
of 3631 articles that were classified as unrest-related. The shortest text was only 6 words
long, the longest had 3520, and the median article had 301 words.

2.9. Three Texts
With the intent of representing both more-detailed and less-detailed texts, I selected one
text each from the group of texts at the first quartile (191 words), the median (301 words),
and the third quartile (505 words) by length.
The first-quartile article, on inspection, turns out to contain two short articles. The first
concerns violence that broke out in Hyderabad in 1985, while the second provides routine
information about the scheduling of the Maharashtra legislature. Only the first is reproduced

Figure 2.4: Distribution of Word Counts in Unrest-Related Articles
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below.

2 die in fresh Hyderabad riots
HYDERABAD March 25 PTI
Two persons, including a woman were killed and ten injured in fresh outbreak of
violence last night in the curfew-bound Tappa Chabutra police station limits.
According to the police, two warring groups attacked houses in the Joshiwi area
yesterday resulting in the death of one person and injuries to seven, one of whom
dying at Osmania Hospital early today.
Three cases of stabbing were also reported from the area this morning. All
injured have been admitted to hospital. Indefinite curfew continued in the riothit Asifnagar, Mangalhat and Tappa Chabutra areas, the police said.
Here we have a text from the PTI wire service that corresponds well with the Peterson’s
description. The first paragraph in particular tells us only that some unspecified violence
took place, that people were harmed, and roughly the neighborhood where the violence took
place.
To highlight just how little this article tells us about violence, we might try a thought
experiment, asking how many words in the article we would need to change to transform
this account into one about a flood or other natural disaster–a genre of article that the
text-selection algorithms frequently returned as a false positive. We would need to:
1. Remove “outbreak of violence” in favor of “flooding”
2. Remove “curfew-bound” from the neighborhood description
3. Remove “two warring groups attacked” in favor of “heavy rains damaged”
4. Remove “stabbing” in favor of “drowning”
5. Remove “indefinite curfew” in favor of “flooding”
6. Remove “riot-hit” from the list of neighborhoods
The piece is written almost entirely in passive voice. Persons “were killed,” and “cases
of stabbing were also reported.” The middle paragraph is the one exception, where “two
warring groups” are said to have “attacked houses.” Here, the authors mask the numbers
and identities of the groups, reduce their relations to a present continuous “warring”. All
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sense of directedness, sequence, and interaction is lost. This frames the violence as tragic but
fairly distributed, or at least balanced, and thus not in need of further violence to balance
the moral scales. The moral balancing becomes more conspicuous when we consider more
detailed accounts of reciprocal violence between groups, which usually takes the form of
alternating one-sided attacks and retreats (Collins 2008:193–241).
The account also steers away from any direct statements about killing, using “houses” as
the direct object of the broad categorical verb “attacked”. The authors place the “resulting
. . .death . . . and injuries” in a dependent clause, doubly separated from the presumable
agent (the “two warring groups”), de-emphasizing agency and with it, moral culpability.
The most specific detail comes in the mention of stabbings in the third paragraph, but
here also, the authors erase the agent, transform the violent verb “stabbing” into a gerund,
then place the gerund in a prepositional phrase modifying the dispassionate bureaucratic
term, “case.” Finally, the police point of view is emphasized in all three paragraphs. In the
first, the location is communicated with reference to a police station and its “limits”, subtly
suggesting that the police are able to “limit” the spread of the violence, without directly
saying so. The second and third paragraphs are written as indirect quotations from the
police, emphasizing the actions taken in response to the violence–taking the injured to the
hospital and imposing curfew–while still avoiding the question of who took the injured to
the hospital or imposed the curfew.
The median-length text from an account of violence in Bangalore in 1994 is markedly different.

Uneasy calm in riot-hit areas of Bangalore
The Times of India News Service
BANGALORE October 10
The man cried out in desperation: “Look, my house has been burned down.”
He had barely completed the sentence when the policemen rained lathi blows
on him. He was taken away by the men in uniform while reporters touring the
riot-hit Padarayanapura watched helplessly yesterday.
The police assured the journalists: “All is well. The situation is under control.”
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There was destruction all around. Frightened residents peeped out of their houses
situated along the narrow streets of this area expecting some succour from the
authorities. But in vain. The police sternly warned the reporters not to talk to
the residents since this might “disturb the calm.” Indeed it was an extremely
uneasy calm that prevailed on the third day of rioting. Violence had erupted in
several parts of Bangalore following protests over the telecasting of Urdu news
bulletins by Doordarshan.
A local doctor said the situation was explosive. “Earlier this morning the police
had opened fire in the air. We can’t say when they will turn violent at the
slightest provocation,” he said.
In other areas where curfew was lifted life seemed to be returning to normal
although the policemen on duty conceded that violence may erupt afresh.
A few shops were doing brisk business. However, few vehicles were out on the
roads. The traffic on Mysore Road resumed partially while BTS buses were
taken off the road at noon. Most people preferred to stay indoors.
The supply of milk, vegetables and other perishables to the curfew-bound areas
had been badly affected. A resident of Padarayanapura, Ms. Haeera said people were allowed to come out of their houses only between 6 a.m. and 8 a.m.
Vegetables were being sold at a premium in these areas.
A cursory reading of the article is enough to show that our previous thought experiment
would not work here. In place of an easy parroting of police perspectives and banal euphemisms there is a short, specific narrative dripping with irony. There is no evasion here.
It is the police who rain blows with lathis – long cane rods that are frequently used in
so called “crowd control” operations in India. The authors supply just enough temporal
context to depict the man as a victim of violence, worthy of police aid. The authors write
themselves into the story in third person, establishing a clear claim to epistemic authority,
then highlight the irony of police claims of control. In the fourth paragraph, the focus of
the text shifts to the environment, highlighting the inhabitants’ fear, while implying that
their fear was more of the police than anyone else. The police’s “stern warning” both underlines the characterization of the police as violent authoritarians, while also painting the
reporters as professionals frustrated in the course of their work. It is only at the end of
this paragraph that the authors linked the situation to its source. Here the authors lapse
back into a euphemistic mode, avoiding formulations of “who did what to whom” in favor
of saying that “violence erupted” like a force of nature. This is modified by a comment on
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the events preceding the unrest: protests over the telecasting of news in Urdu, a language
that has for decades been inextricably linked with Muslim identity in South Asia. Still, the
authors leave the question of who instigated the violence – protestors? counter-protestors?
police? – up to the interpretation of the reader.
The quote from the doctor represents the peak of the piece’s irony, describing the actions
of police officers in terms more usually used to derisively describe “mobs” or “crowds” as
unpredictable and irrational. The final three paragraphs finally label the condition that the
previous paragraphs had described: curfew. An additional reference to the police highlights
their uncertainty and anxiety, while selected observations of “a few” shops and “few” vehicles
in service serve to highlight the people who remained indoors. In its sequential context, this
gestures back to the people hidden away in fear of random police violence in the early paragraphs. The final paragraph adds one more dimension to the plight, noting the difficulties
the curfew presented for those needing to buy supplies.
Far removed from the minimal, banal story, this one borrows more heavily from the memetic
style of journalism, with a more frequent use of direct quotes combined with implied firstperson observation. As a piece focusing on police violence and the conditions of curfew, the
piece works well. But by contrast, the shift into identity- and action-obscuring euphemism
in describing the beginnings of the unrest reflects an attentiveness to the possibility of
spreading unrest that leaves the sources of the violence unexamined.
The longer text comes from an account of unrest in Mumbai (then Bombay) in May 1970:

Four major incidents mar improvement in riot-hit areas
By A Staff Reporter
FOUR major incidents, in which four people were killed, were reported from
Mumbra-Kalyan, Talawali, Waholi and Dombivli on Thursday as the police
claimed “further improvement” in the riot-affected areas in the State.
Bhiwandi, where curfew was relaxed for seven hours from 7 a.m. and Thana,
were under night curfew.
Curfew is likely to be relaxed for nine hours–from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m.–in Bhiwandi
on Friday. More arms were found in two places on Thursday.
No incidents were reported from Thana.
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The number of the dead on Thursday rose to 136, including 69 in Bhiwandi and
25 in Thana town and elsewhere.
Nawab Ali Yavar Jung, Governor, and Mrs. Jung and Mr. V. P. Naik, Chief
Minister, visited Bhiwandi on Thursday.
STABBING IN TRAIN
Two people were stabbed and one assaulted in a running train between Mumbra and Kalyan stations on the Central Railway. These are the first incidents
reported on the railways since the trouble erupted seven days ago.
Mr. M. G. Mugve, DIG-CID (Intelligence) told reporters at the 10 p.m. press
briefing, that one of the two victims of stabbing was in a serious condition in the
Thana hospital.
Armed policemen were escorting trains between Thana and Mumbra, Mr. Mugve
said.
At Taluwali, 13 km from Bhiwandi an 800-strong crowd surrounded the village.
A police party, which arrived here earlier following a tip-off, fired six rounds.
One person was killed.
As the mob was dispersing, the superintendent of police arrived with reinforcements and chased the retreating crowd.
It was stated that some people then turned on the police party, who fired four
rounds to disperse them.
The police made three arrests. One was hurt.
COMMENDABLE COURAGE
A constable, I. N. Nandre showed commendable courage when he faced an angry
mob. First he opened fire. Then, when an assailant tried to snatch away his
rifle, he knocked him down with the butt-end of his rifle, Mr. Mugve said. Two
people were killed when the police opened tire at Waholi, in Kalyan taluka, when
a mob attacked the village and tried to set fire to haystack.
At Dombivli, a big crowd tried to attack the railway station. The police, however,
were ready for them and fired several rounds killing one person.
Mr. Mugve claimed that the police were “on the spot” wherever trouble erupted.
Their “anticipation was working more accurately,” he added.
Most of the undamaged powerlooms in Bhiwandi will start humming in a day or
two, a spokesman of the relief and rehabilitation committee said on Thursday.
BHIWANDI RELIEF
As many as 1500 powerlooms have been damaged. The rest are in working
condition. With the supply of electric power, it should be possible to run the
powerlooms without any delay.
The State Government has agreed to make an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 125 to
each small powerloom unit for repairs.
The Bhiwandi Municipal Council with the approval of the State Government has
sanctioned Rs. 5 lakhs to help small powerloom units to purchase accessories.
It has also been decided to allot a Government piece of land on the
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Continued on Page 6 Column 3
This article then connects to a second, 692 word section a few pages back in the newspaper.

Acid bulbs, fireballs seized in Bhiwandi
Continued from Page 1 Column 7
Bhiwandi-Kalyan Road not far away from the town to rehabilitate the dishoused.
A layout is being prepared to construct the 1000 tenements on the land. Five
hundred of them would be built by the Government and the others would be
leased out to people after the plinth is laid.
BUS SERVICES
The shuttle bus between Bhiwandi and Thana was remused on Thursday. More
buses will be run on this route when is relaxed. the ST division controller said.
The Bhiwandi-Wada service will begin from Friday.
Sweepers from Thana and Kalyan arrived in Bhiwandi to help municipal staff.
The presidents of the Thana and Kalyan civic councils, Mrs. Shalini Bhon and
Mr. Diwadkar as also Mr. Madhu Joshi, general secretary of the Municipal Mazdoor Union, took initiative in organising help.
Following a tip, the police raided a place called Nawipadi in Bhiwandi where they
seized four “live” crude bombs, material for their manufacture, four Rampuri
knives, an acid bulb and tin of acid and iron bars.
They also found three Pakistani currency notes – one of Rs. 5 and two of Re. 1
each.
At Kacheripada, eight acid bulbs, three bottles of acid and 14 fireballs were
recovered from a house. One person was arrested and the police were looking
for the inmates of the house.
The Industries Commissioner would be visiting Bhiwandi on Friday.
The Maharashtra Governor, who went round Bhiwandi and spent some time
talking to the victims, strongly condemned rumour-mongering and called on
the people to tell the authorities the names of the people who indulged in such
activities.
LOANS FOR POWERLOOMS
Mr. Naik, who accompanied the Governor, announced that loans up to Rs.
16,000 would be given by the State Finance Corporation to the affected powerloom units. The corporation would charge only 6.50 per cent interest as against
the usual nine per cent. Repayment would start after two years.
Mr. Naik said confidence among the people would be restored as fast as the
rehabilitation work was completed.
He also said Rs. 1,25,000 would be given as loans to recommission damaged
looms.
Mr. B. M. Yagnik, Maharashtra’s Minister for Prohibition also visited Bhiwandi.
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As many as 70 people were arrested in Thana for the breach of curfew on Wednesday.
On Thursday, eight people were arrested for looting shops and four others were
held as a preventative measure. Sixteen were arrested for specific offences.
ARSON ATTEMPT
An attempt was allegedly made to burn a salt-pan establishment at [–eir], 10
km east of Bassein, late on Wednesday night. Reinforcements have been sent to
Bassein and adjoining places.
Mr. N. W. Pradhan, superintendent of police on special duty, said that in the
course of searches of suspected persons [—–] weapons and combustible articles,
such as a spear, a sword, an arrow and a bow, 19 bottles of petrol and a bottle
of acid were seized.
Thirty-two people were arrested for the possession of the articles.
Up to Wednesday 106 people were arrested for specific offences and 130 were
held as a precautionary measure.
30 remanded to custody
By A Staff Reporter
Dnayaneshvar Shankar Naivekar and 30 others were arrested by the Dadar Police
to forestall a breach of the peace in the Darar area and were produced before
Mr. S. V. Gokaran, Presidency Magistrate, Dadar Court, on Wednesday.
The police stated that on receipt of reliable information that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace being committed in Greater Bombay, the accused
were arrested.
One of the accused, Bandu Laxman Patil, was released on a bail of Rs. 750 as
the police officer stated he was ill. The others were remanded to jail custody till
May 27.
Permission refused to unity march
By A Staff Reporter
The Police commissioner of Bombay on Thursday refused permission to the unity
march proposed to be taken out by trade-union organisations in Bombay on
Friday.
According to a statement issued by the coordination committee of the trade
unions, the commissioner took the view that certain elements might take advantage of the situation and create trouble.
The committee has protested against the commissioner’s attitude.
While an interpretive reading of this article in as much depth as the earlier ones is not
feasible here, what is important to notice are the ways that this longer article departs from
the bland PTI format. The top paragraphs still emulate the staccato recounting of casualty
counts and curfew declarations, but the following paragraphs are much clearer about the
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interactive rhythms of violence. There are details about stabbings, back-and-forth battles
between an 800-strong crowd and the police, attempted arson, attacks on the train station
and powerlooms, and two lists of weapons recovered in police raids. Through most of the
article, the identities of combatants are replaced by the terms “crowd” and “mob,” with only
the police and agents of the state identified more precisely. The penultimate section is a
notable departure from this, however, with the names of two suspects with Hindu-coded
names prominently listed.
It is clear that if all of the texts under analysis resembled the minimal account in the first
text, it would be impossible to place much confidence in any of the conclusions drawn from
such an analysis. The presence of more detailed texts like the second two suggests that the
search for large-scale patterns is not completely doomed, though results from the analysis
will have to be viewed with an appropriate level of skepticism. We will return to this point
in the conclusion.

2.10. Measuring Repertoires by Counting Verbs
It ought to be clear from the treatment of these sample texts that the texts in view are
far from transparent windows onto the interactions they ostensibly represent. Still, the
journalists’ sense of a responsibility to inform presses for details–little moments when we
catch a glimpse of the interaction on “the other side”. It should also be clear that an
interpretive reading of these articles and their contexts produces a deeper understanding of
context and interaction than is possible through a quantitative analysis of linguistic features.
Nonetheless, the gamble of using computational text analysis to examine a large number of
texts is that despite a lack of clarity at the level of individual texts, the occasional moments
of clarity will make a different kind of sense at a larger scale, in much the same way that
an impressionist painting resolves from a riot of brushstrokes to a riverbank scene as one
moves back from the painting.
As we have seen in the sample articles above, details about what happened are more likely to
spill through than details about either who did something, or to whom it was done. Given
57

this situation, it makes the most sense to approach the question of changing repertoires
through an analysis of verbs.
In order to do this, I used the implementation of Semantic Role Labelling from AllenNLP to
extract verbs and their arguments from the texts. I lemmatized each verb using the SpaCy
lemmatizer, dropping markers of tense and aspect to get a table of 173,414 verb-argument
sets, representing 7018 unique verb lemmas. I prioritized verbs for analysis, initially based
on their frequency, then on the basis of a class-wise TF-IDF score. The TF-IDF score
ordinarily identifies words that are distinctive to particular documents in a collection. In
this case, since I was interested in words that together differentiated the class of unrestrelated articles from other articles, I calculated a TF-IDF score based on combining all 3631
unrest-related articles into a single document, placing that document alongside other articles
that took place on the same dates and matched some of the same geographic keywords, and
calculating a TF-IDF score for each verb capturing how distinctive it was to the combined
document.
In order to focus my analysis, I then manually classified the verb-lemmas into clusters
of synonyms, aggregating, for example, “start”, “begin”, “commence”, into a single cluster,
“START”. All verbs that occurred more than 35 times in the dataset were classified, as
were a few verbs with lower frequencies chosen either because they were easily identifiable
synonyms of verbs with higher frequencies, or because they had unusually high TF-IDF
scores (indicating in this case that these verbs almost never appeared in articles that were not
unrest-related). In doing this, I found 155 verb lemmas which were used in multiple senses
in the articles in question, and had at least one sense that related to violence, collective
action, response, or the aftermath of violence. For example, a sentence with the lemma
“take” and the word “life” or “lives” in the argument set is of interest, as an indicator of
a killing. However, a sentence with the same lemma “take” and the words “custody” is an
indicator of an entirely different type of action–placing someone under arrest. I used cooccurring terms to differentiate verb senses, taking into account theoretical concerns (for
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example, a distinction between lobbing teargas shells, coded “lob_shell” and lobbing stones,
rocks, bottles, or bricks, coded “lob_stone”) while constructing search queries with empirical
attention to words that frequently co-occurred with a given verb, and to differentiating senses
that were largely homogeneous. Ultimately, I classified these verb lemmas and verb senses
into 299 verb clusters, grouped into 5 overarching categories: Violence, Collective Action,
Response, Aftermath, and General.

7

Having differentiated the verbs into these clusters, I then counted the number of times a
verb from that cluster was used in each year. In order to control for the differing number of
unrest-related events per year and the different article lengths per event, I derived a density
measure, represented in equation eq. 2.1 below.

dc,y =

vc,y × 1000
vy

(2.1)

The density measure dc,y is calculated for each cluster and year, relative to a corpus. For a
given cluster c and year y, the density measure represents the number of verbs in cluster c
during year y multiplied by 1000, and divided by the total number of verbs in the corpus in
year y. Multiplying by 1000 is an arbitrary step chosen to make the density output number
more human readable. The density function represents the expected number of times a verb
from cluster c would appear in a randomly drawn set of 1000 verbs from the selected articles
that year. This produced a time series of densities for each of the 299 verb clusters. For
each of these time series, I ran a 2-tailed t-test with the null-hypothesis that there was no
7

The analyses below are fairly sensitive to the ways in which verb senses are categorized, and to the
degrees to which different verb senses are differentiated or collapsed. For example, an earlier analysis where
use violence and rampage were distinguished from the category be unrest on the basis of the use of
the words “violence”, “violent”, or “rampage” resulted in a different distribution of significant hypotheses:
Violence: 18.8%, Aftermath 9.5%, Response 14.3%, Collective Action 10.5%, General 8.3%. Given that
each of these categories indicated vague descriptions of violent action, it seemed inappropriate to maintain a
distinction between these categories. This is fundamentally an unavoidably hermeneutical problem familiar
to qualitative research, one that is not formally dissimilar from problems of categorization in other areas
of sociology (for example, the social construction of diagnoses (Brown 1995) or the modifiable areal unit
problem in virtually all geographic statistical analyses (Wong 2004)). For purposes of reproducibility, the
author’s verb sense disambiguation rules and verb-lemma classification table are available on request.
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net change in prominence of that verb cluster. The high number of simultaneous t-tests
meant that on average, I would expect around 15 of the verb clusters to be falsely reported
as significant. To control for this, I applied the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini
and Hochberg 1995) with a false-discovery rate of 0.05.
As noted above, carrying out these procedures on a corpus of articles selected for their
accounts of ethno-religious unrest is necessary to get a fine-grained analysis of changes to
the repertoire of violence. However it introduces problems when trying to make comparisons
with changes in other forms of collective action or in domains of activity further afield
from collective violence. In order to allow these broader comparisons, I applied the same
procedures to the random sample of articles, with one exception–I used the much faster
grammatical parser from SpaCy’s transformer-based toolchain to identify verbs rather than
AllenNLP’s Semantic Role Labelling engine. I applied the same verb-sense-differentiation
rules based on words co-occurring with the verb of interest in a sentence, and used the same
categorization of verbs into Violence, Aftermath, Response, Collective Action, and General
clusters. Verbs that did not have a categorization, but did occur 35 or more times in the
randomly sampled dataset were analyzed without further aggregation, in a cluster simply
labelled Uncategorized.

2.11. Overall Findings
The top-level findings are summarized in table 2.2. The first column represents findings from
the theoretical sample, designed to provide a high resolution view of changes to the repertoire
of collective violence, at the cost of accurate comparisons with the Collective Action and
General clusters. The second column represents findings from the random sample, which
allow for more accurate comparisons between the three violence-related categories (Violence,
Aftermath, and Response) and the Collective Action, General, and Uncategorized categories
below, at the cost of less accurate comparisons between the three violence-related categories.
In each entry in the table, the numerator represents the number of clusters that show
statistically significant increases or decreases over the 50-year period, while the denominator
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represents the number of verb clusters from that category present in the sample.
The findings from the first sample (Column 1) offers at least one surprise–there is greater
change in the techniques of violence than in the descriptions of its aftermath. The Aftermath
cluster shows the least movement, while the Response cluster shows greater change over time.
As noted above, this sample is not suited to making comparisons with the Collective Action
and General clusters, which are systematically under-represented.
In general, this would seem to indicate a moderate amount of change in the violence described
during this period, but with descriptions of the results of violence that are highly stereotyped.
Responses to violence appear to be an area of greater innovation than the actual violence
or the descriptions of its aftermath.
The findings from the second sample make it clear that the repertoire of violence is changing
far less than the broader repertoire of Collective Action, or the repertoires of the broader
social environment as described by the verbs and verb clusters in the General and Uncategorized groups.
The table reveals one additional finding, unaccounted for in the initial conceptual model
laid out above, but unsurprising on reflection. The field of Collective Action–the field of
processions, protests, meetings, rumors and speeches–shows a greater level of change over
time than the broader environment. This is in keeping with a view of collective action as an
arena in which participants, organizations, ideas, and behaviors develop more rapidly than
in other fields of society, simultaneously providing an impetus for changes in slower-moving
fields and creating a sense of excitement that helps to draw in participants–it is one of the
places in society “where the action is” (Collins 2001).
In order to dig deeper into these findings, we break down the four specialized categories
below, then return to a general discussion of the results.
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2.12. Violence
Table 2.3 offers a summary of the changes by verb cluster in the Violence category. Three
verb clusters show statistically significant increases: damage vehicle, stab, and target.
The increasing trend in damage vehicle is relatively easy to explain, as per-capita vehicle ownership in India rose dramatically (see Figure 2.5), making vehicles an increasingly
available target for attack. In technical terms, attacks on vehicles (particularly stationary
ones) closely resemble attacks on buildings, in that both can have windows smashed or be
set on fire, providing a way to bring indirect harm to a target while avoiding face-to-face
confrontation.
The other two findings are harder to explain. There are virtually no occurrences of verbs
in the target cluster before 1985, but verbs in this category become much more frequent
after 1990. This is puzzling, since Horowitz has noted that careful, even obsessive selective
targeting is the norm for ethnic violence (Horowitz 2001:124–31). Given this, I suspect that

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.5: Violence verb clusters with significant change over time
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Table 2.2: Change in verb categories over time in unrest-related articles, and in 10,000 randomly sampled articles from the TOI, 1950-2000.
Numerators represent the number of verb-clusters showing significant increase or decrease
over time; denominators represent all verb clusters in the verb cluster category (row) appearing in the sample (column).
Verb Category

Unrest Articles (3631
articles)

Randomly Sampled Articles
(10,000 articles)

Violence
Aftermath
Response
Collective Action
General
Uncategorized (freq>34)

10.0% (3/30)
5.0% (1/21)
12.5% (7/56)
5.6% (2/38)
5.1% (8/156)
-

5.9% (1/17)
11.8% (2/17)
11.4% (5/44)
21.4% (6/28)
18.5% (27/146)
13.0% (52/399)

Table 2.3: Violence Summary
Change

Verb Clusters

Increasing

damage vehicle, stab, target

Decreasing

none

Not Significant

attack, beat, be unrest, break, burn, damage, damage business,
damage house, damage place of worship, defeat, demolish, die,
fight, hurt, kill, loot, settle score, shoot, slaughter, steal,
throw, throw filth, throw stones, use acid, use teargas, use
weapon
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the result indicates a shift in the newspaper’s descriptive style, behind which could lie any of
a wide array of factors–shifts in language use, shifts in writers’ consciousness of the targeted
nature of ethno-religious violence, shifts in editorial policy, or some other linguistic or media
phenomenon. In short, Horowitz’ findings lead me to suspect that this apparent finding is
a linguistic mirage. It may tell us something about the news-reporting process, but it does
not likely reflect a real trend in the behavior of participants in unrest.
The observation that the prominence of stab-verbs increased significantly,‘ though unevenly
across the 50 year period is a puzzle. It is particularly curious in light of Pandey’s association
of stabbing with older, less violent forms of unrest. Unlike damage vehicle, it is unlikely
to be linked to a change in availability of targets or of resources. It is impossible to settle
the question of why this might be the case with the data at hand. However, we may advance
some theoretically informed suppositions. First, it is of course possible that this finding is a
linguistic mirage, as I have argued is the case for target. If so, the puzzle becomes one of
linguistics or of categorization. That stab should change as much as it does while throw
stones, beat, shoot and other extremely common actions in the repertoire do not is

Figure 2.6: Registered Motor Vehicles per Capita in India, 1951-2001 (Data: Author’s
calculations based on total numbers of registered motor vehicles in India from the Ministry of
Road Transport and Highways (India) and Provisional Population Totals from the Registrar
General of India, Census 2011)
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surprising. Two other major possibilities remain. If we assume that Collins’ (Collins 2008)
categorization of pathways holds true, we can quickly eliminate pathways 2 and 3 – staged
fair fights and remote violence. This leaves us with pathway 1, suggesting that attackers
have found new techniques by which to generate situational asymmetries of strength, or
pathways 4 and 5 – techniques of conflict-avoidance through self-entrainment, whether in
keeping up an interactional front or through absorption in technique. Pathway 4 seems
unlikely, but not impossible–members of targeted groups in ethno-religious unrest tend to
have more reason to hide their identities than attackers during the actual episodes of violence,
though this dynamic often reverses after the violence has ended8 As such, we can venture a
guess that if the change in text reflects a change in practice, it likely indicates a shift toward
creating greater situational power asymmetry or a shift toward violence by persons absorbed
in technique. However, following up on these hypotheses requires exploration beyond the
scope of this paper–additional data sources and methodologies.

2.13. Aftermath
Table 2.4 offers a summary of the changes by verb cluster in the Aftermath category. There
is only one statistically significant change in this category, an increase in prominence of the
increase cluster.
The verbs in the increase category often reflect descriptions of the increasing numbers of
8

See Horowitz for a case of a member of a targeted group hiding his identity (2001:130) and for discussions of government permissiveness and absence, and regular lack of remorse, conditions which could make
deception about one’s violent intentions unnecessary (2001:326-373).

Figure 2.7: Aftermath verb clusters with significant change over time
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those killed, injured, or arrested, or of a general sense of escalation, as can be seen in the
random sample of 10 instances of increase verbs in Table 2.4, with their corresponding
arguments. In table 2.5 and similar ones below, arguments are labelled by their semantic
roles, where ARG0 indicates the most agent-like argument, ARG1 indicates the most patientlike argument, and ARG2 is usually a benefactive, instrument, or attribute.
On the surface, this would seem to simply indicate the higher numbers of casualties during
the surge in unrest between 1980 and 1993, but this does not take into account that the
number increasing represents not the frequency of these words, but their density within the
newspaper accounts of unrest. More likely, then, this reflects the presence of articles that
contain multiple casualty or escalation reports–articles that are linked to multiple episodes of
unrest, since a casualty count is included with virtually every Times of India unrest report.
Table 2.6 demonstrates the plausibility of this explanation, showing that of the articles
linked to more than 10 events, all but one are from the first 8 days after the destruction of
the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992–the culmination of the wave of unrest
that began around 1980.
The rising density of increase verbs thus suggests not merely an increase in casualties, but
an increase in the temporal clustering of episodes of unrest over time, and is likely linked to
the change in diffusion processes during the 1980-1993 wave of unrest.

2.14. Response
There is more proportional change in the verbs in the response category than in any of the
other categories. In this category, arrest, disperse, and punish show decreasing trends,
while deploy, identify, resign, and search show upward trends across the period under
study. A summary is displayed in Table 2.7.
Of these verb clusters, disperse and deploy deal directly with the collective movement of
bodies, and thus likely are most proximate to physical violence.
Formulations represented by the disperse cluster are extremely consistent, with very nearly
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Table 2.4: Aftermath Summary
Change

Verb Clusters

Increasing

increase

Decreasing

none

Not Significant

appear, be calm, be chaotic, blame, decrease, fall, fill, improve,
judge, numerical description, prevail reach, release, return,
return normal, study, suffer loss, visit, worsen

Table 2.5: Random sample (10 out of 1672) of verbs
with their arguments from the increase category
VERB

ARG0

ARG1

ARG2

take_toll

-

The municipal corporations
ance and the relief
welfare ambulance corps

to hospital

intensify

-

Such vile attempts

-

increase

-

ihe death roll in Rhiwandi

-

increase

-

the police force

-

increase

-

hydel generation

by nine per cent

take_toll

-

provocative funeral
pro cession

-

grow

-

the situation

out of control

raise

5 PTI members
in the Lok
Sabha todday

storm over riots in Bihar
and killings of Harijans by
dacoits in UP

-

building

-

tension

-

rise

-

tide

-
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Table 2.6: Articles linked to more than 10 episodes of unrest
Riots mentioned

Headline

Date

16
15
13
12
12
11

Shoot orders in Kanpur
Mixed response to bandh
Army assumes control of riot-hit Calcutta Areas
24 burnt alive in Surat
More forces rushed to Kanpur
Normalcy returning to country

1992-12-11
1992-12-09
1964-01-13
1992-12-10
1992-12-12
1992-12-14

Table 2.7: Response Summary
Change

Verb Clusters

Increasing

deploy, identify, resign, search

Decreasing

disperse, arrest, punish

Not Significant

act, aid, call for peace, calm, catch, close continue curfew,
control, defy curfew, do duty, do nothing, end, enforce, escalate,
fail, fear, find, force, help, hide, house, impose censorship, impose
curfew, impose rule, intervene, open order, prevent, protect, raid,
refuse disperse, register, relax curfew, reopen rescue, restore,
result, save, seize, separate, shelter, strengthen, surround,
survive, suspend, throw body, transfer treat, work

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.8: Short-term Response verb clusters with significant change over time
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all following the pattern police - disperse - crowd. The deploy cluster, which is also
quite consistent, usually deals with the sending of reinforcements, often paramilitary units
reserved for emergencies, but in some cases military units.
Together, these clusters seem to indicate increased difficulty in bringing these episodes of
unrest under control across the 50-year period, resulting in fewer straightforward accounts
of crowd dispersal, and more calls for reinforcements.
The remaining five relate to the processes of investigating and of assigning blame for unrest,
part of the process which Brass labels the explanation/interpretation stage of communal
violence.
From these a discouraging picture emerges. On the one hand, the search and identify
clusters, which relate both to the identification of victims and to the identification of perpetrators has increased, possibly indicating improvements in the technologies or techniques of
surveillance. In light of this, and in light of the tendency noted in the discussion of increase
verbs above for verbs associated with casualty and arrest totals to rise over the period in
view, it is surprising to see the arrest cluster fall so markedly. The decrease in the punish
category tells a similar story, but the data here is less reliable, as the filtering methods
employed focused primarily on the temporally continuous phases of unrest, sentencing after
a trial (one of the more significant verbs in the punish cluster – see Table 2.8) tends to take
place after a significant gap of time.
These trends ring true to Brass’s observations about the explanation/interpretation stage,
that it “is marked by a process of blame displacement . . . that does not isolate effectively
those most responsible for the production of violence, but diffuses blame widely, blurring
responsibility, and thereby contributing to the perpetuation of violent productions in future” (Brass 2003:15). The upward trend in resign verbs over time may suggest a building
sense among public figures that public opinion still demands some form of accountability.
The indicated likelihood that accountability comes in the form of publicized resignations,

69

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Figure 2.9: Longer-term Response verb clusters with significant change over time
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Table 2.8: Random sample (10 out of 128) of verbs with their arguments from the punish
category
VERB

ARG0

ARG1

ARG2

sentence

the Magistrate

him

to two months rigorous
imprisonment and fine
of Rs 100

jail

By Staff Reporter

Student

punish
punish

tin guilty students
the Government

those found of breach ol
the law PiajaSocialisi
member Mr Nath Pai

sentence

The accused

to death

punish

Troublemakers

By Staff Reporter

punish

police officers

for emergency crimes
to life imprisonment

sentence

Reuter Dublin judges

Thomas Mcmahon 31

impose_sanction

the courts

mild punishment
invariably small fines

punish

the guilty
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which are more commonly a product of interacting systems of political maneuvering, media
reporting, and public opinion than of a justice system at least nominally committed to processes of investigation and argument provides little reason to suspect that the ones bearing
(relatively mild) consequences are the same as the ones instigating violence.

2.15. Collective Action
The fourth category for consideration is that of Collective Action. However, as noted above,
we are approaching the limits of the theoretical dataset. Table 2.9 notes the decreasing
trends in the convene and have procession clusters.
The most prominent surprise in this category is the decline in the have procession cluster.
This would seem to indicate a decrease in the importance of processions (or at least in their
association with violence) during this period. However this association must be treated as
highly suspect given the detailed documentation of the newly created Ram Shila Puja rituals
and L.K. Advani’s Rath Yatra (Flåten 2016), both of which played a significant role in the
creation of the 1980-1993 wave of unrest. As with the target verbs above, we are likely
dealing again with a linguistic mirage–a tendency for the newspaper not to discuss these
processions, at least not in the terms captured by this verb cluster.
The decrease in density of the convene cluster seems to point in the direction of a decrease
in the organization of meetings, conferences, committees, and functions, (see Table 2.10) or
at the minimum a decrease in reporting on these types of activities in the same context as

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.10: Collective Action verb clusters with significant change over time
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reports on violent unrest. Unlike have procession, the broader literature surrounding this
variety of unrest does not strongly consider trends in this area, so we do not have a firm
basis on which to conclude whether this represents primarily a change in collective action–
away from the calling of formal meetings as a prelude or response to collective violence–
or a change in reporting–an increasing tendency to avert the journalistic gaze from the
types of collective action that precede collective violence. These conclusions must not be
overemphasized, however, in the absence of triangulating evidence from other sources.

9

2.16. Conclusion
As noted above, this study builds on a well-established interdisciplinary research program
that attempts to explain ethno-religious violence across India in general and comparative
terms. This study pushes beyond what has currently been attempted in this program by
combining (a) a focus on disaggregating episodes of unrest into finer-grained actions, (b) sensitivity to a social world that is undergoing continuous but uneven change, and (c) attention
to the micro-sociological realities of violence–the tendency of the dilemma of confrontational
tension/fear to severely limit the forms that violence can take.
Examining the repertoire of ethnoreligious violence in India reveals a remarkably stable
core phenomenon persisting over the course of a half century, both in times of relative
quiescence (from 1950 to 1979, and from 1993-2000) and during a large-scale wave of violent
unrest (from 1980 through 1993). The constraint of overcoming confrontational tension/fear
seems to limit innovation in the forms of violence so that changes in this phenomenon are
significantly slower than in the broader social environment, and the particularly fast-moving
environment of Collective Action in which they are embedded.
9

That these results are questionable underscores the unsuitability of the theoretical sample for drawing conclusions about the broader repertoires of Collective Action. The random sample presents similar
problems, however, as it introduces additional senses for some verbs that did not appear in the theoretical
sample which complicate analysis. For example, in the random sample, the verb cluster resist appears to
show a significant decrease. Closer inspection, however, shows that an unknown percentage of instances of
resist relate to materials–metals, paints, etc.–that resist rust or weathering. This suggests that an attempt
to measure the changes in collective action using methods akin to those used here will require a separate
theoretical sample of articles related to unrest, and additional hermeneutical work to differentiate the verb
senses that arise in this sample. While such a project could prove insightful, it exceeds the bounds of the
current study.
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Table 2.9: Collective Action clusters from theoretical sample
Change

Verb Clusters

Increasing

none

Decreasing

convene, have procession

Not Significant

agrree, allow, armed, be tense, boycott, commit suicide, court
arrest, disrupt, exchange, hoist, incite, lead, leave, make speech,
march, mark, meet, move, observe bandh, offend, pray, protest,
pull, push, resist, rumor, shout, spare, spread, threaten, throw
water, turn, wear, withdraw

Table 2.10: Random sample (10 out of 933) of verbs with their arguments from the convene
category
VERB

ARG0

ARG1

ARG2

preside

Jb Kamath

-

-

hold_meeting

-

its meeting scheduled

-

constitute

the Muslim community

60 per cent of the population

-

organise

-

an international conference

-

organise

by the Janata party

the arrival of the from Kalyan

-

inaugurate

by former corporator Mr
Krishna Shetty

The campaign

-

hold_meeting

-

its meeting

-

inaugurate

-

function

-

hold_conference

by the University
of Toronto

The first such international
conference on Maharashtra

-

the Institute of Adventure
Sports

the trek

-

organise

74

With this general finding in mind, more detailed findings point in more concerning directions.
The findings that verbs in the stab cluster are increasing in prominence, that disperse verbs
are decreasing, and that deploy verbs are increasing points, at a minimum, in the direction
of increasing violence. The development in the stab verbs is particularly interesting, and
could point in the direction of refined tactics or training in violence. Field research combined
with archival work sensitive to spatial and interactional maneuvering will likely be necessary
to clarify whether this narrative finding has a behavioral counterpart. The growth in the
increase verb also seems to indicate greater clustering of unrest during the latter part of
the period under study, and should direct our attention to the processes and mechanisms of
unrest diffusion.
The finding that search and identify verbs have increased, while arrest and punish
verbs have decreased, with resign increasing suggests that more could be done to hold
organizers and perpetrators accountable through the justice system.
This conclusion must be treated with caution, however. Though the Times of India archive
offers a wide angle on collective violence with coverage stretching from early in the British
Raj to the present on a subcontinental scale, it is not an unobstructed view. Beyond
the normal selection constraints involved in translating lived experience into reports or
narratives, the orientation of journalists in India’s English-speaking press toward reporting
in a way that does not promote the spread of ethno-religious violence means that violence
is usually described in a highly stereotyped and euphemized fashion. However, it remains
unclear how big a problem this violence-obscuring tendency is without considering other
data sources. Finer-grained police records, NGO reports, eyewitness testimonies, videos,
and images, where they are available and credible, can be used to triangulate with the
broad conclusions of this study.
To cope with this uncertainty, we might sketch out two limiting interpretations of the conclusions, one that treats the Times’ window on violence as fully transparent, and another
that treats it as fully opaque. The “transparent” interpretation interprets each of the changes
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detected above as a real change in the patterns of ethno-religious violence. The findings that
suggest that targeting was an innovation, or that processions connected with ethno-religious
unrest became less significant during this period despite good evidence to the contrary suggest that an extreme version of this “transparent” interpretation is untenable.
If we instead take the most “opaque” interpretation, the conclusion becomes one about
writing style, rather than violent ritual. If we take the texts as an index of nothing but
their own style and perhaps the anxieties of their authors, this study will have shown a
very persistent concern in the English-language press to avoid provoking violence, and an
extremely stable set of reporting strategies to communicate that violence took place while
shrouding most of what took place in obscurity.
The more “transparent” view would represent good news for those who study ethno-religious
unrest using comparative methods. It would indicate that they are not, in fact, building on
comparisons between apples and oranges–that there is a sufficiently coherent phenomenon
to compare across these instances. However, the phenomenon is rendered stable by a microlevel mechanism–the problem of avoiding a buildup of confrontational tension/fear, and the
farther one goes from violence, either into its antecedents or into the responses it generates,
this stability begins to break down.
The “transparent” interpretation may also represent good news for those seeking to curtail this form of violence. Successful micro-sociological interventions against the forms of
violence that make up the core of the phenomenon, if they can be identified, understood,
and replicated, have a good chance of suppressing violence for a substantial period of time
before new techniques of violence are developed to surmount them. Techniques of neutralizing violence in crowd situations have begun to emerge with the kinds of fine-grained study
of violence that video-recordings make possible, and investigations by Bramsen (Bramsen
2018), Nassauer (Nassauer 2015), Collins (Collins 2019) and Dhattiwala (Dhattiwala 2019)
have all begun to yield insights into the means of constraining violence in crowd situations.
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The “opaque” interpretation, on the other hand, serves as a spur to diversify the sources that
inform our research, in directions that India’s social historians have led the way in exploring.
It can lead us into deeper study of the news writing process, to investigate the degree to
which Indian journalists’ concerns about triggering unrest are well or poorly founded, and
whether stylistic variation in reporting is associated with increased or decreased diffusion of
violence.
These findings provide several other openings for future research. First among these is
the question of whether repertoires of violence consistently change more slowly than their
surroundings, or whether India’s ethnic violence is distinctive in this regard. Second, the
stability of the repertoire suggests that a comparative approach that aggregates detailed
case studies of violence is warranted,10 at least in the Indian case. Such comparative study,
aimed at further revealing the core of the phenomenon of collective violence may reveal
potential areas of micro-sociological intervention to help prevent loss of life. Third, the
detailed findings suggest fruitful possibilities in studying whether and how the interactional
contexts surrounding stabbings during unrest may have shifted, as well as greater attention
to the ways in which the police and justice system decide whom to hold accountable for the
destruction and loss of life that collective violence brings about.

10

The rich detail captured not just by Freitag, but by Pandey (Pandey 2012), Amin (Amin 1995), Roy
(Roy 1994), Gossman (Gossman 1999) and others provides ample data for a study of the pre-independence
repertoire of collective violence. While attempting to reconstruct this goes beyond the scope of this particular
study, I have begun to address it in a separate manuscript.
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CHAPTER 3
On the Diffusion of Collective Violence in India
A Times of India report from April 25, 1987 recounts a series of incidents of collective
violence. Among them are the following brief reports:
April 9: A major violence broke out in Virpur village in Kaira district following an
attack on the Ram-Janaki procession. The police fired 112 rounds after bursting 42
tear-gas shells. In the clashes and the police firing nearly 13 people were killed. Some
dead bodies were reportedly taken to Rajasthan by the fleeing mobs, the police said.
. . .
April 11: The Virpur incident has had its echo in Borchholi, a nearby village, where
a house was set on fire. At Kot and Nakhso villages, in Kaira district, some religious
places were attacked.
April 12: Two people were killed when the police fired nine rounds to disperse an armed
mob which attempted to enter Virpur village, to settle scores with a rival group . . .
(Sayed 1987)

These are just 3 of the 22 incidents mentioned in the article, most of which occurred within
a few neighboring districts of central Gujarat, all within three weeks of each other.
Violence breeds violence, the saying goes. This is the fundamental idea behind all diffusion
analyses of violence. Probing when, where, how, and under what conditions this happens is
the business of social scientists. Previous investigations of collective violence give us reason
to believe that violence diffuses. This is true at a variety of scales, from the scale of a
decade-long protest campaign (Myers 2000; Myers 2011), over weeks-long strings of episodes
(Aidt, Leon-Ablan, and Satchell 2021; Bonnasse-Gahot et al. 2018), and even within hoursand days-long episodes (Davies et al. 2013). Most studies of diffusion to date have focused
on violent uprisings carried out in the name of the disadvantaged–what we might refer to as
violent protests, rather than on violence committed in the name of socially powerful groups,
targeting less powerful social groups–what we might refer to as pogroms. Further, much of
this analysis has focused on violence in the United States and Europe, with scant attention
to other parts of the world.
In this article, I bring the literature on diffusion into conversation with the literature on
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ethno-religious violence in India, a paradigmatic case in the study of ethnic violence with
a healthy stock of accumulated findings (see Chandra 2001:110). This study challenges
the literature on communal violence to take diffusion seriously, and with it the question of
networks and organizations that can facilitate that diffusion. State-level media, frequently
cited in qualitative work as a contributing cause of violence, is here shown to be a likely
vector for the diffusion of violence. Meanwhile, it reaffirms previous findings showing that
violence is more likely in areas where local Hindu and Muslim populations or incomes are
more equal; this is consistent with violence as a tool for reinforcing an ethno-religious status
hierarchy. Evidence for electoral competition, party fractionalization, and election margins
turn out to have little predictive power when applied in an all-India context, suggesting that
there may be additions factors at play distinguishing the areas where collective violence has
been more convincingly tied to elections (on Uttar Pradesh, see Wilkinson 2004; on Gujarat,
see Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012).

3.1. Ethnoreligious Collective Violence in India
Violence in India between Hindus and Muslims, locally called “communal violence,” has
taken place in India since at least the 1920s, although waves of violent ethno-religious mobilization in the 1890s are sometimes cited as precursors (for a few of the conflicting views,
see discussions by Bayly 1985; Freitag 1989; Pandey 2012). This genre of violence rose to
prominence as the urban poor in North India staked out claims to martial identities through
increased participation in public religious processions and festivals, in the context of religious polarization in the movements for Indian independence (Gooptu 2001:185–320). The
partition of India, Pakistan, and what is now Bangladesh too was accompanied by violence
undertaken in the name of ethno-religious communities. While the violence reported in this
period bears resemblance to prior and subsequent forms of ethno-religious violence, the scale
and cruelty of the violence that took place was qualitatively different, constituting a determined exercise in ethnic cleansing (Brass 2006:11–64; Khan 2008; Talbot and Singh 2009).
Nonetheless, Partition violence has remained a benchmark by which more recent events are
judged as “the worst since 1947” (Pandey 1992:33), and a resource for rumor, polarization,
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and the extremes of violent action (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012:83–92; Kakar 1996:25–40). However, violence mobilizing along lines of religious identity and targeting across the religious
identity boundaries–especially that between “Hindu” and “Muslim” categories in India have
continued since that date, with an average of around 15 events per year between Independence and the Emergency from 1975-1977, then a major wave of violent events that took
place between 1977 and 1992. The latter wave was related to the Ramjanmbhoomi campaign
coordinated by a variety of Hindu Nationalist organizations, resurgent after the Emergency,
which led to the destruction of a 16th century mosque that activists claimed was built on
the birthplace of the god Ram, and also to the rise of the BJP to power in India’s central
government.
Prior studies have offered 3 main explanations for this violence: political maneuvering,
economic competition, and an absence of institutionalized interdependence.
The first explanation to emerge, and the one that so far predominates, follows Paul Brass

Figure 3.1: Hindu-Muslim collective violence with at least one death reported in the Times
of India, 1950-2000 (Mitra and Ray 2014; Varshney and Wilkinson 2006)
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in claiming that these incidents of collective violence are primarily an elite-led phenomenon,
created and coordinated by local politicians for their own electoral advantage, mobilizing
voters for violence using networks of informants and service providers. Brass has claimed
that these relations have stabilized in some Indian cities–Aligarh and Meerut serving as his
primary case studies–into Institutionalized Riot Systems (Brass 2003; Brass 2004). On the
basis of comparisons between Indian cities and states, Wilkinson has argued that electoral
incentives explain when and where collective violence has taken place, with severe violence
occurring where party competition is bipolar, particularly intense, and where the target
group, in this case the religious minority, is not a crucial part of the ruling party’s electoral
base (Wilkinson 2004). This explanation has generally held up well. Iyer and Shrivastava
found that collective violence that took place shortly before elections increased the vote share
of India’s most prominent Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, by 5 to 7 percentage points (Iyer
and Shrivastava 2018), and Dhattiwala and Biggs found similar results in analysis of the
aftermath of the anti-Muslim violence that spread across Gujarat in 2002 (Dhattiwala and
Biggs 2012). Fieldwork by Berenschot supports the idea that mobilization follows patterns
of service provision by politicians, mediated by a network of “social workers” connecting
politicians to constituents (Berenschot 2012, 2020).
The second explanation focused on the relationship between economic growth and violence.
Bohlken and Sergenti argued that during the wave of violence during the 1980s and early 90s,
states that experienced higher economic growth had fewer incidents of collective violence
(Bohlken and Sergenti 2010). Mitra and Ray have argued that increases in consumption by
minority groups correlates with increases the risk of future religious conflict, while increased
consumption by majority groups may reduce it (Mitra and Ray 2014). More recent work
has extended this line of inquiry from growth to inequality. Bulutgil and Prasad argue that
when within-group inequality is high, and between-group inequality is low, ethno-religious
divisions would not naturally be salient, and ethno-nationalist political entrepreneurs might
incite collective violence to reassert ethno-religious divisions (Bulutgil and Prasad unpublished manuscript).
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The third explanation highlights institutions and pre-independence historical legacies. Comparing cities that regularly experienced collective violence to cities that did not, Varshney
suggested that cities with a history of violence lacked strong inter-religious civic connections,
compared to similar cities without that history of violence (Varshney 2002). Similarly, Jha
has argued that collective violence was significantly lower in cities that had been trading
ports from between the rise of Islam in the 7th century and the rise of European involvement
in the Indian Ocean in the 17th century. Jha argues that this trade produced inter-group
economic complementarities between Hindus and Muslims, cultivating institutions that continued to reduce incentives for inter-religious violence through the colonial period, and even
into the early 21st century (Jha 2008). Verghese has similarly noted that former Princely
States have seen more inter-religious violence than former direct colonies. He attributes this
to policies in Princely States that promoted religious discrimination, but inter-caste solidarity, while arguing that British policies promoted a carefully balanced approach to religious
group while institutionalizing caste discrimination (Verghese 2016).
To date, however, these models have relied primarily on regression and logistic regression
models that assume independence between events, an assumption that is difficult to justify
both in light of what we know about other forms of collective violence, as well as from
newspaper accounts of incidents of collective violence that appear clearly linked to each
other. An analysis that includes diffusion terms in the analysis is clearly overdue.

3.2. Collective Violence as a Diffusing Innovation
That violence could be in some sense “contagious” is not a new hypothesis. Besides the
canonization in folk wisdom, it has been a subject of proto-sociological speculation since
the work of turn-of-the-century crowd theorists like Le Bon (Le Bon [2002] 1896) and Tarde
(Tarde 1903), as well as in Freud’s work on group psychology (Freud [1990] 1921). However
the speculative nature of these arguments, and in the case of Le Bon, the unapologetically racist, classist, and anti-democratic theses he advanced, led many sociologists to tread
carefully around the subject. The idea that violence was in some sense “automatically”
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contagious with members of a crowd invariably and automatically imitating each other has
been put to rest by the empirical observation that processes of imitation and diffusion, even
when they do take place face to face, are always partial (McPhail 1991).
The idea that violence could diffuse from one place to another returned to prominence with
the publication of the Kerner Commission report on civil disorders in the US (United States
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968), and the Lord Scarman Report on
the Brixton disorders in the UK (Scarman 1981), both of which raised the possibility that
mass media reporting of civil disorders was contributing to the spread of collective violence.
The new wave of engagement that followed saw an major theoretical update from a view of
diffusion as irrational mimicry to one of rational learning mechanisms. A central piece of the
theoretical model was Bandura’s research (Bandura, Ross, and Ross 1961), which showed
that even small children, when observing someone acting out violently, will take into account
not just the actions of the one they are observing, but the consequences of those actions, and
choose whether or not to imitate the action accordingly. Myers (Myers 2000; 2011) among
others, adopts this rational-actor approach in theorizing the diffusion of violent protest along
the color line in the US in the 1960s-70s. Other approaches are also possible, including more
semiotically or hermeneutically oriented ones. On the basis of his observations during and
after the so-called “Rodney King Riots”, Katz has given a phenomenological account, arguing
that the diffusion of violence spread in this case with an “Epiphany of Invisibility” (Katz
2015). This account is more suited to explaining the diffusion of violence in more-or-less
face-to-face circumstances, rather than what might explain how collective violence might
move from one town to another.
Another pathway of explanation proceeds from the observations that mobilization often
begins with a “moral shock” (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), through the classical sociological
observation that social position is often implicated in a person’s sense of moral and aesthetic
judgment (Black 1998; Bourdieu 1986; Collins 2004:39–40; Durkheim 1912; Marx 1859:21),
and more specifically to the argument that violence is often carried out with a sense of
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moral justification or even compulsion (Cooney 2009; Fiske and Rai 2014), even, or perhaps
especially in situations of ethnic violence (Horowitz 2001:366–74; Senechal de la Roche 2008).
We may suspect that seeing collective violence taking place elsewhere may be taken as a
sign by an observer that a grievous moral offense has been perpetrated–a moral shock. If
the observer’s social position has cultivated in them a suspicion of the targets of the attack,
the moral shock may encourage them to seek information about possible moral breaches by
the targets that would justify the attack on them. In the process, they may discover (or
construct) reasons to carry out a similar attack on people who share social characteristics
with the targeted group. By contrast, an observer formed to sympathize with the target
may be shocked into action, even retaliation by the collective violence directly.
While the moral-emotional pathway of explanation appears more convincing at face value
than accounts that require us to conceptualize persons as either thoughtless imitators or
hyper-rational calculators, the thesis that violence may diffuse is compatible with a wide
variety of explanations, on the condition that those explanations suggest a link between the
knowledge that violence has taken place in one area and the possibility (for one finding out
about the violence) of initiating or joining in violence at another time or place.
Which explanation makes the best sense of the diffusion of violence is a question that stands
relatively apart from the question of whether violence diffuses. In general, the evidence
that collective violence diffuses is quite strong. Strong evidence for the diffusion of protest,
strikes, and violence has been found in studies of eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain
(Aidt and Leon-Ablan 2021; Aidt et al. 2021; Bohstedt and Williams 1988; Charlesworth
1983), in France (Conell and Cohn 1995), the Netherlands (Jansen, Sluiter, and Akkerman
2016), and the US (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Biggs 2003; McAdam 1983; McAdam 1995;
Myers 2000; Myers 2011), and in several African states (Warren 2015). More recent work
has begun to explore processes of diffusion within episodes of unrest (Bonnasse-Gahot et
al. 2018; Davies et al. 2013), and on reciprocal escalation between state forces and their
opponents (Baudains et al. 2019; Bramsen 2017; Myers and Oliver 2008).
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3.3. Event History modeling of Collective Violence Diffusion
While other methods for modeling diffusion exist, this paper follows the Event History-based
heterogeneous diffusion models developed by David Strang and colleagues (Greve, Strang,
and Tuma 1995; Strang 1991; Strang and Tuma 1993), and used by Myers to describe the
diffusion-effect of violent protest in the US in the 1960s (2000; 2011). In the interests of
clarity, I summarize first Strang and Tuma’s general approach to modelling diffusion (Strang
and Tuma 1993), then the modifications to this approach suggested by Myers for modeling
the diffusion of collective violence (Myers 2011).
Strang and Tuma’s approach begins with the standard population-level formulation of a
diffusion process (1993:616). In this formulation, consider an innovation diffusing through a
population of size I. At any given moment, time t, there are a number of individuals who
have not yet adopted the innovation N (t), and a number who have adopted the innovation
and are now spreading it, S(t). These numbers add up to the total size of the population:
N (t) + S(t) = I. The standard formulation (see, e.g. Bailey 1975) in eq. 3.1 describes the
probability at any particular moment that someone new will adopt an innovation.

prob(N (t + ∆t) = n − 1|N (t) = n)
= (a + bs(t))n(t)
∆t→0
∆t
lim

(3.1)

The right side of this equation breaks down influences related to contacts or linkages within
a population, and influences due to external factors. External influences are proportional
to the number of possible adoptees available, n(t), while contact-related influences are proportional to the number of spreaders s(t) multiplied by the number of possible adoptees
n(t).
Strang and Tuma note that this model unrealistically assumes that (1) all members of the
population are equally susceptible to external factors, (2) all spreader/potential adopter
contacts are equally likely and contagious, and (3) the rate and contagiousness of contacts

85

do not vary with time (1993:617). In light of this, they translate the equation into individuallevel models of diffusion, within an event-history framework. Here, the variable of interest
is no longer the population-level variable N (t), but the binary variable Yi (t) that equals
one if an individual i has adopted by time t, or zero if not. Rather than the population
level probability, we become interested in the individual hazard rate of adoption at time t,
which we may call ri (t). The hazard is defined in eq. 3.2. It gives the probability that an
individual will adopt an innovation at time t, given that that individual has not adopted
the innovation prior to that point.

prob(Yi (t + ∆t) = 1|Yi (t) = 0)
∆t→0
∆t

ri (t) = lim

(3.2)

In order to translate eq. 3.1 to individual hazards, we will need to move from speaking of
the number of non-adopters N (t) at the population level, to the set of non-adopters N (t)
and the number of spreaders S(t) to the set of spreaders S (t) at time t.
The equation for the individual-level hazard rate that corresponds to eq. 3.1 above is:

rn (t) = an +

X

b, where n ∈ N (t)

(3.3)

s∈S (t)

Here, the content of S (t), the set the spreaders that are relevant to not-yet-adopting individual n, is left as a theoretical matter, one which we will return to below in describing the
different diffusion terms used below(Strang and Tuma 1993:617–18).
In order to prevent explanatory variables from predicting uninterpretable negative hazard
rates, we model the logarithm of the hazard instead of the hazard itself, following the
multiplicative formulation of the diffusion model below (Strang and Tuma 1993:619):
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ln(rn (t)) = an +

X

b

(3.4)

s∈S (t)

As Myers notes, the b can be variously specified to capture different types of heterogeneity
(2011:294–95). For our case, the most relevant involve measures of geographic and temporal
proximity (see Greve et al. 1995; Myers 2011; Strang and Tuma 1993, among others).
Myers builds on this formulation, but notes that collective violence differs in an important
respect from the assumptions underlying Strang and Tuma’s more general diffusion model
(Myers 2011:296–99). Most diffusion models draw off of a simple Susceptible-Infected (SI)
epidemiological model, with the simplifying assumption that once one has been infected,
they cannot be infected again. Here one might think of a disease like chicken pox which confers reliable immunity after first infection. In this model, there are no transitions back from
an “infected” state back to a “susceptible” state. In innovation-diffusion terms, this is the
assumption of permanent adoption–that once an innovation is adopted, it will not be abandoned in the same time frame that it is adopted. This is a helpful simplifying assumption,
and in standard diffusion models, it is responsible for the characteristic sigmoid (s-shaped)
graphs of adoption that often characterize diffusion patterns (Mahajan and Peterson 1985).
This assumption is not sustainable in modeling the diffusion of collective violence, however,
as a single location does not generally remain in a state of collective violence for long before
returning to quiescence, and a single location can experience repeated incidents of collective
violence. In the data used for this study, the median episode of collective violence lasted for
only 1 day (mean 2.25 days, range 1-25 days), while a single Parliamentary Constituency
experienced 46 episodes of collective violence (#286, which includes Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar in Gujarat). In event history terminology, this adds up to the observation that
collective violence is a temporary, not an absorbing state (Therneau, Crowson, and Atkinson 2021a). This requires two modifications to the data structure, splitting each location
(Parliamentary Constituency, for purposes of this study) into E + 1 risk episodes, where
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E is the number of episodes of collective violence occurring in the PC during the years in
study (Allison 1984; see Myers 2011). This is equivalent to changing from a focus on the set
of individuals that may or may not adopt (I) to the set of adoptions that may or may not
take place (A).
The non-absorbing condition does create some problems because in the standard diffusion
model, as the assumption that one cannot have repeated adoptions of an innovation is
responsible for the end of a diffusion process Myers (2011); Pitcher, Hamblin, and Miller
(1978). In the terms of the formula above, the decrease in adoptions toward the end of the
wave of adoptions is caused by the decrease in size of the set of non-adopters N (t). However,
with locations re-entering N (t) quickly after adoption, a separate mechanism is needed to
account for the end of a wave of collective violence. Myers and Oliver have proposed such a
model at the population level (Myers and Oliver 2008), but this Opposing Forces diffusion
model has yet to be translated to a suitable individual level model. In this paper, I thus
follow Myers’ workaround, as described in the next section.
One further general explanatory note is necessary here, as the unit of analysis differs from
most previous approaches to this question. As hinted above, this study uses Parliamentary
Constituencies as the unit of analysis. Previous approaches have generally focused on either town-level data (Jha 2008; Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004:19–62) or state-level data
(Mitra and Ray 2014; Wilkinson 2005a:173–203), with a few studies approaching the question using district-level data (Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; Bulutgil and Prasad unpublished
manuscript).
There are advantages to each of these approaches. On the one hand, focusing on the state
level is an attractive option both practically and in terms of some of the proposed causal
explanations. At the practical level, it has historically been difficult to assemble long-term
consistent panel data for use at levels below that of the state, as district boundaries have
shifted frequently over the years under study (see, for example, Kumar and Somanathan
2009). State boundaries have been much more consistent, though even here, successful
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movements to carve new states of old ones (Chattisgarh out of Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand
out of Bihar, Telangana out of Andhra Pradesh) analysts of historical data to proceed with
caution. Performing consistent analysis at a level below that of the state becomes even more
difficult when dealing with a phenomenon like collective violence where a combination of
demographic, economic, and political explanations have been advanced. Adequately testing
these hypotheses requires data on population, which is generally gathered at the district level
by the decennial census, socioeconomic data, which has most consistently been gathered at
the level of “regions,” usually groups of districts smaller than a state, by the National Sample
Survey Organization, and election results, which are gathered by Parliamentary or Assembly
Constituency, and have borders that rarely coincide with those of districts. Using state-level
data is attractive because all three of these data sources aggregate to state borders, allowing
data to be gathered at a consistent unit of analysis. Furthermore, as Wilkinson has argued,
if one of the most important factors in determining whether serious collective violence occurs
is the response of the police, it is important to consider state-level factors, because in India,
the police force is controlled at the state level, rather than locally (Wilkinson 2004:57–62).
On the other hand, focusing on the town level acknowledges the reality that ethno-religious
violence is an extremely locally concentrated phenomenon, with only eight cities in India
accounting for 45.5% of all deaths from Hindu-Muslim violence (Varshney 2002:6–7). The
downside of this approach is that it marginalizes the cases of rural collective violence. Collective violence in smaller towns and villages, while less common than in urban areas, has been
a part of some of the largest post-2000 incidents of violence since 2000, the 2002 pogrom
that spread across Gujarat, and the violence in Muzaffarnagar in 2013. An approach that
does not dismiss rural areas is necessary to fully describe the phenomenon in question.
This study attempts to preserve the focus on local-level factors that a town-level analysis
makes possible, while using a newly available solution to the common-unit-of-analysis problem that has usually attended analyses below the state level. In doing this, I have followed
Swaminathan et al in prioritizing electoral boundaries over administrative ones Swaminathan
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et al. (2019). Parliamentary Constituencies represent similar units to districts by area during the period under study, but have undergone far fewer boundary changes than districts.
India had 542 PCs from 1976-1989, and has had 543 since 1989, with only one significant
boundary change as a result of the Fourth Delimitaton, which took effect in 2005. This
consistency, a result of the forty-second (1976) and eighty-fourth (2002) amendments to the
Indian constitution is a boon to statistical analysis, but has had less salutary effects on
democratic representation in India (Kumar 2009; Singh 2000; Vaishnav and Hintson 2019).
By comparison, India had 356 districts in 1971, 412 in 1981, 466 in 1991, and 593 in 2001
(Kumar and Somanathan 2009, 2016). As Swaminathan et al point out, there are additional
salutary effects to studying social phenomena at the level of Parliamentary Constituencies,
as the Members of Parliament representing a PC are both empowered to take local action
for development outcomes, and responsible to their constituents. Districts, by contrast, lack
this political accountability mechanism, and are thus a less useful unit of analysis for work
that is relevant to public policy (Swaminathan et al. 2019:44). Finally, for a project that
seeks to integrate demographic, economic, and political data at the same low-level of aggregation, it makes theoretical sense to estimate quantities such as the population or total
economic consumption of a Parliamentary Constituency, as these are fundamentally aggregated individual or household properties. By contrast, attempting to estimate margins of
victory or effective numbers of parties of a different geographical area than the one in which
an electoral contest is actually held is at best an attempt at counterfactual imagination,
since these are properties of electoral contests, not of individuals or households. Given these
considerations, the parliamentary constituency ends up having nearly all the virtues of both
the town- and state-level units.
Prior studies have not used Parliamentary Constituencies in these studies largely because
a robust method of using demographic and economic data collected at the district level to
estimate equivalent variables in Parliamentary Constituencies using GIS has only recently
been developed and demonstrated (Blossom et al. 2019; Swaminathan et al. 2019). Using
Swaminathan et al’s crosswalk method for data from the 1980s and 90s has entailed a few
90

modifications to the procedure, modifications which I discuss in more detail in the section
on demographic and economic measures below.
3.3.1. The fundamental adoption trajectory
The simplest form of diffusion to model is a homogeneous-influence model, in which each
previous event anywhere in the population–in this case, in any of India’s PCs–increases
the likelihood that a PC not experiencing an incident of collective violence will begin to
experience one. This produces the following equation:

ln(rn (t)) = αxi + β

X

qa,t−1

(3.5)

a∈A

In this formulation, αxi represents the vector of non-diffusion related predictors of violence
for parliamentary constituency i with its vector of coefficients, where q is a binary dummy
variable indicating whether or not adoption a has occurred by time t − 1 for the set of
all potential adoptions A. This kind of model (rather unrealistically) assumes that each
incident has equal influence in every PC, and that this influence does not decay over time.
Despite this, it serves, in general, as a useful baseline measure of whether diffusion is taking
place in the population.
Or at least it would, if not for the twin problems of temporary adoption and repeat adoptions that result from collective violence being a non-absorbing state, as noted above. In
practice, this simple model of linear influence predicts an infinite increase in violence, since
the competing state, a state in which a PC is even temporarily “immune” to violence for
any of a number of reasons has barely been theorized, much less measured Myers and Oliver
(2008). Such an “immune” state could, hypothetically, involve the widespread adoption of
a moral judgment within the PC that either the purported triggering event does not justify
violence (see Brass 1997:97–128 for an example in this vein), or that the goal toward which
the violence is expected to contribute has already been attained–a formulation that might
explain the sudden decrease in ethno-religious violence in the years after the destruction
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of the Babri Masjid in 1992. Or, in line with balance-of-power thinking, it could involve
the presence of a repressive force sufficiently large or proactive enough to frighten potential
participants into inaction (see Brass 2003:134–46; Wilkinson 2004:186–87).
Absent a reasonable measure of whether or not a PC is temporarily “immune” to collective
violence, we are left simply with the observation that the spread of violence competes with
suppressive forces, whether violent or non-violent, which almost invariably prevail, given a
sufficiently large timescale. This is equivalent to saying say that direct physical violence is
generally an exceptional, not a commonly prevailing form of human interaction (see Collins
2008). Thus we expect the simple model to have little correspondence with reality, absent
some representation of these suppressive forces. A rough but simple way of translating
this mathematically is to treat the effect of increasing incidents of collective violence as
non-linear, modeled most simply by including the square of the number of incidents in the
model, with the expectation that the coefficient of the linear term (β1 in eq. 3.6) will be
positive, but that of the squared term (β2 ) will be negative.

ln(rn (t)) = αxi + β1

X

qa,t−1 + β2 (

a∈A

X

qa,(t−1) )2

(3.6)

a∈A

It is thus eq. 3.6 that is taken as modeling the fundamental adoption trajectory of collective
violence, the baseline model on which others can be built.
As we will be adding several additional terms to this equation, we will simplify things
considerably by introducing the intermediate concept of the “contagion” experienced by a
given PC at a particular time, which we can denote cit . The variables involved in describing
the diffusion patterns we are interested in each represent different ways of estimating cit ,
and ultimately the combined models will treat each relevant variant of cit as one element of
the vector cit . Formally, then all following models can be written as follows:
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ln(rn (t)) = αxi + βcit

(3.7)

For the baseline model in eq. 3.6, the first element of βcit can be written:

X

cit =

qa,t−1

(3.8)

qa,t−1 )2

(3.9)

a∈A

and the second term can be written:

cit = (

X

a∈A

This puts the equations in terms that may be easily estimated using Cox’s partial-likelihood
estimation Cox (1972). One final note is necessary here. The technique of focusing on risk
episodes rather than simply individuals comes with the significant danger of papering over
unobserved unit-level predictors of collective violence. This may result in an underestimate
of standard errors, and thus unwarranted levels of confidence in the statistical significance
of results. In the models presented here, we control for these unobserved predictors by using
the number of prior incidents of collective violence observed in the PC as a control variable
(See Allison 1984; Myers 2011:304).
3.3.2. Decaying Influence over Time
As noted above, the baseline model assumes that at any given point in time, all prior incidents of collective violence contribute equally to contagion. This seems unlikely in the case
of collective violence, since violence usually lasts only a few days. A more likely situation is
that seeing or hearing about collective violence temporarily renders questions about whether
or not violence is justified relevant, but that after a short time, other questions and concerns
press in, displacing questions of participation in violence from the center of attention. One
way of modeling this is to assign importance only to events that took place in the previous
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week:

cit =

X

mT (a),t−7≤T ≤t−1

(3.10)

a∈A

Here A is still the set of all adoptions, but m is a dummy indicating whether the time of
the adoption T (a) occurred between 1 and 7 days before the current time t.
eq. 3.10 is an improvement over the temporally homogeneous baseline model, but it still
represents a counter-intuitive model of memory, one in which everything that happened in
the past week is equally relevant, while anything beyond this boundary is irrelevant. A
more intuitive alternative is to model the contribution of each recent episode to “contagion”
as being inversely proportional to the amount of time since the episode ended. This is
represented here as follows.

cit =

X mT (a),t−7≤T ≤t−1
t − T (a)

(3.11)

a∈A

The denominator represents the amount of time between T (a), the time of adoption, and
the reference present time, t.
3.3.3. Decaying Influence over Distance
Beyond temporal homogeneity, we may imagine that other factors are also relevant to diffusion. For instance, geographic distance may serve as a proxy for geographically concentrated
contact networks, particularly networks of face-to-face contacts. This would contrast with
diffusion hypotheses that focus on contagion via mass media influence, which would predict
a more homogeneous geographic influence. Here we model the decay of influence over distance by dividing dividing the contagion term in eq. 3.11 by the great-circle distance (in
kilometers) between the location of a relevant episode of collective violence and the centroid
of the PC under consideration. That is:
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cit =

X mT (a),t−7≤T ≤t−1
(t − T (a))dij(a)

(3.12)

a∈A

where dij(a) is the distance between the centroid of PC i and the location where adoption a
occurred.
3.3.4. States as Boundaries for Diffusion
Up to this point, the diffusion terms introduced have closely followed Myers (2011), with
two minor exceptions–in these models I have not attempted to control for annual rhythms
of protest, and in controlling for distance, I have used the relatively simple inverse-distance
decay model rather than the more complex data-derived Gompertz function used by Myers
(2011:313).
However, the literature on the connections between collective violence and the media in
India suggests an additional diffusion term as potentially useful. In 1956, India underwent a
major process of boundary reorganization, with language used as the primary criterion for
boundary-making. Parallel to this, and as a consequence, there exists a tiered media structure in India, with national-level news outlets largely reporting in English, and regional-level
news outlets reporting in the official languages of the states. Previous work has suggested
that regional-level newspapers have a history of printing material with a more editorial voice
and less care taken to check facts, resulting in in the spread of material that could hardly
be better designed to provoke outrage, some of which turns out to have no basis in fact
Ghassem-Fachandi (2012). If these observations hold systematically, and state-language
newspapers contribute more to contagion than national newspapers, it would lead us to
expect a more homogeneous pattern of exposure within the areas in which state-language
newspapers reporting on an incident of collective violence circulate. The language-based division of the states of India permits us to use state boundaries as a rough approximation to
the areas in which state-language newspapers circulate. We model this using a term similar
to eq. 3.11, as follows:
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cit =

X mT (a),t−7≤T ≤t−1
pij(a)
t − T (a)

(3.13)

a∈A

where pij(a) is a dummy variable indicating whether PC i is in the same state as the location
where adoption a occurred.

3.4. Data
For data on ethno-religious collective violence, this study relies on the Varshney-Wilkinson
Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India (Varshney and Wilkinson 2006), along with Mitra and Rai’s extension to this dataset (Mitra and Ray 2014). This study follows Wilkinson’s
recommendation in selecting incidents with reported fatalities, in light of his finding that this
practice mitigates regional bias observed in the reporting of less-serious incidents (Wilkinson
2004:248). In places where onset dates or duration dates were unavailable, I checked the
records in the database against the relevant articles in the Times of India archive, and found
that I was able to find an onset date for every event, and a duration for every incident but
one. For estimation purposes, I coded this event as having a duration of 1 day, on the logic
that this was the minimum number of days that the PC could have experienced collective
violence while still having an incident as defined in Varshney and Wilkinson’s data entry
protocols. I then carefully geolocated every event using both Google’s Maps API and the
India Place Finder web application Mizushima (2011). Where these disagreed or produced
ambiguous locations (disagreement was defined as a difference of 0.05 degrees in either longitude or latitude), I consulted the original Times of India articles and used a combination
of contextual clues and Google Maps to identify coordinates manually. I then overlaid these
points onto 1976-2004 PC shapefiles obtained from ML Infomap to identify which PC each
episode had taken place in. Finally, to avoid having one episode begin in a PC before another had ended, I collapsed episodes that took place within the same PC and overlapped
into single stretches of time in which the PC was treated as though it were in a “violent”
state.
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3.4.1. Demographic Controls
One of the more consistent findings in the literature on Hindu-Muslim collective violence is
that violence is more likely in cities than in rural areas (Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004).
As such, the population of a geographic unit is an important control variable to include in
models. Also important is the ethnoreligious breakdown of the population in the geographical unit. For these variables and others derived from them, I rely on statistics from the 1981
and 1991 Indian census rounds, which collect these data at the district level.
To estimate populations at the PC level, I followed the GIS crosswalk procedure applied by
Swaminathan et al (Blossom et al. 2019; Swaminathan et al. 2019), using the geopandas
and rasterio packages for python. This process involved the following steps:
1. Geocoding the total population, Hindu population, and Muslim population variables
to 1981 and 1991 district shapefiles obtained from ML Infomap
2. Overlaying these shapefiles onto 1976-2004 PC shapefiles, also from ML Infomap
3. Using the intersect option to generate a new set of shapefiles, with each shape having
both the district ID and the PC ID of the overlapping areas
4. Calculating and comparing the areas of the generated new shapefiles and the original
districts to eliminate “slivers” (polygons with less than 0.01% of the original district
area)
5. Overlaying the new shapefiles over the WorldPop 2000 100 meter resolution population
raster (the earliest date available for raster data at this resolution)
6. Using the zonal_stats command from the rasterstats package to produce a total
population per intersected polygon
7. Calculating the percentage of district population in the intersected polygon
8. Dividing the new population by the total population of the district
9. Multiplying the Muslim and Hindu populations by the percentage of the district population contained in each segment, to produce an estimate of the number of Hindus
or Muslims in each district segment
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10. Aggregating the intersected shapefiles by PC ID, producing an estimate of the total
number of Hindus and Muslims in each PC
3.4.2. Economic Controls
As noted above, differences in the economic positions of Hindus and Muslims have also
been proposed as explanations for differing propensities of locations to experience collective violence. In order to estimate these, I used microdata from three of the quinquennial
“thick” rounds of the National Sample Survey, round 38 (1983), round 43 (1987-88) and
round 50 (1993-1994), which aggregate to the level of NSS regions. Using the microdata and
the provided sample weights, I calculated the total population, Hindu population, Muslim
population, and total Hindu and Muslim expenditures (household mean per capita expenditure multiplied by number of members of the household, all summed by head-of-household
religious affiliation). Using the supporting documentation from these rounds and district
shapefiles from 1983, 1987, and 1993, I constructed shapefiles to represent the NSS regions
used for each of these rounds. These regions remained virtually unchanged between rounds.
I then used the same technique described above to estimate the equivalent data at the PC
level, but used these constructed NSS region shapefiles instead of district shapefiles.
As noted above, there are three main hypotheses associated with economic variables in the
literature, related to overall growth, majority-group growth vs. minority-group growth, and
within-group vs. between-group inequality. However, including a measure of the change in
expenditure between NSS rounds would further limit the window for analysis to the years
1988-2000. By contrast, the third is more amenable to inclusion in this model. In particular,
I focus on the between-group inequality because of it has a close relation to Mitra and Ray’s
(2014) findings, given that improving the economic fortunes of the minority group, in this
case usually a disadvantaged minority group, is likely to decrease between-group inequality.
Based on the estimates derived above, I calculate a measure of between-group inequality
similar to that used by Bulutgil and Prasad (unpublished manuscript):
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BGIi =

M Ci
i
( HC
HPi ) − ( M Pi )
HCi +M Ci
HPi +M Pi

(3.14)

Where, for a district i, BGIi represents the between-group inequality in district , HCi and
M Ci represent Hindu and Muslim consumption, respectively, and HPi and M Pi represent
Hindu and Muslim populations. The numerator represents the difference between average
Hindu consumption and average Muslim consumption, while the denominator represents the
pooled average consumption of Hindus and Muslims together.
In order to use these data in event history models, I assigned census data state changes to
the official reference dates of March 1, 1981 and March 1, 1991. Populations for intervening
years were not interpolated, to avoid breaching the assumptions underlying event history
analysis resulting in unpredictable biases to the model (Therneau, Crowson, and Atkinson
2021b). NSS rounds did not have reference dates, so I assigned each round the date of
the last day of the last month in which NSS data was listed as gathered. Thus round 38
is assigned to December 31, 1983, round 43 is assigned to June 30, 1988, and round 50 is
assigned to June 30, 1994.
3.4.3. Electoral Controls
In addition to economic and demographic variables, it is also useful to contrast the results
of diffusion-based models with models that account for the political environment in each
PC. For this, I relied on data on Lok Sabha (national) and Vidhan Sabha (state-level)
elections from Ashoka University’s Lok Dhaba portal, based on statistical reports published
by the Election Commission of India (Agarwal et al. 2021). For Lok Sabha elections, I
calculated the effective number of parties for each PC, as well as the margin of victory.
For Vidhan Sabha elections, I calculated the same statistics, effective number of party and
margin of victory, but at the level of the Assembly Constituency, which represent smaller
subdivisions of Parliamentary Constituency. I then assigned the margin of victory from
the closest Assembly Constituency election contained in a PC to that PC. I assigned the
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median effective number of parties at the AC level to the PC level. I also calculated an
alternative measure of the effective number of parties at the PC level, aggregating the votes
that accrued to each party in all the AC elections contained within the PC, then calculating
the effective number of parties on the basis of those vote totals. This electoral data was
then assigned to the PCs as a time-dependent variable on the date on which the election
occurred.

3.5. Results
Combining multiple data sources in the way this study has done imposes restrictions on the
models that can be used, as each data source has a slightly different period of coverage. The
collective violence covers the longest time period, from 1950-2000. To avoid problems related
to the reallocation of districts, I only use election data from after the Emergency, restricting
analysis to the 1977-2000 period. Using district data from the 1981 and 1991 censuses cuts
the period under analysis to 1981-2000, while using NSS data effectively restricts the time
window to the period from 1984-2000. In light of these restrictions, I undertook three sets
of models. The first model used only diffusion terms, but covered the full time range from
1950-2000. The second model includes electoral data and demographic controls from the
census, and uses only data from 1981-2000. The third model includes electoral data and
socioeconomic data from the National Sample Survey, and uses the shortest analysis period,
from 1984-2000.
In the sections below, I present the results of each of the three variations of the models
separately, introducing the uncontrolled diffusion model first, then proceeding to introduce
electoral, demographic, and economic variables below.
3.5.1. Diffusion Model without Controls
The initial set of diffusion models presented in Table 3.1 underscores the relevance of diffusion to the study of collective violence in India. Across all 5 uncontrolled models, the
fundamental adoption trajectory stands out as highly significant. As expected, we find a
positive coefficient associated with the cumulative event count, and a negative coefficient for
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the quadratic term. These indicate the expected rising-then-falling pattern associated with
a wave of collective violence initiation followed by the application of violence suppression.
The hypothesis that more recent events are more influential than those further in the past
also finds support in the consistently significant positive coefficient for the number of events
in the previous week. Counterintuitively, in models 3 and 4, the term that suggests a steady
decrease in the salience of recent incidents turns out to lack significance, as does the term
that suggests that nearby events are more salient than distant ones. Model 5 confirms the
intuition that state boundaries are important in accounting for the pattern of diffusion, suggesting that the critiques of state-language media sources carries weight not just in specific
circumstances, but at a more general level.
3.5.2. Demography and Diffusion
With the initial uncontrolled model having highlighted the importance of diffusion models,
the next several models use a subset of the collective violence data from 1981-2000 to test
how these models fare when we control for PC-level demographic estimates derived from
1981 and 1991 census data.
An initial set of models tests which candidate demographic controls are important to factor
into subsequent models. Model 2a affirms that larger population centers are at greater
risk of collective violence. Model 2b accounts for the intuition that a necessary condition
for violence against a minority group is the presence of enough members of that minority
group in an area. In contrast to Wilkinson’s model, the percentage Muslim term emerges as
highly significant, perhaps reflecting the variation in Muslim population across Indian states
as compared to Uttar Pradesh, which has a relatively high proportion of Muslim citizens
compared to other states in Southern, Eastern, and Northeastern India. Meanwhile, the
curvilinear term accounts for changes in the level of contention as the populations approach
parity. This model accords with Wilkinson’s, implying that violence is more frequent as
group populations are more evenly matched (2004:43–44). Models 2c and 2d provide an
alternate model of this hypothesis, using an alternate measure of the group population
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Table 3.1: Diffusion Models without Controls (1950-2000)
History of Violence
(Control)

Cumulative Events
at t (CE)

CE2 ×10−3

1a

1b

1c

1d

1e

.072∗∗∗

.077∗∗∗

.077∗∗∗

.077∗∗∗

.075∗∗∗

(.006)

(.006)

(.006)

(.006)

(.006)

.015∗∗∗

.015∗∗∗

.015∗∗∗

.015∗∗∗

.014∗∗∗

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

−.020∗∗∗
(.001)

−.020∗∗∗
(.001)

−.020∗∗∗
(.001)

−.020∗∗∗
(.001)

−.019∗∗∗
(.001)

.145∗∗∗

.158∗∗∗

.155∗∗∗

.174∗∗∗

(.016)

(.039)

(.039)

(.041)

−.019
(.056)

−.018
(.056)

−.161∗
(.068)

.930

.531

(1.397)

(2.656)

Events in the
Previous Week (EPW)

EPW (time discount)

EPW (time
and distance discount)

EPW in same state
(discounted for time)

.690∗∗∗
(.104)

Observations
LR Test

1,871,573
575.036∗∗∗

1,871,484
636.865∗∗∗

1,871,478
638.246∗∗∗
∗

Note:
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1,871,478
638.661∗∗∗
p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

1,871,451
683.563∗∗∗
∗∗∗

p<0.01

disparity:

GP Di =

HPi − M Pi
HPi + M Pi

(3.15)

Where GP Di is the group population disparity measure, HPi is the Hindu population in
district i, and M Pi is the Muslim population in district i. In both 2c and 2d, this term
is significant. Model 2d shows that the initial curvilinear model and the more constrained
absolute-value work at cross-purposes, and a comparison of the likelihood ratio tests between
models 2b and 2c indicates that the curvilinear model is a better approximation to the data,
so this version is retained for the remaining analyses.
The second set of models examines whether the diffusion variables remain significant with
the introduction of demographic controls. Table 3.3 demonstrates a similar pattern to the
diffusion patterns in the uncontrolled model. Across all models, the demographic controls
and fundamental adoption trajectory remain significant. In contrast to the earlier model,
however, the term capturing the enhanced salience of events in the past 7 days loses statistical
significance when the other diffusion terms are added. The time-discounted model, as before,
shows no statistical significance, and the term factoring in distance loses significance as soon
as the term representing the influence of events in the same state is added to the model. This
pattern affirms the importance of both the large-scale wave of adoption of collective violence
during the 1980s, and suggests that the networks through which collective violence diffused
is one that is better modeled as homogeneous within state borders than geographically
centered.
3.5.3. Electoral Competition and Diffusion
The next set of models takes up the argument from Wilkinson (2004) that electoral competition is a key predictor of ethno-religious violence in India. As with the demographic
variables, an initial model examines key explanatory variables from Wilkinson’s model to
ensure that an appropriate set of control variables is chosen against which to test the diffu103

Table 3.2: Demographic Models with Census Data (1981-2000)
History of Violence
(Control)

Population ×10−6

2a

2b

2c

2d

.254∗∗∗

.241∗∗∗

.243∗∗∗

.238∗∗∗

(.049)

(.043)

(.045)

(.044)

.715∗∗∗
(.141)

.588∗∗∗
(.150)

.623∗∗∗
(.150)

.622∗∗∗
(.146)

Percent Muslim

6.406∗∗∗
(1.442)

13.144∗∗∗
(3.110)

Percent Muslim2

−6.695∗
(2.379)

−12.756∗∗∗
(3.337)

Group Population
Disparity

Observations
LR Test

998,495
75.041∗∗∗

998,495
105.436∗∗∗
∗

Note:

104

−1.532∗∗∗

2.286∗∗∗

(.309)

(.968)

998,495
96.426∗∗∗

998,495
110.336∗∗∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 3.3: Diffusion Models with Census Demographic Controls (1981-2000)
2e

2f

2g

2h

2i

.198∗∗∗

.195∗∗∗

.192∗∗∗

.187∗∗∗

.185∗∗∗

(.051)

(.051)

(.051)

(.051)

(.055)

Population ×10−6

.610∗∗∗
(.152)

.613∗∗∗
(.151)

.612∗∗∗
(.151)

.635∗∗∗
(.149)

.633∗∗∗
(.152)

Percent Muslim

6.487∗∗∗
(1.402)

6.498∗∗∗
(1.400)

6.507∗∗∗
(1.401)

6.498∗∗∗
(1.399)

6.506∗∗∗
(1.398)

Percent Muslim2

−6.545∗∗
(2.282)

−6.539∗∗
(2.277)

−6.550∗∗
(2.278)

−6.495∗∗
(2.270)

−6.444∗∗
(2.256)

.015∗∗∗

.013∗∗∗

.013∗∗∗

.013∗∗∗

.013∗∗∗

(.004)

(.004)

(.004)

(.004)

(.004)

−.035∗∗∗
(.008)

−.032∗∗∗
(.009)

−.032∗∗∗
(.009)

−.032∗∗∗
(.009)

−.032∗∗∗
(.009)

.158∗∗∗

.114

.116

.099

(.029)

(.098)

(.102)

(.105)

.063
(.130)

.022
(.138)

.006
(.144)

13.085∗∗

2.457

(7.108)

(11.027)

History of Violence
(Control)

Cumulative Events
at t (CE)

CE2 ×10−3

Events in the
Previous Week (EPW)

EPW (time discount)

EPW (time
and distance discount)

EPW in same state
(discounted for time)

.725∗∗∗
(.230)

Observations
LR Test

998,494
126.723∗∗∗

998,494
143.863∗∗∗

998,494
146.258∗∗∗
∗

Note:

105

998,494
150.669∗∗∗
p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

998,494
160.333∗∗∗
∗∗∗

p<0.01

sion models. The results appear below in Table 3.4.
Because of the number of variables associated with this model, this analysis proceeds in a
stepwise fashion, introducing one class of variable at a time before providing a more complete model. Model 2i introduces variables related to the six month period directly preceding
elections to the Lok Sabha (national legislature) or the various Vidhan Sabhas (state legislatures). The results provide tentative support for the proposition that collective violence is
more likely during the six months leading up to national elections, but not state elections.
Model 2j similarly examines the six month period directly after elections. It provides moderate support for the idea that collective violence is less likely shortly after national elections
than other times, though this effect does not translate to state elections. Models 2k and 2l
engage with Wilkinson’s argument that violence is more likely when the effective number
of parties is lower (Wilkinson 2004:138–42). The two models differ from each other in the
means by which the effective number of parties at the level of Assembly Constituencies (ACs)
is aggregated to the Parliamentary Constituency (PC) level. For Model 2k, the median of
the individual measures of effective number of parties for all ACs contained within a PC is
assigned to the PC. For Model 2l, the votes cast for each party are pooled between all ACs
in a PC, and a combined effective number of parties measure is calculated on this basis.
None of these measures of party fractionalization at the Parliamentary Constituency level
predict a significant shift in the hazard of collective violence, however. Model 2m engages
the argument that collective violence is more likely in situations where political elites have
reason to believe that the election will be close. For these models the margin of victory at
the last Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections, expressed as a percentage of the total votes
cast, serves as an indicator. As with the measures of party fractionalization, measures of
election closeness here prove non-significant.
Models 2n and 2o collect and present the variables associated with Lok Sabha and Vidhan
Sabha elections separately. In these combined models, the only significant influence on
the hazard is the variable representing the 6 month period after national elections, with
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Note:

Observations
LR Test

Lowest Margin
of Victory (VS)

Margin of Victory (LS)

Pooled electorate
ENOP (VS)

Median ENOP (VS)

ENOP (LS)

6m after
election (VS)

6m after
election (LS)

6m before
election (VS)

6m before
election (LS)

History of Violence
(Control)

.159
(.490)

(.011)

(.010)

.132∗∗∗

2o

1,059,903
63.005∗∗∗

(.274)

(.307)

1,051,547
69.059∗∗∗

1,040,827
51.636∗∗∗

(.228)

(.259)

∗

(.209)

.051

(.268)

.015

(.012)

.131∗∗∗

2q

∗∗

p<0.05;

1,040,669
63.049∗∗∗

(.945)

−.023

(.069)
.132
(.530)

.093

(.270)
−.041
(.105)

−.290

(.326)

−.808∗∗

p<0.1;

1,054,246
52.380∗∗∗

(.895)

(.914)
1,040,827
50.104∗∗∗

−.206

−.397

1,067,465
82.910∗∗∗

(.064)

(.066)

1,040,669
51.885∗∗∗

.042

.092
−.186
(.514)

−.199

−.345
−.043
(.096)

−.650∗∗

(.197)

(.185)
−.715∗∗

.036

(.011)

.108∗∗∗

2p

.166

(.248)

−.048
(.098)

(.012)

.118∗∗∗

2n

(.219)

−.074
(.109)
.132
(.101)

(.011)

.120∗∗∗

2m

.068

(.011)

(.010)

.120∗∗∗

2l

.446∗

.130∗∗∗

2k

.109∗∗∗

2j

Table 3.4: Electoral Competition Controls (1981-2000)

∗∗∗

p<0.01

1,075,796
80.571∗∗∗

(.273)

−.635∗∗

(.240)

.109

(.010)

.130∗∗∗

2r

the negative coefficient representing a decreased likelihood of violence during this period.
This significance is preserved in the combined model, 2p, where this again remains the
only significant variable. A final model, 2q, includes only variables that demonstrated
significance at other levels. In this model too, the only significant variable remains the 6
month period after national elections. Despite this, I retain all four election-timing related
variables as controls for estimation of the diffusion model below, given that event history
models give particular importance to temporal clustering, and each of these election-timing
related variables represents a competing model of the timing of collective violence.
These results are surprising in light of the support that electoral competition-related explanations have received in other studies. These contrast with Wilkinson’s own city-level
regression models (Wilkinson 2004:42–47). Wilkinson presents two models, one predicting
the incidence of Hindu-Muslim collective violence, the other predicting the number of fatalities from Hindu-Muslim collective violence. Of these, the former has a dependent variable
that corresponds to that used in this model. In Wilkinson’s equivalent model, the primary
significant variables prove to be indicators of the six months before an election, a variable
indicating whether the previous state election had a margin of less than 5%, and the closeness of the previous Vidhan Sabha constituency race. One explanation for the difference
may stem from the fact that Wilkinson’s model does not test for an effect during the six
months after an election; it is possible that Wilkinson’s model’s emphasis on the six months
before elections is capturing variation that could otherwise be related to the six months after
the election, though other studies that model this would need to be consulted. The second
explanation for differences may come from Wilkinson’s model mixing state-level characteristics with city-level characteristics, whereas the current model measures each concept at
the PC level. It is possible that the homogeneous-influence-in-state variable in the diffusion
models is capturing some of this variance.
We next move on to modeling diffusion using the control variables related to election timing.
The next set of models, which combine the election-timing related coefficients and diffusion
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variables offer few surprises. Among the control variables, the tendency for violence to remain suppressed six months after a national election is maintained through all five models,
but none of the other controls are consistently significant. The corresponding variable for
state elections appears mildly significant in model 3r with the introduction of the fundamental adoption trajectory, but returns to statistical insignificance with the introduction of
the term capturing events in the last seven days. As with the uncontrolled diffusion model
(and in contrast with the model controlling for demographic patterns), this variable remains
significant in all models, and the term representing smooth temporal discounting remains
insignificant. In model 2u, the term that introduces the distance-based discounting appears
significant, but in model 2v, introducing the in-state, time-discounted event count renders
the simpler distance discount non-significant.
3.5.4. Economic Power and Diffusion
Beyond demographic and electoral-competition-based explanations, a third common class
of explanations suggests that the relative economic differences between groups play a key
role in causing collective violence. Investigating the role that economic differences requires
the use of a different data source, in this case the microdata from India’s National Sample
Surveys. The first year for which these microdata are currently available is 1983, resulting in
a time window that is constricted still further compared to that of the census-based models
above. Additionally, using NSS data at the PC level relies on a variation of the crosswalk
estimation procedure that has been vetted less thoroughly than the one used to translate
district-level data to the PC level. Finally, comparisons between PC population statistics
between census data and NSS data suggest that the two may not be directly substituted for
one another. As a result, the process for developing demographic controls is repeated here,
with the addition of the between-group inequality term defined in eq. 3.14. Results from
these models appear in Table 3.6.
As was the case with census-based demographic variables (see Table 3.2), the population
variable remains highly significant through all models, as does the Muslim percentage pop-
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Table 3.5: Diffusion Models with Electoral Competition Controls (1981-2000)
History of Violence
(Control)
6m before
election (LS)
6m after
election (LS)
6m before
election (VS)
6m after
election (VS)
Cumulative Events
at t (CE)
CE2 ×10−3

2s

2t

2u

2v

2w

.116∗∗∗

.120∗∗∗

.121∗∗∗

.121∗∗∗

.121∗∗∗

(.015)

(.015)

(.015)

(.015)

(.015)

.055

.102

.105

.104

.110

(.251)

(.253)

(.253)

(.253)

(.254)

−.923∗∗∗

−.804∗∗∗

−.804∗∗∗

−.808∗∗∗

−.810∗∗∗

(.319)

(.322)

(.322)

(.322)

(.323)

.129

.124

.124

.129

.114

(.205)

(.206)

(.206)

(.206)

(.207)

−.425∗

−.364

−.365

−.365

−.363

(.269)

(.271)

(.271)

(.271)

(.272)

.024∗∗∗

.021∗∗∗

.021∗∗∗

.021∗∗∗

.020∗∗∗

(.003)
−.049∗∗∗
(.006)

(.003)
−.043∗∗∗
(.007)

(.003)
−.043∗∗∗
(.007)

(.003)
−.043∗∗∗
(.007)

(.003)
−.041∗∗∗
(.007)

.177∗∗∗

.152∗∗

.151∗∗

.143∗∗

(.023)

(.065)
.035
(.085)

(.065)
.018
(.087)

(.068)
−.006
(.098)

7.209∗∗∗

−9.284

(4.367)

(15.114)

Events in the
Previous Week (EPW)
EPW (time discount)
EPW (time
and distance discount)
EPW in same state
(discounted for time)

.616∗∗∗
(.192)

Observations
LR Test

1,048,499
136.627∗∗∗

1,048,499
171.636∗∗∗

1,048,499
172.038∗∗∗
∗

Note:
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1,048,499
176.609∗∗∗
p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

1,048,499
188.022∗∗∗
∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 3.6: Economic and Demographic Controls (1984-2000)
History of Violence
(Control)

Between Group
Inequality

3a

3b

3c

.098∗∗∗

.034

.038

(.016)

(.020)

(.020)

.084

.116∗

.135∗∗

(.071)

(.074)

(.078)

.770∗∗∗
(.146)

.760∗∗∗
(.147)

Population ×10−6

Percent Muslim

3.853∗∗∗
(1.240)

Percent Muslim2

−2.584
(1.692)

Observations
LR Test
Note:

990,290
21.285∗∗∗
∗

990,290
45.775∗∗∗

p<0.1;
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∗∗

p<0.05;

990,290
61.757∗∗∗
∗∗∗

p<0.01

ulation variable. Once the population variable is introduced, the between-group inequality variable quickly emerges as significant, but the coefficient is opposite to Bulutgil and
Prasad’s finding (unpublished manuscript), with greater between-group inequality predicting a higher, rather than a lower chance of collective violence. Including the between-group
inequality variable also attenuates the effects of the curvilinear Muslim population variable
to the point that it fades from statistical significance.
The next models investigate the effects of including the measure of between-group inequality
alongside electoral control variables. The results in this case differ somewhat from those of
the earlier electoral models, with the variable representing the six months before a national
election now appearing as a period when the hazard of collective violence is elevated, in
contrast to earlier models that highlighted a six month period after elections when the
hazard was lowered.
The final set of models bring together controls related to between-group inequality, demographics, and electoral competition, and once again test these against the diffusion terms.
In this final set of models, the coefficients for between-group inequality, the curvilinear term
for the Muslim percentage, and the 6 months after a national election quickly fade from
significance. A further set of surprises appears in the diffusion terms. With all controls in
place, the fundamental adoption trajectory is quickly displaced by the terms representing
the most recent episodes of unrest. In the final model, the number of events in the previous
week is significant in the expected direction, as are the terms representing a geographically
centered distance discount function and the homogeneous in-state influence function. The
term representing the time discount is significant in the final model only, but is unexpectedly
negative, rather than positive.

3.6. Conclusion
This study brings diffusion modelling to the study of collective ethno-religious violence in
India, while also demonstrating the usefulness of a new unit of analysis–the parliamentary
constituency. This study is the first to bring together economic, demographic, electoral
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Table 3.7: Economic and Electoral Controls (1984-2000)
3d

3e

History of Violence (Control)

∗∗∗

.136
(.021)

.135∗∗∗
(.020)

Between Group Inequality (BGI)

.072
(.076)

.075
(.074)

6 Months before National Election

.785∗∗∗
(.304)

.649∗∗
(.292)

6 Months after National Election

−.406
(.370)

−.575
(.352)

Margin of Victory (Last National Election)

−.020
(.121)

Effective No. of Parties (Last National Election)

.433
(.586)

6 Months before State Election

.197
(.224)

6 Months after State Election

−.238
(.331)

Effective No. of Parties (Last State Election)
Pooled PC Electorate

.095
(.079)
−.515
(1.141)

Lowest Margin of Victory (Last State Election)

Observations
LR Test

956,619
43.565∗∗∗

Note:

∗
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p<0.1;

∗∗

974,624
34.211∗∗∗
p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 3.8: Diffusion with Economic, Demographic, and Electoral Controls (1984-2000)
3f

3g

3h

3i

3j

3k

History of
Violence (Ctrl)

.081∗∗∗

.076∗∗∗

.081∗∗∗

.081∗∗∗

.079∗∗∗

.076∗∗∗

BGI

(.023)
.128∗∗
(.080)

(.026)
.112∗
(.087)

(.026)
.100
(.093)

(.026)
.101
(.093)

(.026)
.103
(.092)

(.027)
.105
(.095)

Population
×10−6

.823∗∗∗

.782∗∗∗

.757∗∗∗

.760∗∗∗

.776∗∗∗

.811∗∗∗

(.153)
3.503∗∗∗
(1.253)
−1.968
(1.666)

(.153)
3.333∗∗∗
(1.262)
−1.870
(1.678)

(.155)
3.277∗∗∗
(1.267)
−1.774
(1.678)

(.154)
3.285∗∗∗
(1.266)
−1.780
(1.678)

(.153)
3.262∗∗∗
(1.268)
−1.733
(1.676)

(.153)
3.232∗∗∗
(1.279)
−1.597
(1.662)

.644∗∗

.614∗∗

.695∗∗

.697∗∗

.709∗∗

.685∗∗

(.286)

(.286)

Percent Muslim
Percent Muslim2
6m before
election (LS)
6m after
election (LS)

(.291)

(.292)

(.292)

(.289)

−.649

∗∗

−.886

−.593

−.583

−.583

−.621

(.357)

(.368)
.028∗∗∗
(.008)
−.055∗∗∗
(.016)

(.374)
.019∗∗
(.008)
−.036∗
(.017)
.211∗∗∗
(.031)

(.374)
.018∗
(.008)
−.034∗
(.017)
.291∗∗∗
(.083)

(.375)
.018∗
(.008)
−.033∗
(.017)
.296∗∗∗
(.083)

(.377)
.015
(.009)
−.029
(.018)
.347∗∗∗
(.085)

−.119

−.150

−.344∗∗

(.119)

(.120)

(.137)

∗

CE
CE2
EPW
EPW
(t discount)
EPW
(t + d discount)

∗∗∗

10.277

(3.324)
EPW
in same state
(t discount)

6.227∗∗
(5.433)
.856∗∗∗
(.178)

Observations
LR Test

974,624
75.773∗∗∗

974,624
89.909∗∗∗

974,624
117.652∗∗∗

974,624
118.692∗∗∗
∗

Note:
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974,624
125.286∗∗∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

974,624
146.679∗∗∗
∗∗∗

p<0.01

competition, and diffusion models at the Parliamentary Constituency level.
A few key findings emerge from this comparison. Taken alone or together, demographic and
economic models reaffirm that violence is more likely when Hindu and Muslim communities are more equal, whether in population or in per-capita expenditure. This reinforces the
impression of this collective violence as pogrom-like, intended to reinforce ethno-religious hierarchies in situations where decreased disparities in population or decreased between-group
economic inequality threatens the influence of the more powerful group or the salience of
the ethno-religious divide. Variables related to electoral competition suggest, albeit inconsistently, that the hazard of violence is greater just before a national election and lower in
the period just after. However, party fractionalization and election margins are not good
predictors of violence at the parliamentary constituency level when considering data on the
whole of India. Finally, diffusion is a consistently important factor in anticipating when
and where violence is likely to occur. In the Indian context, the models tested consistently
suggest that state boundaries have special relevance for the spread of collective violence,
likely linked to the circulation of state-level media.
A few shortcomings of this study suggest that extending this study further forward in the
timeline may prove fruitful. That the crosswalk method relies on a raster map of population
distributions from 2000–right at the tail end of the study–to estimate populations from as
early as 1981 rests on the assumption that population distribution (as opposed to population)
has remained relatively constant over time. Assembling and using data on collective violence
from 2000 forward would circumvent this problem, given that up-to-date population rasters
are available for this later period. Extending analysis to the more recent period would also
permit the use of data from additional data sources, such as the India Human Development
Surveys, which include participation in civic life, allowing the inclusion of Varshney’s theory
that inter-religious ties are a crucial part of preventing collective violence. An additional
shortcoming relates to the specificity of the kind of collective violence expressed here. As
many analysts have noted, there is a complex interaction between caste-based and ethno-
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religious politics in contemporary India, with ethno-religious violence frequently suspected
as a tool for building inter-caste coalitions (see Verghese 2016; Wilkinson 2004). Thus an
analysis that considered caste-based violence as well as ethno-religious violence and took into
account caste compositions of different PCs could provide useful extensions of this project.
More importantly, this study suggests that further study of diffusion effects in Indian collective violence is warranted. A careful attempt to disentangle state-level media networks from
state-level partisan networks would be a logical next step. Exploring alternative formulations of time and distance decay, and factoring in the severity of the incidents of collective
violence would also be logical next steps.
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CHAPTER 4
When Emotions Work: A Case Study of De-escalation
“The only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.” Wayne
LaPierre, NRA Executive Vice President, December 21, 2012 (Guardian 2012)

While the press widely scorned Wayne LaPierre’s tone-deaf response to the 2012 school
shooting in Newtown, CT, a startling majority of contemporary strategies for reducing
violence boil down to the same logic: curtailing violence through the use or threat of violence.
Any vision of a non-violent world requires some answer to two questions: Is it possible to
curb violence without resorting to it? And if so how?
For the last 14 years, the most promising breakthroughs in the study of violence have come
from naturalistic studies of violent interactions, but comparable studies of de-escalation are
only just beginning to emerge. Recordings of violence are more common than recordings of
de-escalation away from violence–perhaps because stories of death and violence are among
the most “tellable,” while stories where violence is avoided are more vulnerable to the retort
“So what?” (see Labov 2013). Of course, there are exceptions. This paper examines one such
exception, the case of Antoinette Tuff and Michael Hill. Tuff, the bookkeeper for a school in
Decatur, GA, was on duty at the front desk one day when Hill walked in with an assault rifle
and a backpack full of ammunition, threatening a school shooting (see Figure 4.1a). After
30 minutes of tense interaction, Hill set his weapons aside, lay on the floor, and told Tuff he
was ready for her to let the police come in and take him away (see Figure 4.1b). The case
was unusually well documented, because a 9-1-1 call Tuff placed early in the interaction
captured a great deal of what happened. The recording was released by the local news,
as was partial video footage from the school’s security cameras. Antoinette Tuff became a
minor celebrity, and a year later she released a memoir of the events (Tuff 2014).
This study brings several micro-sociological and conversation analytic tools to bear on these
sources, along with an interpretive reading of Tuff’s memoir. While I consider several turn117

(a) Hill holds up the gun, which he has just removed from a black bag. The woman immediately in
front of him is Belinda, a teacher at the school Tuff is offscreen behind the printers on the left hand
side. [00:12]

(b) Hill lies face-down on the floor. His feet protrude from behind the desk. The gun and his bags
are on the counter. [28:52]

Figure 4.1: Hill before and after the de-escalation process.
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ing points in the interaction, I focus on one that takes place in the middle of the interaction, in which a shift in emotional dominance from the gunman to the school’s bookkeeper
takes place. I trace this shift to the intersection of two process. The first is the bookkeeper’s process of emotional fortification involving cognitive emotion work (Hochschild
2012), pragmatically-oriented situational semiosis (Peirce 1905), and a sense of divine participation in her internal conversation (Luhrmann 2012; Wiley 2016). The second is one
of acute emotional exhaustion in the gunman brought about by violent confrontations with
the police (Collins 2008). The two processes meet in a moment of externalization for the
bookkeeper (Chalari 2009), in which her expressions of solidarity and mutual vulnerability
overcome the exhausted gunman and set the stage for processes of deliberation (Gibson
2012), identity repair (Goffman 1982), and “doing being ordinary” (Sacks 1984) that lead
the confrontation to a non-violent conclusion.

4.1. De-escalation in situ
While there is an extensive literature on de-escalation in a variety of disciplines (in policing
and psychiatric nursing in particular), much of it provides theoretically motivated normative procedures, rather than a naturalistic examination of real cases of de-escalation. Two
exceptions stand out. The first is the literature on negotiation in hostage situations and
other crises (Donohue and Ramesh 1992; William A. Donohue, Ramesh, and Borchgrevink
1991a; Donohue and Taylor 2007; Hammer 2001; Rogan 2009, 2011; Rogan and Hammer
1994, 1995; Rogan and Hammer 2002; Taylor and Donald 2004). The second is the emerging literature on de-escalation that has begun to grow out of the microsociological study of
violence (Collins 2019), and its emphasis on avoiding selection on the dependent variable.
Much of this literature has focused on protest or crowd-like situations (Bramsen 2018; Nassauer 2015, 2018a; Weenink, Dhattiwala, and van der Duin 2022). I discuss each of these in
turn below.
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4.1.1. Crisis Negotiation
Before diving deeper into the literature in this area, it is worth bearing the range of possible
outcomes of hostage/crisis negotiations in mind. One of the best conceptual mappings is
that put together by Blair, Martaindale and Nichols (2014), reporting on active-shooter
events in the US between 2000 and 2012, reproduced as Figure 4.2.
Crisis negotiations, of course, cover far more situations than active shootings–hostagetakings, barricade events, and suicide attempts are all handled in similar ways by police
negotiating teams, and as a result have similar interactional features. A few features in particular stand out. In the active-shooter events reported above, suicide is the most common
outcome, accounting for 34 out of the 104 events, with being shot by police as the next most
likely outcome (23 of 104 events). This is in line with FBI statistics on hostage and barricade
situations, which indicated that suicides and attempted suicides accounted for more than
a third of crisis negotiation incidents to which police responded (cited in Rogan 2009:35),

Figure 4.2: Active Shooter Event resolutions, 2000-2012, (from Blair et al. 2014)
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while by one set of accounts, nearly 80% of school shooters had a history of suicide attempts
(Newman et al. 2004:244). Police tactical responses are also common, and until the negotiation crises in 1972, represented the dominant response to hostage and barricade situations
(Rogan and Hammer 2002). But other scenarios also exist, including situations where the
attacker leaves, situations where victims subdue the attacker (violently or non-violently),
and situations where the police subdue the attacker without shooting them. The present
study falls into one of the low-frequency categories, representing a case where one of the
would-be victims of the threatened school shootings convinces the attacker to surrender.
The hostage negotiation literature, like the role of professional hostage negotiator, grew
partly as a response to failures of confrontational approaches to crisis situations during the
Attica Uprising of 1971 and the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. In both high profile incidents, tactical responses to hostage takers led to the deaths of hostages, law enforcement
personnel, and hostage-takers, and later high profile negotiation failures like the 1993 negotiations with the Branch Davidian group in Waco, TX, served to underscore the need for
these investigations. While early work drew primarily from practitioner experience, social
scientists using recordings from FBI negotiation teams began to produce more rigorously researched naturalistic studies of negotiation in the early 1990s (Rogan and Hammer 2002:230,
234).
Work by William Donohue and colleagues (William A. Donohue et al. 1991b) set the agenda
for the next 2 decades worth of work in the area, highlighting several characteristics that
distinguished what they called “crisis bargaining” from other forms of negotiation–the prominence of coercive challenges and strategies, a lack of complete information for both parties,
high stakes, high emotional arousal, a sense of urgency, a preponderance of “face” or identity issues, a narrow focus on a limited set of alternative outcomes, and relatively little
negotiation about implementation, monitoring, or contingencies. In the face of these distinctive challenges, they highlighted three aspects of crisis bargaining communication. The
first was relationally oriented communication, focused on building trust, a sense of closeness
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or immediacy, informality, and the handling of situational control. The second, related to
the “content” of communication, included negotiating demands, exploring feelings, and integrating information. The third, aspect, that of strategic consideration, related to tasks
of adjusting positions, gaining compliance, and developing proposed courses of action. All
three aspects served as part of a main goal of nudging the interaction from a crisis bargaining
mode–“you do this or I’ll hurt you”–to one of normative bargaining–“you do this and I’ll do
that.” Finally, Donohue et al provided an overview of a practitioner-created phase model
of negotiations, tracing negotiations through the tasks of intelligence gathering, establishing communication, clarifying problems and developing a relationship, problem solving, and
resolution. Perhaps more important than these theoretical frames, however, was the use of
transcript extracts from an actual hostage negotiation to ground the discussion of phases,
a move that laid the groundwork for a generation of studies that tested and modified these
hypotheses based on transcripts and recordings of negotiations, mostly collected by FBI
negotiators (William A. Donohue et al. 1991b).
One of the early results of the new generation was the finding that while phase models
provided reasonable descriptions of the simulated situations created to train negotiators,
real negotiations rarely followed a consistent sequence of tasks. Instead, problems related
to maintaining communication channels, keeping the attention of impaired hostage-takers,
and changing negotiators shed light on the ways in which large-scale tasks frequently had
to be repeated or re-sequenced (Holmes 1992; Holmes 1997; Holmes and Sykes 1993).
Decoupled from a rigid phase model, investigations of communicative action proved more
useful. Donohue, Rogan and Borchgrevnik (William A. Donohue et al. 1991a) found that
language that communicated spatial immediacy–using words like “these” instead of “those”,
“here” instead of “there”, words specifying nearness or contact (“adjoin”, “meet”, “touch”)
rather than distance or displacement (“away”, “remove”) correlated well with cooperative
moments in negotiation, while their opposites correlated with more competitive negotiation
phases (William A. Donohue et al. 1991a). Another study found that, when comparing the
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kinds of verbal behaviors that occurred close together in transcripts of 9 resolved hostage
negotiations, the behaviours fell fairly well into nine qualitative categories, summarized in
table 4.1 below (Taylor 2002).
A study centered on facework meanwhile found that both negotiators and hostage-takers
collaborated to restore the hostage taker’s face, while the incident they examined in which
the hostage-taker attacked their own face ended in suicide (Rogan and Hammer 1994). Emotion too was found to play an important role, with all negotiations studied beginning with
negative affect, followed by an increase in message affect as hostage takers and negotiators
established contact, a decrease in affect during relationship building. When negotiators attempted problem solving, positive affect increased in the case that was resolved nonviolently,
while negative affect increased in the case where the hostage taker committed suicide, and
a third case saw significant variance, leading up to the hostage taker reneging on surrender
(Rogan and Hammer 1995). Later examinations of suicidal vs. non-suicidal outcomes found
that words indicating anger was more common in non-suicidal outcomes, as were words
about inhibition, seeing, physical being, bodily states, religion, communication, inclusion,
and negative emotion, and profanities. Both positive and negative emotion words were more
common in surrender incidents than suicidal incidents, but particular emotional linguistic
factors–assents, negations, positive feelings, anxiety/fear, and sadness/depression were more
closely associated with suicidal outcomes (Rogan 2009).
Based on these findings, Rogan and Hammer have advanced a model (the S.A.F.E. model)
that emphasizes four “frames” that seem to be critical for crisis negotiation:
• Substantive: Tangible demands, in which increased expression of peripheral demands
indicates an escalating conflict dynamic
• Attunement: Relational concerns, relating to establishing a relationship of trust and
some degree of intimacy between the negotiator and the person in crisis
• Face: Concerns with one’s social value, with the threat of losing face by backing down
constantly relevant.
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• Emotions: Concern with feelings, but in the crisis negotiation literature, they are
usually treated as an obstacle to be overcome on the way to rational bargaining.
A few more recent case studies have moved from tracing general themes and patterns in these
conversations toward a greater attentiveness to turn-by-turn conversational moves made by
negotiators and their interlocutors. In comparing negotiator’s conversational patterns with
those of systemically oriented therapists, Charlés (1999) noted several helpful similarities.
These similarities include utilizing a team process, joining and establishing rapport, making
sense of behavior in context, utilizing information from a larger system, achieving conversational flexibility, attending to process and nonverbal communication, and working patiently
toward understanding rather than jumping to an interpretation of a situation, and selectively using the language of the hostage taker (Charles 1999). This issue of linguistic style
matching has received additional attention from other researchers. One study found that
overall linguistic style matching was much more common in negotiations that ended peacefully than others. At a turn-by-turn level, things went well when negotiators were able to
lead hostage takers into a focus on the present, discussion of social issues, positive affect,
and a focus on problem solving through inclusion, insight, and causation. Things went
poorly when hostage takers were able to lead negotiators into negations, first person dialog,
exclusions, and a focus on discrepancies between the negotiator’s and hostage taker’s perspectives (Taylor and Thomas 2008). Both this study and another found that linguistic style
matching rose, peaked, and fell in negotiations that resulted in surrender, while it fluctuated
back and forth in negotiations that resulted in hostage taker suicide (Rogan 2011; Taylor
and Thomas 2008). Another case study that has been used in training police negotiators
similarly highlights linguistic style matching, refering to it as “mirroring”. This technique is
highlighted alongside the use of reflective empathizers, statements like “I understand what
you mean,” or “I know what you’re saying”, “I” messages used to highlight the reality and
personhood of the negotiator, and the use of tag questions and eliciting statements to draw
out acknowledgements of others’ positions from the person in crisis (Royce 2005, 2012).
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A few recent contributions to the conversation have gone deeper, moving beyond noting
patterns to studying conversational pragmatics at key points in crisis negotiations. Agne
and Tracy (Agne and Tracy 2001) focused on the ways in which FBI negotiators named
and framed the trouble they faced in the stalled negotiations with Branch Davidians in
Waco, TX. Agne and Tracy described how in negotiations Koresh portrayed himself as a
biblical expert speaking to a novice, and the negotiators supported Koresh’s face in these
moments, effectively ratifying God as the legitimate authority in the situation, and Koresh
as God’s spokesman (Agne and Tracy 2001). Revisiting this case, Agne further noted that
the conversation between Koresh and the negotiators played out as a conflict between two
moral framings of the situation, one in legal terms, one in terms of Branch Davidian theology.
Agne showed that Koresh consistently managed to successfully reframe the conversation and
gain the conversational advantage (Agne 2007).
Rubin (2016) reports that tag questions can be useful tools minimize power assymetries
and build rapport, but that they are effective only in situations where the negotiator and
the person in crisis already perceive the negotiator as the more powerful interlocutor; when
the person in crisis perceives him or herself as more powerful than the negotiator, tag
questions are not as effective. Meanwhile Garcia (2017) highlights footing shifts, tone of voice
shifts, self-disclosures, and active listening techniques like continuers, questions, repeats, and
paraphrases as tools used to keep a crisis from escalating.
Perhaps the most important recent advance, however, has been Sikveland, Kevoe-Feldman
and Stokoe’s recent study of communicative challenges in crisis negotiations (Sikveland,
Kevoe-Feldman, and Stokoe 2020). The authors find that when negotiators respond to their
interlocutors’ resistance by challenging their reasoning in the next turn, it can bring about
positive changes in the behavior of suicidal people.
This line of research, heavily informed by audio recordings and transcripts of crisis negotiations has been extremely productive, demonstrating that collaborative strategies generally
outperform confrontational ones, revealing that relational and identity concerns are fre125

quently as important as substantive demands in crisis negotiations (if not more so), and
capturing some of the key conversational mechanisms that negotiators can use to promote
non-violent crisis resolution. If there is a consistent area of weakness in these studies, it has
to do with emotion. While several key voices have gestured to the importance of emotion,
few have investigated it empirically, and none have so far considered the processes by which
emotion is woven into conversations.
4.1.2. Micro-sociological perspectives on violence, emotion, and de-escalation
By contrast, the micro-sociological approach to studying violence has centered emotion.
Making heavy use of photographic and video evidence, Collins argues that violent confrontations are suffused with tension and fear, making most violence tentative and incompetent. Effective violence, he points out, involves pathways where resistance collapses, where
supportive audiences bolster attackers’ emotional energy, or attackers avoid confrontation
through deception, remote violence, or absorption in technique (Collins 2008, 2009). By
contrast, activities in which interactants synchronize their behaviors, attention, and emotions in rhythmic, affiliative patterns bring about a sense of solidarity and emotional energy
even when interactants are discussing deep conflicts, sometimes leading to dramatic resolutions (Campos-Castillo and Hitlin 2013; Collins 2004; Kaukomaa, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori 2015; Peräkylä et al. 2015; Rossner 2013). While people often work to mask their
emotions–particularly ones that are socially stigmatized–signs of emotion often appear in
facial expressions and body postures before being masked (Ekman 2009; Ekman and Friesen
2003), providing evidence for emotion as one of the fastest forms of situational proprioception (Jasper 2014). Beyond simple masking, Hochschild demonstrates that people use a
battery of techniques to alter their emotions bodily (by consciously changing facial expressions, gestures, or posture in order to prompt a desired feeling) or cognitively (summoning
images and thoughts to divert focus from a situation or reframe it) (Hochschild 2012). The
latter set of cognitive techniques are of particular interest because they represent a form
of internal conversation (Archer 2003; Archer 2007; Wiley 1994, 2016; see also Fernyhough
2016; Langland-Hassan and Vicente 2018), hinting at a trajectory by which a social process
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can become an individual one through rehearsal. Specifically, important specific others and
imagined others generalized from rehearsed interactions can become temporary or permanent “visitors” in a person’s internal attention space. These may present images or thoughts,
which are then available for refutation or acceptance in the internal conversation, and for
externalization in verbal interaction (Chalari 2009; Collins 2004:183–218; Mead 1967).
Micro-sociological work on escalation and de-escalation has continued to focus on emotion–
especially fearless calm in the face of attempts at emotional domination (Collins 2019).
Studying the lead-up to the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, Klusemann noted that the micro-situational turning point in the massacre involved the Serbian
commander General Mladić emotionally dominating the commander of the peacekeeping
forces (Klusemann 2010b), while Nassauer has convincingly argued that situational and
emotional factors are overwhelmingly better at predicting whether violence will erupt at
a protest than police strategies or protestor motivations (Nassauer 2019). The bystander
intervention and the withdrawal of audience support is a common effective path toward
de-escalation, as shown in studies of fights in bars (Levine, Taylor, and Best 2011; Liebst,
Heinskou, and Ejbye-Ernst 2018), schools (Sanchez-Jankowski 2016), streets (Bloch et al.
2018; Philpot et al. 2020; Weenink et al. 2022), and even in cases of football hooliganism (Adang 2011). Nassauer finds that in protests that have escalated to violence, it is
possible for protestors to return a situation to non-violence through a strong but calm verbal response, facing their attackers head on and calling out “We are peaceful, how about
you?” (Nassauer 2013:216), while Bramsen finds that even in situations where security forces
have been ordered to attack demonstrators, protestors were able to keep from being shot as
long as they could present a fearless front face-to-face with security forces. When security
forces were able to attack protestors from behind and break their formation, however, the
protestors’ nonviolent emotional domination of the situation was disrupted (Bramsen 2018).
In video studies of attempted robberies, robberies were successful when the robber could get
the clerk to fall into a rhythm with them, but when robbers lost nonverbal dominance, robberies could be successfully resisted (Mosselman, Weenink, and Lindegaard 2018; Nassauer
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2018a).
Drawing from (and contributing to) this line of research, this study centers questions of emotional dominance, emotional turning points, and emotion work. It also combines these with
questions about relationships, identities, and outcomes highlighted by the crisis negotiation
literature.

4.2. Comparable Causal Mechanisms of a Unique Event
As is by now clear, this study focuses on a single case, a technique that has been employed, critiqued, and justified from a wide variety of positions. At risk of serving up stale
arguments, I rehearse a few of the traditional stances, objections, and responses, before
describing the particular sort of single-case analysis I employ. It is most naturally justifiable
in a hermeneutical approach to research, where the focus on a single case using a variety
of materials lends itself easily to intensive close reading without requiring the researcher
to compromise the sense of the event’s unique context and structure. As such, it is particularly useful for analyzing unusual, untranslatable, or potentially incommensurable cases
(Steinmetz 2004:15–21). The traditional statistician’s critiques usually arrive at this point,
critiquing single case analysis as the ultimate “small-N” variety of study, vulnerable to problems of falsification and generalization (Stoecker 1991). A by now traditional response points
out that “intensive” research designs–like case studies–are typically far more effective at analyzing causal processes, while “extensive” designs–including statistical analyses–typically
produce interesting descriptions of general cases, but struggle to capture causality (Bennett
and Elman 2006:457; Stoecker 1991).
For the reader whose aim is the verstehen of a single case, the critique of a case’s generalizability is easy to shrug off with the claim that expecting all unique events to be generated
by more-or-less universal covering laws is too simple a way to characterize an event’s causes
(Steinmetz 2004). But the problem of falsification is somewhat harder to shrug off, however,
in that there are always multiple ways in which an event can be condensed and abstracted
into a theoretical or narrative frame (see Culler 2002:171), each of which distort the events
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that took place in slightly different ways. This is less weighty of a problem when the researcher’s aim is simply to produce factual (episteme) or sympathetic (verstehen) knowledge
of the individual case under study. But if the researcher hopes to have an effect on future
events–whether by advocating for a change in policy or by informing the moral judgment
of a reader–that is, to produce technical (techne) or moral (phronesis) knowledge–there is
value in sorting through these theoretical stories to find ones that “work” more robustly, in a
broader variety of cases. It is here that the heuristic of falsification becomes useful necessitating the sometimes odious task of commensuration–the measurement of things against or
in comparison to one another (Steinmetz 2004:386). This is as much as to say that in order
to contribute to a more widely applicable theory of de-escalation, this case will need to be
legible alongside other similarly detailed case studies (Orum 2015) to identify mechanisms
that may be useful to improve skills and policies associated with de-escalation.
This leaves a quandary for the researcher–how to enable commensuration while still faithfully
representing the case under study? As Steinmetz argues, we may compensate by “distinguish[ing] between comparisons among empirical events and comparisons among underlying
theoretical causal mechanisms” (Steinmetz 2004:392). That is to say, if we focus on the
mechanisms underlying events, we may find that events that on the surface appear incomparable may still be produced by similar patterns of action and interaction. One way in
which this (rather abstract) argument may be rendered concrete is by breaking down an
interaction into parts small enough to compare with other conversations, before attempting
to put a fuller picture of the interaction back together. Or, in the words of Harvey Sacks:
The idea is to take singular sequences of conversation and tear them apart in such a
way as to find rules, techniques, procedures, methods, maxims . . . that can be used
to generate the orderly features we find in the conversations we examine. The point
is, then, to come back to the singular things we observe in a singular sequence, with
some rules that handle those singular features, and also, necessarily, handle lots of other
events. (Sacks 1984:413)

In essence, we return to a variety of single-case analysis that has occasionally and productively been used in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Cora Garcia 2010; Garcia
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1998; Garcia 2015, 2017; Mori 2004; Pino and Mortari 2012; Schegloff 1987; Toerien and
Kitzinger 2007; Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen 1988). Schegloff contrasts the ordinary
practice of conversation analysis where the researcher uses “A set of fragments, then, to
explicate a single phenomenon” to this single-case approach, where “the resources of past
work on a range of phenomena . . . are brought to bear on the analytic explanation of a
single fragment of talk.” (Schegloff 1987), with a view to illuminating the ways in which
the participants take an extraordinary event and “[make] some sense or other of what is
going on, and find some way of conducting themselves that deals with the situation.” This
is as much as to say that they sought orderly ways of interacting, or ways of handling the
apparent lack of interactional order at the level of the individual case, rather than at some
abstract aggregate level (Schegloff 1987:102). Adopting this approach does not necessarily
limit this analysis to the hyper-local scale of phenomena usually tackled in Conversation
Analysis. In the analysis to follow, I identify processes that operate closer in scale to the
phenomena Goffman described as “frames” – answers to the question “What is going on right
now?” Of course, this is only an approximate gesture. Frames are by Goffman’s account
highly recursive, and thus can operate at a variety of scales (Goffman 1986).

4.3. Triangulating Audio, Video, and Memoir
The amount of detail available about this interaction is a product of a multi-media contentgenerating feedback loop, one started by the gunman’s awareness of the performative nature
of his threat of violence. That we have so complete a record of this event is because two of
Michael Hill’s first orders were for Tuff to call the police and the local news. The relatively
complete record of what took place would have generated attention no matter the outcome,
but several factors, some coincidental, some products of the interaction, produced an event
that could easily be told.11 The story was framed as the miraculous story of an unlikely
hero triumphing in the face of what was immediately labeled a “school shooting”, albeit an
11

As an illustrative aside, I recall that when I was initially researching this case, I found news reports
of another averted school shooting that took place in California in 2013, where a teacher talked down the
shooter, but was unwilling to talk to the media about it. It is telling that not only can I not remember any
further details about the event, but I have also been unable to find the original coverage again to refresh my
memory.
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averted one. This label has stuck despite several features that distinguish it from other
events also categorized as “school shootings”, including the fact that Hill’s guns were only
ever fired accidentally or at the police.12 This framing proved highly resonant in a media
environment that had been shaped by the high-profile school shooting in Newtown, CT 8
months earlier. In an all-too-predictable sequence of events, the Newtown tragedy triggered
calls for increased gun control, which were met with vociferous protests by gun lobbyists
and stalled by partisan gridlock. In contrast to these stories of diffuse actors struggling to
act in morally contested discursive territory, a heroic tale of an individual triumphing over a
national issue over the course of a half hour, in a conversation that people could listen to for
themselves was bound to be received as cathartic. The story generated multiple interviews
with Tuff, and a congratulatory phone call from President Obama, which generated further
media coverage. Meanwhile, as Marx clearly saw in 1867, the fundamental logic of capitalism
is the transformation of things into commodities (Marx 1976:4). In capitalist America, where
opportunities for economic advancement are often withheld from women, people racialized
as Black, and those who, like Tuff, were born into families with limited resources

13 ,

it was

natural for Tuff’s story and her resultant celebrity to be commoditized. In this case, the
story was turned into a ghost-written memoir, a lifetime movie, and motivational speaking
engagements.
To note this is not to discount Tuff’s laudable handling of the situation. It does affect the
way in which we should read and interpret these media sources when using them as data.
They are not simple windows on what happened, selected for purely theoretical reasons,
but selective accounts of interaction presenting an individual hero triumphing over one of
America’s besetting social problems. The first media of the interaction, the audio recording
of the 9-1-1 call was released the next day, a 24-minute audio file with long moments of silence
when the 9-1-1 dispatcher was on hold (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013). Interviews with
12

I am endebted to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to examine this framing more critically.
Tuff describes how, at age 13, she and her mother were rendered homeless because paying her mother’s
medical bills left too little money to pay the rent (2014:32), how when she was dating her husband, they would
split a single meal at McDonalds because they could not afford two (2014:42), and how her homelessness led
to her dropping out of school after 7th grade (2014:45).
13
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Tuff followed soon after, along with statements from others claiming to know the gunman
(Boyle and Associated Press 2013; Johnson 2013; Winter, Bell, and Chuck 2013; WSB-TV
2013), and a phone call from the president (Richinik 2013). Media attention turned to other
matters, but briefly returned when Tuff’s ghost-written memoir, Prepared for a Purpose
was released in January 2014 (Tuff 2014). Partial surveillance camera videos from inside
and outside the school during the event were released along with police statements related
to the case after the gunman entered a plea bargain agreement and was sentenced to 20
years in prison in September 2014 (11Alive Staff WXIA 2014; BBC 2014; Atlanta JournalConstitution 2014; Fleischer 2014; Gailes 2014; Kershaw et al. 2014). In 2018, her story was
made into an Oscar-nominated short film (Van Dyke 2017), then a full-length movie for the
Lifetime network (Curtis-Hall 2018). For an internet’s-eye-view of public interest in Tuff’s
story over time, see Figure 4.3 below.
For this case study, I read the news sources, transcribed the audio file using a simplified
version of Jeffersonian notation (ten Have 2007), and coded the video surveillance action-byaction. The audio recording had significant gaps in it when the call was muted or the action
in the room too quiet to register on the phone receiver. Hill’s utterances were particularly

Figure 4.3: Popularity of the search term “Antoinette Tuff”, 2013-2015 The Y-axis variable represents the number of Google searches for the term “Antoinette Tuff” divided by
total searches conducted, scaled such that the maximum point is 100. “B” marks the publication of Tuff’s memoir. “A” marks Hill’s sentencing date. Data Source: Google Trends
(www.google.com/trends).
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hard to make out, as he was far from the telephone for most of the conversation, though
applying a Audacity’s noise-reduction filter to the audio slightly improved audio clarity.
The surveillance footage posted by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution is grainy, somewhat
choppy, and most of the content between Hill’s first episode of shooting at the police and
his surrender was removed. By 2017, another version of the surveillance footage had been
anonymously posted to the video hosting service LiveLeak–a service that had a reputation
for hosting videos of violence and gore. The LiveLeak version had significantly lower quality
than the version posted by Atlanta Journal-Constitution, but covered several parts of the
interaction that were missing from the video released by the news, though several minutes
of interaction seem to be missing from this video too. Attempts to synchronize sound and
video sources demonstrated that the speed of the video recordings was uneven, though the
attempt established that the entire interaction took less than 30 minutes–significantly less
time than the hours-long negotiations that have been studied in other parts of the literature
on crisis negotiation. In the surveillance video, Tuff is out of view of the camera for most of
the video. Hill is too far from the camera for his facial expressions to be clearly seen, but
his larger body language, movements around the room, and gestures are visible.
I fell back on the memoir for accounts of the events that took place between overlapping gaps
in the audio and video files. The memoir, while an invaluable source of data, presents some
interpretive challenges. The book was ghostwritten by Alex Tresniowski, and published five
months after the incident. Speaking of their collaboration, Tuff said in an interview, “I
had a excellent person who actually wrote it for me, which was actually Alex, and Alex
was a great writer, and so even with the emotions behind it, he helped to actually get me
to pull out everything we need to have done in the book” (WSB-TV 2014). Tresniowski,
formerly a human-interest writer for People magazine, had collaborated on a number of
other books with Christian themes, telling stories of people overcoming hard circumstances,
including When Life Gives You Lemons (2000), An Invisible Thread (2012), Waking up
in Heaven (2013), What it Takes (2014), and a true crime book, The Vendetta (2009)
(Amazon n.d.). The memoir interweaves a narrative account of Tuff and Hill’s conversation
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with Tuff’s biography, highlighting her previous struggles, and the ways she interpreted
them as strengthening and preparing her for the confrontation with Hill. The writing style
is very dramatic, frequently using cliff-hanger chapter endings and highlighting Tuff’s (and
occasionally Hill’s) emotions. It generally held to the dominant media framing that Hill
was aiming to commit a school shooting. Others, and even Tuff herself, have invoked other
framings of the situation in media reports. In an early interview, Tuff reported that Hill
asked her to call the local TV channel so that a camera crew could record him “killing
police” (Newcomb and Castellano 2013). Natasha Knott, whose family had taken Hill in
and who he reportedly thought of as a mother figure, framed his actions as the cry for help
of a person who had been victimized because of his intellectual disabilities (Johnson 2013).
Hill’s brother attempted to frame it as an extreme episode in a history of violence-provoking
mental illness (WSB-TV 2013a). In Hill’s police statement after the episode, he claimed he
had woken up feeling suicidal, and that he was waiting for the police to kill him (Kershaw
et al. 2014), a framing that Hill’s lawyer eventually argued in his defense (BBC 2014).
The book also regularly takes a Christian pedagogical tone, with “belief” as a prominent
theme–belief in oneself, belief in one’s loved ones, and most prominently, belief in God’s
providence. Biblical quotations and allusions are frequent, and the narrative as a whole
is framed as a story of divine providence. Tuff has insisted on this framing from her first
interview, recorded within a few hours of the attack.
IN: You’re the hero today.
(..)
AT: I give it all to Go:d=I’m not the hero. hih hih (..)
I wa:s terrifi:ed.
(..)

(WSB-TV 2013)
It seems likely then that the elective affinity between Tuff’s framing and Tresniowski’s experience writing books with Christian themes contributed heavily to the book’s interpretation
of what took place.
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The book also makes frequent use of inner speech as a way of communicating Tuff’s perspective on events, a feature that requires careful consideration. The two most straightforward
approaches are to ignore them as a purely literary construct, or to treat them as straightforward accounts of internal conversation. Internal Conversation has proven a tricky subject to
study, largely because it is almost entirely private to an individual. In most circumstances,
researchers are reliant on self-reports of internal speech, which could plausibly be an adaptation of the types of internal dialog that appears as an expository devise in prose fiction,
and thus entirely a discursive construct. Neurolinguistic research, which shows that people’s
reported experiences of inner speech have correlates in their breathing patterns, in activation
of the muscles frequently used for speech, and in cerebral regions traditionally associated
with (audible) speech production (Lœvenbruck et al. 2018) suggests that dismissing internal
conversation would be a mistake. On the other hand, taking literary accounts of internal
conversation at face value is as unwise as taking literary representations of interpersonal
dialog at face value. Careful accounts of internal conversations suggest that inner speech is
syntactically concise, semantically rich, and readily incorporates images (Wiley 2016:13–15),
and that it can include pragmatic and mental state information (that is, information about
what a statement is doing, and one’s attitude toward that information) (Carruthers 2018).
In light of this, I suggest that we take the accounts of Tuff’s inner speech in her memoir
seriously, but not literally, as a sort of “it is as if I said” account, in much the same way
that we take accounts of spoken dialog in the book when we do not have an additional
point of reference. This is still a gamble, wagering that the theoretical payoff of accepting
the book’s descriptions of inner speech as an approximation to Tuff’s real phenomenological
experiences is worth the risk that we are confusing a literary construct with real experience.
One particular scene highlights the differences between the book’s perspective and what
appears in the video file. The book’s account reads as follows:
That’s when the front door to the office opened and a middle-aged man walked in.
His name was Lou, and he was another staffer at the school. Lou was one of the happiest,
most carefree souls you’d ever want to meet. He didn’t walk places so much as glide
there. He had a sparkle in his eyes and he was light on his feet. When he walked into
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the front office he was the same way–happy, carefree, maybe even whistling. I realized
he hadn’t heard about the Intruder Alert. He had no idea what was happening.
The gunman swung to face him and pointed the rifle toward him.
Lou looked up and noticed the gunman, and at first it didn’t seem to faze him. He still
had a big old smile on his face. Maybe, like me, his first thought was that this was a
prank. He stopped in his tracks and the gunman shouted his same words.
“This is not a joke!” he said “This is serious!” He jabbed his rifle toward Lou to make
his point.
Lou froze. Before anything else could happen I spoke up. “Lou, come behind the counter
with me,” I said, motioning him toward me.
For some reason, Lou didn’t hurry. He walked slowly, as if he still wasn’t sure this
was for real. There was no urgency in his movements, almost like he was sauntering. I
wanted him to step on it so he’d be behind the counter and less exposed–and also so
the gunman wouldn’t get angrier.
But it was too late for that.
Before Lou could make it behind the counter, the gunman took his AK-47 and fired.
The sound was deafening. The shooting had begun.
. . . [Here I have omitted 11 pages of Tuff’s biographical material]
For a moment I thought the gunman had fired at us, and I waited to see Lou crumple
to the ground, or maybe it would be me. But neither of us fell. The gunman had aimed
two feet right of us, and down at the floor, and fired one shot.
The gunshot was incredibly loud, and then I heard the bullet bounce off the floor and
ricochet across the room. I didn’t know that bullets ricochet. But I heard the bullet
whiz in the air and hit another wall, and I heard the shell casing come to rest on the
counter to my left. All that happened in a split second. The harsh smell of a spark of
fire filled the air.
I turned to Lou and saw he was clutching his chest. He looked like he was having a
heart attack. It wouldn’t have surprised me if he was. The sound of the gunshot took
the level of terror in the room to a whole new level. This man not only had a deadly
weapon but he was more than willing to use it. I felt my own heart seize in my chest, like
someone had grabbed it and wouldn’t stop squeezing. A cold, heavy reality occurred
to me again–I could die at any moment.
Now Lou was bracing himself against the desk, still holding his chest. I couldn’t tell if
he was having a heart attack or not, and I don’t think Lou could either.
(Tuff 2014:39–40, 53–54)

In the surveillance video, Hill’s gun, which he is cradling at elbow-height, comes up briefly
when Lou enters the room, but quickly returns to being pointed at the floor (see Figure 4.4a).
After Lou is on the Tuff’s side of the receptionist’s desk, Hill fires a single shot, which ricochets off the floor (see Figure 4.4b) and hits a box mounted on the wall, knocking it off
(Figure 4.4c). Lou then remains in a crouched position for around 25 seconds (Figure 4.4d).
The resemblance between the scenes is clear, but the book dramatizes the action by portraying the shooter as more menacing and intentional than he appears in the surveillance
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video, and by describing Tuff’s emotions in colorful metaphor and something resembling
inner speech. In the video, Hill moves with a hunched-forward posture, his weapon dangling
lazily downward, making the shot look more like a slip of the trigger finger than an intentional warning shot. This coincides with Hill’s statement to the police later that day, when
Hill said he “accidentally fired the rifle one time inside the school first and then only shot
the weapon at police officers who were outside” (Kershaw et al. 2014)

14 .

4.4. Achieving Threat, Achieving De-Escalation
In the section that follows, I first provide a broad composite narrative account of the interaction. Following the strategy employed by Gibson in analyzing deliberation during the
14
A skeptic might argue that Hill would have been wise to make this claim even if the shot were fired
intentionally, but given Hill’s generally careless handling of his weapon throughout the video, I am inclined
to take Hill at his word.

(a) Lou enters the room, walking casually,
while Hill’s gun barrel points downward
[01:02]

(c) The bullet hits the box on the wall
[01:11]

(b) Michael Hill’s gun discharges at the floor
[01:11]

(d) Lou remains hunched over while
Hill walks around casually [01:36]

Figure 4.4: The surveillance-camera view of Lou entering and reacting to Hill’s gunshot
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Cuban Missile Crisis (Gibson 2012), I direct my attention toward several key turning points
in the interaction, points where the projectible outcome of the situation changed, or was
seen as vulnerable to change by the participants in the interaction. I analyze these moments
with an eye to identifying the processes and mechanisms employed in those turning points.
I then return to briefly contextualize this de-escalation sequence in the longer flows of Tuff’s
and Hill’s lives. In the narration below, all page references are to Tuff’s memoir unless
otherwise noted.
The scene examined here unfolds almost exclusively in the reception area of the McNair
Discovery Learning Academy in Decatur, GA, then a rapidly gentrifying enclave just inside
the perimeter of the Atlanta Metro Area (see Figure 4.5). The room has 3 visible doors,
leading to the vestibule (V), a back door leading to the teacher’s lounge (TL), and a side
door that led opened onto a large hallway (H) that offered access to the rest of the school,
as well as a view of the back of the school through the large-paned windows. The space is
dominated by a large L-shaped counter (C), with a smaller desk (D) tucked behind it.

Figure 4.5: An overview of the School’s Reception Area
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It was early afternoon, around 12:40 on August 20, 2013. The school receptionist was on
lunch break, and the school’s bookkeeper, Antoinette Tuff, had been asked to cover the
front desk. A teacher, Belinda, had come in to ask for Tuff’s help, and was sitting at the
front counter, while Tuff was working at the smaller desk. About five minutes later, Michael
Hill came in through the foyer door, having come in through the security doors just after a
mother and her young child left the building. He was wearing a black shirt and pants, and
carrying a heavy-looking black backpack and a long flat cloth bag recognizable in retrospect
as a soft rifle case. He stopped about halfway to the desk and pulled out what was later
identified as a GP WASR-10/63 assault rifle, a Romanian derivative of the more famous
soviet AK series (Kershaw et al. 2014). According to Tuff, his first concern was to establish
that what was happening was real and serious, not a joke or a show (p. 21, and see also
WSB-TV 2013). Belinda, who was closest to Hill, stood up, and Hill told her to “Go, tell
everyone in the building I’m here. Tell them this is not a joke, this is for real” (p. 22).
Belinda left through the side door, and Hill made as if to follow, allowing his gun to dangle
at his side as he looked through the door. Tuff addressed him at this point, and Hill walked
to the opposite side of the room, across the counter from Tuff. They conversed briefly, then
Lou entered the room through the hallway door, resulting in the scene described above. Hill
sent Lou out with similar instructions to the ones he had given Belinda (p. 54). After this,
Hill ordered Tuff to tell everyone in the school what was happening over the intercom.
Once she had done this, he had her call 9-1-1. She did so, although the police had already
arrived on the scene. She relayed a message from Hill, telling the police officers to hold on
and conveying his threat to start shooting. While she was still on the phone, Hill stepped
into the vestibule and began shooting at the police. Hill’s first trip to the vestibule lasted
30 seconds, with four gunshots heard 4, 8, 12, and 20 seconds after Tuff picked up the phone
again.
Hill returned to the office, seemingly in an emotional state. He told Tuff to order the police
to stop moving, and to keep off the radio, and Tuff relayed these orders. He then told Tuff to
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call a news station. She asked him for the number, but eventually had to look up the phone
number on her computer. Hill reportedly told her that he wanted the news there “because
he was going to end his life and take all the cops and everybody with him” (WSB-TV 2013).
Hill then sat down and opened his backpack. He pulled out a water bottle, took a drink,
then pulled out a large plastic bag full of ammunition and proceeded to load bullets into at
least one extra magazines. Tuff reports that he stuffed his pockets, replaced his magazine
(p. 71), while Tuff found the contact information for the news agency. Hill had Tuff pass on
that he wanted a news helicopter to record what happened next (p.78).
After this, the audio and video footage suggests that Hill returned to the vestibule and
exchanges more shots with the police.

15

In his police statement, Hill claimed to have fired

only “three to five rounds each time” that he came to the front door (Kershaw et al. 2014),
while Tuff’s memoir suggests a much more intense firefight took place (p. 111-112). While
none of the evidence is decisive, the book’s tendency to dramatize (one is tempted to say
exaggerate) the actual moments of violence inclines me toward Hill’s account. The one place
where the accounts converge is that this time the police returned fire (p. 112). This return
of fire seems to have frightened Tuff more than the preceding events, and she called Hill
back in. There is no audio recording of either the exchange of fire, or of Tuff inviting Hill
15

At this point, the order of events becomes a murky. There are a series of forward and backward skips in
the video recording where some of the recording could be missing, and the apparent order of events in the
video contradicts the order of events in the memoir. The best clue to the order of events comes from three
long gaps in the audio file. The first gap comes after Hill instructs Tuff to put the police on hold and call
the news. This is followed by a 40 second gap in communication. There is then a brief, seemingly overheard
moment where Tuff says she is trying to find a number for channel 2. This is followed by a pause that
lasts for 1 minute, 49 seconds. Tuff then comes back on the line, directly addressing the dispatcher, telling
her in a tense-sounding voice that Hill wants the police to back up. There is then a 2 minute, 20 second
pause before Tuff’s voice returns, again telling the police to back off, but offering the information that Hill
“doesn’t want the kids, he wants the police” (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013). In the absence of further
evidence, the best hypothesis would seem to be that Hill was engaged in reloading his magazines during the
first and part of the second silences, that the call to the local news took place during the second one, and
that the second exchange of fire took place during the third period of silence. The memoir suggests that
Hill made a phone call before exchanging fire with the police for the second time. However, the only cell
phone call that Hill makes in the video file takes place after he comes back inside, and about 4 minutes after
Tuff announces that Hill “doesn’t want the kids” there is a fifty-seven second silent period, ending in some
talk about phoning a relative that looks like it potentially matches this order of events. Revealingly, the
dialog in the book at this point says nothing about what happens in this part of the conversation, instead
compressing the conversation preceding it, about contacting Hill’s probation officer, and the line “she sounds
like she loves you an awful lot,” and omitting the exchange “you on the phone with a relative?” “yes, yeah”,
producing a confusing, disjointed point in the story.
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back in.
Hill returned with a bleeding cut on his arm, possibly from a sharp edge on a doorway
(pp. 113-115). He sits down in a chair, takes a drink, and for the first time expresses regret
for his actions (p. 115). By her own account, Tuff took the initiative at this point, and
re-opened the conversation with the police dispatcher. At this point, Hill began to offer
concessions, first saying that the police were his target, not the students. Also at this
point he began to speak more directly about suicidal intentions. At this point Tuff begins
to lead in a back-and-forth conversation, trying to help Hill come up with an alternative
acceptable outcome besides suicide (pp. 115-120). As Tuff worked to convince Hill that
another outcome was possible, Hill asked Tuff to communicate an apology on his behalf
over the school intercom (p. 142-143). After this, they began to plan out Hill’s surrender
(pp. 146-149). Hill suggested he lay face-down on the floor, while Tuff suggested Hill put
his gun and his ammunition on the counter. They did both, and waited for a police team to
arrive and take him into custody (pp. 147-149). Tuff and Hill ended up waiting longer than
expected, and Tuff took it upon herself to relieve the tension by sharing parts of her life
story. Hill began to respond in kind, and the two struck up an uneasy round of small talk
that got them through until the police arrived and took Hill into custody (150-151, 171-172,
189-193).
4.4.1. Escalation: Establishing a Serious Threat
To jump immediately into describing mechanisms that aided de-escalation without examining the conditions that made de-escalation necessary would be as short sighted as trying
to explain why a traveller takes the roads they do while considering only their destination
and not where their journey begins, or the strategies a chess player uses without considering
the conditions for victory. As Gibson and DiCicco-Bloom point out, in life as in games,
strategies are emergent properties of the systems of rules and constraints (DiCicco-Bloom
and Gibson 2010). Likewise, de-escalatory mechanisms and strategies are emergent as a response to conflict situations, and in the case of many crisis negotiations, the specific conflict
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in view is a threat.
There are a wide range of expected outcomes from an everyday interaction; death is not
usually one of them. The first key change in this unfolding narrative was not a de-escalatory
move, but an escalatory one. Within seconds of coming in the door, Hill utterly changes
the course of the situation with one move: pulling a gun out of a bag. A gun, Collins
argues, is first and foremost a semantic object, a prop for use in the bluster that usually
serves as a preventative alternative to violence (Collins 2019:491; 2022:271–72). In this case,
displaying a gun in a school served (to borrow Goffman’s (1986) terminology) to “key” the
interactional frame, or in more temporally-sensitive language, narrative schema of a school
shooting–“another Sandy Hook”, in the language of many media reports on the event, as well
as the back cover of Tuff’s memoir. Doing so quickly set an expectation that there would
be bloodshed before the day ended.
This conclusion was not foregone, however. As Goffman has noted, every social act is a
performance that is in danger of being “muffed” (Goffman 1982), and displaying a weapon
does not always carry the performance, as Jacques (2014) has shown. In this case, both
Tuff and Hill orient to the possibility that this could be a joke, or a performance. Tuff
writes, “I noticed [the rifle] without any sense of alarm, because my first thought was Is this
a joke? Some kid with a fake gun playing a prank? Or maybe a real gun, but he’s just fooling
around? ” (Tuff 2014:21). For his part, Hill seems to have opened the situation by yelling
something to the effect of “I’m not playing! This is for real! This is not a show!” (WSB-TV
2013), or “This is not a joke! I need you to understand that this is not a joke. I am here.
This is real. We are all going to die today” (Tuff 2014:21).
In this context, the initial interactions between Hill and his interlocutors present a puzzle.
In her immediate post-crisis interview, Tuff reported Hill’s first words as “I’m not playin.
This is for real. This is not a show,” (WSB-TV 2013), while in the memoir they are rendered
as “This is not a joke! . . . I need you to understand that this is not a joke. I am here.
This is real. We are all going to die today” (Tuff 2014:23). When Hill sends Belinda out of
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the room, he orders her, “Go tell everyone in the building I’m here. Tell them this is not a
joke, this is for real” (Tuff 2014:22), and after the scene with Lou, he says “Leave now and
tell everyone this is happening” (Tuff 2014:54). Once Lou left, Hill ordered Tuff to repeat a
similar message over the intercom, and then to warn the police that he was about to start
shooting (Tuff 2014:54–55).
The repetitive nature of this theme quickly becomes suspicious on examination. After all, one
of the distinguishing features of mass shootings is a pattern of clandestine activity erupting
into unforeseen violence (Collins 2022:261–73; Newman 2004). Or in Tuff’s words, “I tried
to remind myself that the boy came in talking, not shooting. As well as I could remember,
in other shootings it was almost always the other way around” (Tuff 2014:78). Moreover,
Tuff reports that even after Belinda’s departure, Hill kept repeating “This is not a joke. I’m
not playing. This is for real. We are going to die today” and “I am not playing. I know I’m
going to die” (Tuff 2014:36, 39) while pacing back and forth. This sheds some light on the
puzzle: Hill seems to be using affirmations of his seriousness as an incantation–an emotionalenergy building ritual technique of self-entrainment that is common in conflict-talk(Collins
2008:408–12).
But why would he need to use such a ritual? Collins’ micro-sociological theory of violence
suggests a reason. Hill was trying to carry off situational dominance against long odds. Even
at the beginning of the interaction, Hill shows signs of low emotional energy. His posture
remains slightly hunched, his gaze and the barrel of his gun remain pointed at the floor, and
he moves through the space with slow, plodding footsteps and swinging arms. Meanwhile,
he was in a close-quarters face-to-face situation with no deceptive cover to maintain and
no supportive audience, a combination of situational factors that usually favors strategies
of solidarity-building rather than confrontation [collins@collinsInteractionRitualChains2004;
Collins (2008)]. Unveiling his gun, however, placed him in a bind because it signalled
an orientation toward confrontation. In this context, Hill’s commitment to declaring his
intentions and seriousness is legible as an attempt to recruit an audience, while pacing
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and repeating his affirmations of seriousness seem to be an attempt at self-entrainment. It
quickly becomes clear that absorption in technique is not a viable strategy; the casual way
in which he holds the gun at elbow-height and swings it around the room, sometimes by one
hand throughout the video present an image of his inexperience with the tool, especially
when compared to the practiced grip and motions that the SWAT team display in the final
scenes of the surveillance footage. As the police investigation later revealed, Hill had only
gotten access to the gun and ammunition earlier that day, and that too primarily as a result
of others’ machinations (Fleischer 2014). In his interactional dilemma, Hill is left reliant on
a verbal tool, and one wonders if even this would have been enough to keep his performance
from going awry if his gun had not accidentally gone off while Lou was in the room.
If nothing else, the dramatic, multi-sensory presentation of Hill’s gunshot in the Tuff’s
memoir suggests that Hill’s believably accidental gunshot was effective in escalating Tuff’s
sense of threat. Tuff states in her memoir, “I sat shaking in my chair. My hands were
shaking so hard I couldn’t have held a pencil if I tried. The gunshot changed everything. If
I had any doubts about what the gunman had in mind, they were gone now. But at least
no one had been killed” (Tuff 2014:54). This gave Hill the situational upper hand. On Hill’s
orders, Lou left the room in a hurry.
Even this dominance was situationally contingent, though. Having dismissed Lou, Hill
turned his back to the only other person in the room, and moved with the same plodding
movements and loosely-hanging arms to the door to the hallway. He pulled it open with so
little force that he needed to try again to overcome the door’s spring-loading mechanism,
and stepped through with his gun hanging from one hand, pointed at the ground. Hill
quickly returns for reasons that remain hazy.

16

In any case, he returned to the counter and

alternated between pacing, turning his head toward Tuff, and looking out the window for
16

It is possible that Tuff called him back, as there is some inconsistency between the book’s version of
events and the sequence of actions in the surveillance footage. It is equally possible that in the wake of
Lou’s entry through that door, Hill was attempting to make ensure that the hallway was clear. The latter
interpretation is more consistent with Hill’s attention to the scenes outside the window, and his order, relayed
by Tuff, for the police to keep anyone from entering the building.
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about a minute and a half, then ordered Tuff to annnounce his presence over the intercom
and call 9-1-1. Tuff seems to have complied promptly, with a forward-leaning, seemingly
submissive body posture. When Tuff began speaking to the dispatcher (Kendra McCray,
KM in the transcripts to follow), she spoke quickly, and her interaction was limited to
answering the dispatcher’s question and relaying Hill’s messages, seemingly word-for-word.
KM: DeKalb police,
=whats-the address the emergency.
AT: ...yes ma’am,
=I’m on Second Avenue in the school,
=and the gentleman said
=tell them to hold down
=the police off’cers are coming,
=and he say he gon’ sta:rt shootin.
=so tell them to back o:ff.
KM: ...okay one mo:ment.
(1.35)
AT: (H 0.6 H)
do not let anybody in the building,
(0.6)
MH: including (?the?) po:lice,
AT: =including no po:lice,
=do not let anybody in the building,
=including the police.

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
4.4.2. Fortification: Divine Communication, Emotion Work, and Semiosis
Given that Hill had stumblingly cemented his emotional dominance over the situation, how
did the process of de-escalation begin? I argue that Tuff’s account, easy to dismiss as a
pious cliché, a religious response to a close brush with death, or a supernaturalist refusal
to explain away a seemingly miraculous outcome, actually constitutes a coherent, detailed
account of a set of internal experiences in terms easily understood by those with a background in contemporary American Evangelicalism, but somewhat opaque to those outside
this tradition.
Tuff’s first interview contains the thrust of her account:
IN: You’re the hero today.
(..)
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AT: I give it all to Go:d
=I’m not the hero. hih hih (..)
I wa:s terrifi:ed.
(..)
IN: You kept it together,
(.)
AT: Yeah I don’t know ho:w but I di:d.
by his grace and mercy I di:d.
(..)
IN: Anything else you wanna say?
(..)
AT: No I just give it all to him, eh hih hih

(WSB-TV 2013)
The core of the explanation is that God, not Tuff, kept Tuff calm and “together” despite her
feeling “terrified”. I argue that this is a shorthand for a series of three interlinked experiences
that are effectively traced in the representations of inner speech recounted in Tuff’s memoir.
The first is an experience where Tuff, in the midst of the traumatic situation unfolding
around her, found memorized words from scripture and hymnody surfacing in her internal
conversation in ways that she, like many American Evangelicals, had through informal liturgical practice come to identify as the voice of God. Psychological Anthropologist T. M.
Luhrmann puts it this way:
In effect, people train the mind in such a way that they experience part of their mind
as the presence of God. They learn to reinterpret the familiar experiences of their
own minds and bodies as not being their own at all–but God’s. They learn to identify
some thoughts as God’s voice, some images as God’s suggestions, some sensations as
God’s touch or the response to his nearness. They construct God’s interactions out of
these personal mental events, mapping the abstract concept “God” out of their mental
awareness into a being they imagine and reimagine in ways shaped by the Bible and
encouraged by their church community. They learn to shift the way they scan their
worlds, always searching for a mark of God’s presence, chastening the unruly mind if
it stubbornly insists that there is nothing there. Then they turn around and allow this
sense of God–an external being they find internally in their minds–to discipline their
thoughts and emotions. they allow the God they learn to experience in their minds to
persuade them that an external God looks after them and loves them unconditionally.
(Luhrmann 2012:xxi)

Tuff’s account, though in a slightly different vocabulary, is recognizable.
I wasn’t very good at listening. All of us are good at talking, but sometimes we’re not
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so great at hearing the words that come back. I mean really hearing them. Yet that’s
the only way we can have a true conversation with anybody–by spending as much time
listening as talking. Otherwise we’re just babbling to ourselves.
The same is true of our conversations with God.
Listening to God was something I had to work on. . .
The idea was to set up times in my life when I could have a quiet, meaningful conversation with God. And the crazier my life was, the more quiet time I needed. When
things were most chaotic, that’s exactly when you need God’s guidance the most. So I
had to train myself to clear my head even whe nthe world around me was crumbling,
so that God’s words could come through and lead me to still waters.
In the weeks before August 20, my training began.
Apostle Tuff had me focus on 1 Corinthians 15:58: “Therefore my beloved brethren, be
ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye
know that your labor is not in vain.” Steadfast and unmovable–those two words stayed
with me. My life was a roller coaster of pain and anger and despair and dejection, but
inside I could remain steadfast and unmovable in the Lord. It was possible to do–I just
had to find a way to do it.
The trick, it turned out, was practice. At night I began going to sleep with an audiobook
of the Bible playing softly by my bed. I would lay there and listen to the words of the
Bible and let them wash over me, and I would drift off to sleep with a wonderful feeling
of peace and safety. I’d get up at 5:00 a.m., go down to the kitchen, and put on a
CD of jazz versions of gospel songs like “To Worship You,” and I’d sit at the table and
talk to God. Not praying, just talking, as if God were right there next to me, having
breakfast. Sometimes I’d talk so loud I’d hear one of my kids yell out, “Mom, be quiet,
you’re talking to God too loud!”
Most days I probably talked to God for a good fifteen minutes. I’d tell Him what’s
happening, ask Him questions, work things out. Now, Apostle taught me that for as
long as you talk to God, that’s how long you have to listen. So if I talked for fifteen
minutes, then I had to sit at the table in total silence and just listen for fifteen minutes.
I’d close my eyes and shut everything down and block out the world as best I could,
and I would sit there and listen.
That’s quiet time. . . .
Most days God did not answer me during my quiet time. That’s just the way it is. But
some days He’d guide me to a Scripture and I’d open my Bible and read His words, and
those words were always a response to something I asked Him about. One particularly
terrible morning, when I felt my life was so out of control it was hardly worth living,
God directed me to Psalm 118:17-18: “I shall not die, but live, and declare the works
of the Lord,” it read. “The Lord has chastened me severely, but He has not given me
over to death” (NKJV)
I started to weep. It was God’s answer to me, and it made me feel so safe. No, I will
not die–I will live so that I can serve Him. How much clearer could God’s answer be?
. . . We’re [often] too busy or too distracted or too frightened to hear what He is
telling us. But now I was training myself to stay calm and free my ears, so that God’s
words could come to me smoothly and easily, in any situation–no matter how chaotic
or frightening it might be.
(Tuff 2014:74–77)

The next process is slightly more familiar. Cognitive emotion work, as briefly summarized
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above, involves a process of shaping one’s emotions by reframing a current experience with
reference to other worlds that could, should, might, or (it is believed) will be. I argue
that some of the snatches of inner speech that Tuff experienced as coming from God were
experienced as cognitive emotion work, words that reassured her in the midst of her fear,
and helped her to maintain a calm, centered composure. Tuff recalls one of these experiences
shortly before Lou entered the room. She writes:
What the gunman couldn’t see were my legs, which were trembling, or my hands, which
were shaking. He couldn’t hear my heart, which was beeting two miles a minute. He
could not see how utterly terrified I was. . . . I felt fear, real gut-level fear, which made
every nerve in my body light up. But I also felt dread, a kind of soul-crushing dread,
which made my body feel heavy and weak. . .
So why, if I was so terrified, was I able to speak so calmly?
That very morning, in the kitchen of my home, I read Psalm 23–“The Lord is my
shepherd . . . He leadeth me beside the still waters.” I read the words, “I will fear no
evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staf they comfort me.” And I read, “Thou
preparest a table before me in the presence of mine enemies.” The morning before that,
at the same table, I read those very same words–“I will fear no evil: for thou art with
me.” And the morning before that, and the one before that, too. I read those words
every morning, and in this way they seeped into my soul. So on August 20, when I
asked God, “What are we going to do now?” I already had my answer. God was going
to lead me beside the still waters. God was going to comfort me.
God was going to do the talking for me.
I did not have to pray to have this understanding–it was just there. In fact, I don’t
remember praying for help or comfort in those early moments, because those moments
were just too chaotic. . . .
. . . God gave me my calm, assuring tone because that’s how He needed me to speak.
(Tuff 2014:37–38)

Later, in a passage the memoir places during the period Hill was loading his magazines, Tuff
writes:
I am standing in the shadow of death and all around me is darkness and chaos and in
the midst of it all I think, No, it cannot be this way. We must not die today, we must
survive. We must go home to our families, we must kiss our loved ones. We must live
so that we can serve God.
I think, The Devil shall lay no claim to our souls this day.>
[Tuff@tuffPreparedPurposeInspiring2014, p. 73]

The third process, semiosis, requires a brief explanation because semiotic theories abound.
I have in mind a Peircean account of meaning, in which, “To ascertain the meaning of an
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intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might result from
the truth of that conception—and the sum of these consequences constitute the entire meaning of the conception.” (Peirce 1905:5.9). While Peirce’s intent was much broader, in this
context I mean only to point to a necessary and constant connection between interpretation
and action–that interpretations of a sign or situation are intimately connected to the process
of acting with reference to the signs we perceive. I argue that some of the signs, experienced
by Tuff as coming from God, offered interpretations of the situation that suggested possible
courses of action.
Very early in the interaction, Tuff recalls remembering a quotation from John 10:10: that
“The thief cometh not, but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy,” (Tuff 2014:11). This
frame then went through two further alterations, with Tuff characterizing what she was
facing as a “demon [that] has come to steal, kill, and destroy,” (Tuff 2014:11), and finally
as “death itself” (Tuff 2014:11). For Tuff, Hill was embodying a primal evil force that she
intepreted first as a thief, then a demon. An important transition in this immanent ontology
of evil took place shortly thereafter, though, as Tuff revised her statement to say that “the
demon inside him was there to steal, kill, and destroy,” (Tuff 2014:37, emphasis added). Not
long afterwards, Tuff writes as though another Biblical quotation surfaced: “Death and life
are in the power of the tongue, [Proverbs 18:21]” (Tuff 2014:37). Together, these quotations
formed an interpretation of the situation where Hill was possessed by a demonic power, but
one which Tuff could oppose by “speak[ing] life into [the] situation” (Tuff 2014:37). Moreover
this interpretation laid the groundwork for the interactional turning-point of the situation.
During Hill’s second exchange of bullets with the police, Hill writes:
Endless explosions were ringing in my ears, and then the sound of more gunshots, these
ones coming from outside, and blasting thorugh the entrance doors, shattering the glass,
and the gunman kept shooting, and the poice kept shooting, and this was the showdown
now, the final confrontation, the end of it all, the bullets flying so bad, the Devil coming
to claim his souls. [emphasis mine]
For some reason, I did not duck when he fired this time. I did not crouch beneath my
desk. Instead I just satthere, calmly watching the gunman shoot. Maybe I was in shock.
But I felt like I had an obligation to watch him, to keep an eye on him and not abandon
him in his darkest moment. I know that sounds crazy. I know my only concern should
have been the safety of the children, and for sure that was my main concern. And after
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that I should have been concerned for the teachers, and for the police, and for myself.
I should have been praying for one of those bulletsto kill the gunman dead.
But I wasn’t. I cannot lie. I am just telling you the truth of what was in my head at
the moment.
And what was there came from God, because it sure didn’t come from me. Even though
I was terrified, even though the shooting nearly stopped my heart, even though seeing
the gunman shot down was probably the best thing I could have hoped for, that is not
what was in my head.
Instead I thought, This is about saving his soul, too.
(Tuff 2014:112)

In summary, then, Tuff’s memoir suggests that she experienced something like inner speech
that she interpreted as coming from God (pobably because that thoughts that arose came
in the form of Biblical quotations). Some of these experiences, like the recollection of Psalm
23, served primarily as a form of cognitive emotion work, providing an assurance of future
comfort that served also as a mental litany against fear. Others, like the qotation from John
10:10, provided an interpretation of the situation that morphed step-by-step from an image
of Hill-as-destroying-thief to Hill-as-destroying-demon to Hill-as-possessed-by-a-destroyingdemon to bullets-as-destroying-demons-coming-to-claim-Hill’s-soul (and Tuff’s too). This
progression suggests a progressive shift in Tuff’s attitude toward Hill from fear and terror
toward first pity, then solidarity. Yet others, like the quotation from Proverbs 20:20 suggested
the tactic of responding to violence through speech oriented toward life.
4.4.3. Externalization: Professed Solidarity Meets Emotional Exhaustion
There is a crucial 2 minute, 20 second silence in the audio recording that seems to mark the
central turning point of the confrontation between Tuff and Hill. It is both preceded and
followed by Tuff telling the dispatcher to tell the police to back up and back off. But there
is a crucial difference between the first and second set of instructions.
KM:
AT:
KM:
AT:
KM:
AT:

[yes ma’am,]
[hello?]
=yes [2 ma’am? 2
[2 police? 2]
..yes ma’am?
.. He said,
=te:ll them to ba:ck up,
=right no:w.
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(0.8)
KM: Okay.
(2.34 – static)
(4.06 – dead silence)
(0.36 – static)
AT: okay, hold on.
(0.28 – static)
KM: okay,
(6.5 – static, typing sounds, background noise)
(12.3 – dead silence)
(12.3 – static, clicks, background noise)
(32.8 – dead silence)
(8.1 – static, background noise)
(65.4 – dead silence)
(2.24 – static)
KM: HH
hello?
ma’[am?]
MH:
[xxxx]xxxx
AT: okay.
(0.4) he sai:d,
(0.3) he said to
=tell them to back off?
=he doesn’t want the ki:ds,
(0.44) He wants the po:lice,
(..) so back off,
(0.52) and um.
(0.75) and what else sir?
(1.9)
MH: Tell ‘em I don’t care if I die,
I got nothin to live for?
AT: (..) he said he don’t [BR ca BR] re if he die,
=he don’t have nothing to live for.
MH: (0.3) (? I ain’t x x x ?)
AT: (..) and he say
=he’s not mentally sta:ble

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
The first set of instructions takes the form of an unconditional order, given in a tense tone of
voice, while the second set includes a key concession (=he doesn't want the ki:ds), and
a significant moment of vulnerable self-revelation by the shooter. This is significant because
it is the first recorded interaction with Hill that does not involve him making demands or
giving orders. It opens a longer sequence in which Tuff, Hill, and the dispatcher begin to
negotiate for a mutually acceptable non-violent resolution to the crisis. Triangulating the
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sequence of talk in the audio recording with events in the memoir indicates that this 2
minute, 20 second period most likely contains the second exchange of fire between Hill and
the police gathered outside. Tuff’s interpretation of this scene has been cited above. The
scene continues, with Tuff challenging Hill’s actions in ways that invoke shared vulnerability,
and express confidence that they can find an alternative solution to the problem together.
The gunman kept shooting. Glass and shell casings were flying everywhere. I knew if
the gunman stayed by the door he would soon be dead. Maybe that was how it had to
be. But maybe not. Maybe God had another plan.
“Sweetheart, come back in here,” I said, as loud as I could so the gunman could hear
me over the shooting. “Bullets don’t have no names. And those bullets are gonna kill
me and you. I need you to come back in here, and it’s gonna be you and me, and we
will work this thing out together.”
The gunman heard what I said. All of a sudden he stopped shooting. The shooting
from outside stopped, too. The gunman kept low and came back into the office and
closed the door behind him. . . .
But he listened to me. He listened and stopped shooting and came back in.
(Tuff 2014:112)

Her published narrative of this moment, absent from either the audio or video recordings,
is both corroborated and complicated by the version she shared with the local news a few
hours after the attack:
IN: Were you concerned about how this was gonna end?
AT: I did when he started putting the clips (.)
and when he came in- cuz when he ca:me in he was just so:
.hhh u::hm, (.) agitated=and then when people start mo:vin an<then when the police officers> started mo:vin i:n an(.) at one ti:me, him and the police officer start exchangin bullets (.)
and I was sitting there. and u:hm (.)
I knew that, (.) bullets don’t have a name. (.)
and so I had to explain to him, (.)
<I just told him to come back> i:n. (..)
because I knew that if theif he was shootin at them they was gon shoot back at him an ban one of those bullets was gon come in and hit me.
an so I just told him to come back i:n. (.)
so that he wouldn’t get hit and nor would I.

(WSB-TV 2013)
The same interviewer asked Tuff how she got through to Hill in that moment.
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IN: Why do you think he listened to you?
(0.5)
((Tuff’s eyes dart back and forth, and she raises her eyebrows))
AT: I don’t have no idea=that wasn’t nobody but Go::d
=I can’t even put that on myself.
(.) I was prayin ha:rd.
(0.3)
Yeah=I don’t- I don’t even know what made him (..)
just deci:de to listen to me:
cuz at- when he first came in he wasn’t. (.)
he wouldn’t even tell me his name.

(WSB-TV 2013)
Discussing the relation between Internal and External Conversation, Athanasia Chalari suggests that we think in terms of processes of internalization and externalization, where exchanges between internal and external conversations take place in order to secure a subjectively defined sense of balance between inner and outer worlds(Chalari 2009). As one
reviewer has noted, this account provides helpful terms for discussing the processes by which
some conversations (and not others) get “inside”, and some thoughts (and not others) get
“outside”, while the theory could be improved by a more thoroughgoing account of ideology
(and with it power) (Kuusela 2010). Importantly, one’s ability to shape the external conversations one is embedded may be crucially shaped by the dynamics of emotional dominance.
The account in the previous section has attempted to theorize and document processes
taking place in Tuff’s internal conversational attention-space that created an unsatisfactory
imbalance between an imagined possible future in which Tuff and Hill could both be saved
and an unfolding narrative that oriented toward an endpoint of death and destruction.
These processes also gave rise to a new source of emotional energy through internalized and
habitualized rituals and the cognitive reframings suggested by them.
In other words, Tuff was absorbed in rituals of self entrainment directed toward de-escalation,
and somewhere between 8 and 14 minutes

17

after Hill unveiled his weapon, she arrived

17
This range is generated by different assumptions about how long the second firefight was, and two
different ways of synchronizing the 9-1-1 audio to the video file, based on synchronizing either the moment
when Hill picks up the telephone for the second time, or the moment Hill returns from the first exchange of
bullets. Because of the video file’s choppiness, these timings should be treated as rough approximations.
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at an action-oriented evaluation of the situation and reached a level of emotional energy,
manifested as vocal strength and calmness that empowered her to act in the situation.
However, emotional dominance is a relational and situational property, not an individual
one. To understand the shift in emotional dominance requires attending to Hill’s emotional
states as well. Here our resources are limited, as there is no account of the situation written
from Hill’s perspective, and Hill’s characterization in Tuff’s memoir bears little resemblance
to the figure that appears in the surveillance video. Our best resource for assessing Hill’s
emotional state is a comparison of Hill’s bodily postures at three different landmarks in the
narrative, ideally points that we can identify not only in the video recordings, but in the
memoir and audio as well.
The first landmark is the beginning of Tuff’s 9-1-1 call. Figure 4.6a shows Hill standing near
Tuff about 16 seconds into the phone call, as Hill dictates instructions to Tuff to pass on to
the dispatcher, an event that appears on page 55 of the memoir.
AT: (H 0.7 H)
do not let anybody in the building,
(0.7)
MH: including (?the?) po:lice,
AT: =including no po:lice,
=do not let anybody in the building,
=including the police.

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
The second landmark, shown in Figure 4.6b, finds Hill in the middle of reloading, between
the first and second exchanges of gunfire with the police. It approximates the point where
Tuff’s voice cuts through the static to announce that she is trying to contact Channel 2.
The equivalent passages are on pages 69 and 77 of the memoir.
(3.5 – static, ending in a few static clicks)
AT: n- what you want me to tell=d’you want me.. w.. I’m tryin to find a number for channel two.
=Okay, you want me to tell them to come u(0.3 - static)
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(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
The third landmark, in Figure 4.6c, represents a moment after Hill returned from firing on
the police a second time, while Tuff is proposing a possible process of surrender, an event
recounted on pages 140-141 of the memoir.
AT: (0.32) Okay.
(..) let me as you this, ma’am,
KM: (..) mmhmm
AT: (..) he didn’t hit anybody,
=he just shot outside the door.
=if I walk out there with him?
(1.89)
If I walk out there with him,
(..) th- they so they won’t shoot him,
=or anything like that,
=he wants to give his self up,
=is that okay,
=they won’t shoot him?

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
The overall trend is from more active, higher-energy postures to more passive, lower-energy
ones over time. In the first scene, where Hill is dictating terms, he is standing, if still
hunched, while Tuff seems to be slightly bent forward, in a more submissive position. In
the second, Hill is no longer standing, but is in a more passive sitting position. However,
he shows signs of activity and absorption in his project. In the third scene, Hill’s posture
is completely passive, with his knees straightened relative to the second picture, his head
resting against the wall, and his hands resting idly on the butt of the gun, which is balanced
barrel-on-the-floor between his thighs. In the context of the video, the changes to Hill’s
posture do not seem to reflect a gradual down-slope of emotional energy, but a step-like loss
of energy after each exchange of fire with the police. This is consistent with Collins’ finding
that violent confrontation is exhausting, rather than exhilarating (Collins 2008:57–82).
By this account, the emotional turning point of the conversation took place as Tuff’s emotional energy rose and Hill’s fell. It is tempting to describe it in mathematical terms as a
crossing point on a graph of Hill’s emotional energy and Tuff’s, but this ignores both the
155

(a) Hill dictating terms to the dispatcher through Tuff before any
exchange of fire

(b) Hill loading his magazines after the first exchange of fire

(c) Hill seated as Tuff suggests surrender after the second exchange of
fire

Figure 4.6: Hill’s changing body posture
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difficulties involved in quantifying emotional energy and the textured nature of social interaction. It is more prudent to say that Hill’s eroding emotional energy created a strategic
opening for Tuff to act decisively–something she was able to do because she was able to
better regulate her emotional response to the situation, and because a plan of action had
been forming in her mind.
4.4.4. Deliberation: Airing Possible Futures
When Hill returned to the office, he was exhausted, and began to fixate on the outcome
of the situation, declaring “This has to end bad,” (Tuff 2014:142). Over the next several
minutes, however, Tuff and the dispatcher were able to shift his visions of doom from “I
know I’m going to die today,” (Tuff 2014:115), to a realization that no one else need die.
Recognizing this, he declared that he did not want to harm the kids, and that it was alright
for the police to evacuate the homes in front of the school if they needed to Tuff (2014),
p. 116-117. Ultimately, Hill’s expectation of doom softened to:
MH: =they’re going to lock me up?
=for a lo:ng time

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
After this, Hill made a phone call to his sister, Ashley Graves. Throughout the exchange
Tuff reaffirmed to Hill that he was loved. In a few more exchanges, Tuff asked Hill questions
that presented reasons for hope. Rather than maintaining silence or returning to his earlier
rituals of self-attunement, Hill began to respond, if only to argue that the new frame was
unrealistic. The brief series of verbal challenges between Tuff and Hill was the first real
conversation they had in which Hill was not giving orders, and Tuff was not repeating
questions asked her by the voice on the other end of the telephone. They conversed, they
briefly weighed actions, consequences, and the framing of the situation, and Tuff stepped
into dominance of the attention space.
After a few such exchanges Tuff assumed the initiative by presenting an alternative possible
future to the dispatcher, determined to demonstrate to Hill that there was a realistic possible
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future in which he would not get shot.
AT: (0.3) Okay.
(0.3) let me ask you this, ma’am,
KM: (..) mmhmm
AT: (..) he didn’t hit anybody,
=he just shot outside the door.
=if I walk out there with him?
(1.9)
If I walk out there with him,
(..) th- they so they won’t shoot him,
=or anything like that,
--> =he wants to give his self up,
=is that okay,
=they won’t shoot him?
KM: (1.1) Yes [ma’am]
AT:
[and he say]
=he just wanna go to the hospital?
KM: (0.7) okay.

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
The line indicated with an arrow, he wants to give his self up. represented the first
time anyone had said that Hill was interested in giving up. That it came from Tuff unprompted by Hill made it a risky interactional move, open to challenge by Hill. To forestall
this, Tuff pulled off a risky bit of tactical syntactic ambiguity. While the first sequence
(if . . . so . . .like that. of the presentation is safely bound up in an “if” clause,
rendering it irrealis, this second sequence is ambiguous as to whether the irrealis framing of
the previous if-statement should apply, rendering the phrase “if he wants to give his self up”
or whether this is a parenthetical explanatory claim, and thus necessarily realis. Only then
does she proceed to the question the first sequence would have led us to expect. The ambiguity would have made the representation awkward to challenge under any circumstances.
Embedding it in a question to a third party to whom only Hill had no direct conversational
access made it even more so. There is a 1 second pause in the tape after her question to
the dispatcher, and in the book, Tuff wrote that Hill, who had given her his full attention
added, “’I want to go to the hospital,’ . . . almost in a whisper.” (Tuff 2014:119). She
borrowed an action Hill had mentioned earlier, “going to the hospital,” and transformed it
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from a missed opportunity to a desirable possibility. Hearing Tuff present this alternate
future, Hill ratified it, letting Tuff lead him from regret to hope. All of this she did without
noticable calculation in the art of speaking, reflecting Tuff’s confidence in the reconfigured
interaction.
4.4.5. Identity Repair and Constructive Contradiction
Having concluded that it was possible for Hill to survive the day’s events, questions of guilt
and tarnished identity began to surface in the interaction. When Hill mentioned feeling bad
about what he’d done, Tuff drew parallels between his suicidal ideation and her own.
AT: well don’t feel bad baby,
=my husband just left me
=after thirty-three ye:ars.

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
She told him of her own attempted suicide several months before. Hill resisted, saying,
“But I don’t even have anyone.” Tuff challenged this, but in a way that emphasized their
togetherness, and presented once again the difficulties of her own life as grounds for common
feeling. Hill protested one last time that “This has to end bad,” and was met with a third
contradiction, framed affectionately. “No it doesn’t baby . . . This is all going to be well.”
(Tuff 2014:142).
It was then that Hill took his first creative action since the turning point, asking Tuff to relay
an apology for him over the intercom. His expressions of regret combined in this action with
her emphasis on their solidarity to authorize Tuff to apologize on his behalf. Tuff stepped
over to the intercom, and spoke, on Hill’s behalf:
AT: (3.02 – static) everybody, this is athis is still a continuous lockdo:wn
(0.98) now he wants to let everybody know that he is sorry,
(0.49) he does not want to ha:rm anybo:dy,
(0.59) everybody stay in place.
(0.64) till the lockdown is over with.

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)
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With this act of face restoration completed, Hill was ready to proceed to the final arrangements for his surrender, asking “What do they want me to do with the gun?” (Tuff 2014:147).
4.4.6. Doing Being Normal
After a short conversation with the dispatcher, Tuff and Hill decided that it would be best
for Hill to place his weapons on the counter, then lie prone on the floor. After he had done
so, a different sort of trouble loomed. The police were not yet ready to come in, and Hill
ended up having to wait on the floor in an extremely vulnerable condition.
To salvage the situation, Tuff and Hill carried on a conversation that took Harvey Sacks’
concept of “doing being normal” (Sacks 1984) that is, the active pursuit of actions and conversational that the participants value precisely for their normalcy, to a new extreme. The
banal conversation about surnames and music presented a striking contrast to the participants’ preceding senses of threat and doom, Hill’s awkward posture, and the imminently
expected arrival of officers armed with assault rifles, riot shields, and the full authority of
the state. In a remarkable demonstration of the ability of everyday conversation to hold
together, the two talked their way through a fragile situation until the police arrived to take
Hill into custody.
AT: (1.05) oh for real,
(..) ribbon week,
=so you was actually in there,
=doin all of that with them?
(0.90) oh ↓how ↑awe↓some.

(Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2013)

4.5. Conclusion
There is a point of irony in the story that can easily elude its casual reader. After the
turning point of the conversation, one of Tuff’s chief projects was to convince Hill that
things didn’t have to turn out for the worse–that he could receive mental health care at a
hospital rather than a violent death or certain imprisonment. In this respect, the hopeful
world Tuff and Hill envisioned surpasses our own. Despite his mental health issues, his
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apparent suicidality, his apology, and his willing surrender, Hill was ultimately retrieved
from his submissive position on the floor at gunpoint, interrogated, jailed, and sentenced
to serve 20 years in prison (BBC 2014). While crisis negotiation as a path to nonviolent
resolution has entered the police repertoire, an ongoing stream of police shootings serves as
a reminder that confrontational approaches to policing remain the norm. Meeting violence
with violence is a deeply ingrained habit, but one which cases like that of Tuff and Hill give
us resources to combat. Of course, Hill’s tentative approach was markedly different from
that of many other mass shooters whose clandestine methods and focus on tactics of surprise
make crisis negotiation an inappropriate framework. Nonetheless, there are lessons that this
and other cases of negotiated surrender offer that have wider applicability in the study of
violence.
Previous cases have demonstrated that an approach that focuses on bargaining, negotiation,
and deliberation over outcomes, while preferable to a confrontational approach to threats
of violence, is often insufficient. Attention to issues of relational rapport and identity repair
are crucial, as is a contextually sensitive approach to challenging the assumptions expressed
by people in crisis. This study highlights the central importance of emotional dynamics to
the study of violent situations. Emotional dominance of the situation creates the space for
those seeking non-violent solutions to open deliberations about outcomes, build relational
rapport, and offer aggressors opportunities for identity repair. In violent situations particularly, the field of tension and fear that accompanies confrontation affords an opportunity.
Attackers who can be confronted, isolated from sources of immediate emotional support,
and sufficiently contained to prevent casualties are likely to suffer emotional exhaustion,
creating openings for negotiated, non-violent solutions.
Directing attention toward the emotional dynamics of violent situations offers more hope
for an answer to the fundamental questions of nonviolence than most previous paradigms.
If we are wise, we will use the insights it offers to build a less-violent world.
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Table 4.1: 2 dimensions of Taylor’s model of communication in crisis negotiations (Adapted
from Taylor 2002:27)
Identity Theme

Relational Theme

Instrumental
Theme

Avoidance
(withdrawal from
interaction)

Provoke, Accuse, Denial

Interupt, Short Negative
Response, Submissive

Shift, Avoid
Retract, Inaction

Distributive
(antagonistic
interaction)

Insult, Criticism, Positive
Self Evaluation,
Commitment

Justify, Excuse Appeal,
Profanity

Reject Demand,
Threat Action,
Reject Offer,
Alternative
Demand

Integrative
(cooperative
interaction)

Negative Self Evaluation,
Empathy, Common, Agree,
Allure, Compliment,
Apology

Discourage, Encourage,
Confidence, Reassure,
Promise

Compromise, Offer,
Accept Offer,
Integrative,
Comply with
Demand
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
In the introduction, to this dissertation I have situated the three articles with reference to a
“micro-first” general sociology of violence that emerged in the late 2000s. In this conclusion,
I summarize my findings, but situate them in two rather more specific subfields to which
they contribute: ethno-religious violence, and crisis negotiation.
The study of ethno-religious violence in India has long been a productive line of cumulative
research, but without an infusion of new methods, insights, and questions, it is in danger of
stagnation. New studies have focused more on trying out trying out new transformations
of the same few structural variables–principally demographic, socio-economic, and electoral
ones. Meanwhile, insights from the study of social movements like the importance of diffusion
effects and organizational networks have not been integrated, nor have critiques that call
for scholars to question whether the framing of ethno-religious conflict in India as primarily
Hindu versus Muslim is still productive, when it is generally conceded that the the politics of
caste and the politics of religion are intimately intertwined. One of the biggest assets in this
field of study was a dataset collected by Ashutosh Varshney and Steven Wilkinson in the late
1990s, and distributed widely by ICPSR. This dataset has served as a backbone for numerous
India-wide studies and promoted dialog across the boundaries of the social sciences. This
dataset is beginning to show its age, however, and will rapidly become a liability for the field
if we cannot come up with new ways to use it and new tools to replace it. Two of the papers
in my dissertation speak to this literature. One paper, the second chapter of this dissertation,
is fairly conventional. This paper aims to collect the major insights of the subfield into a
single paper by bringing together socioeconomic, demographic, and electoral variables, using
new GIS-based techniques to achieve an unprecedented level of granularity. I add to the
literature by importing questions about diffusion from the literature on social movements,
while suggesting a new account of violence diffusion based in the accounts of violence that
centers the emotional constraints and moral justifications for violence. I demonstrate that
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conventional accounts of ethno-religious violence in demographic, economic, and electoral
terms do not get us very far, but that integrating diffusion is a step in the right direction.
The other paper dealing with ethno-religious violence (chapter one in this dissertation) is
a bit more ambitious. Here too I started with Varshney and Wilkinson’s dataset. But
instead of using it as a datasource, I used it as an index to help me find articles which
were supposedly about ethno-religious violence in the digital archive Times of India. Using
these articles, I attempted to press on an irksome ontological question–how far it made
sense to think of these episodes of ethno-religious violence as cases of the same kind of
phenomenon. Of the many ways to frame this question, I decided to start with the historical
one. Following methods productively used by Charles Tilly in tracing the rise of the social
movement in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, I categorized and counted
the verbs appearing in the ethno-religious-violence-related articles in the Times of India,
then put the time series for each verb through a simple statistical test to see whether it
made sense to think of the definition, or more accurately the repertoire, of ethno-relgious
violence was changing over time. In order to get a more adquate baseline, I repeated the
procedure on a randomly selected set of articles. Drawing off of theories that emphasize
the role of emotions as constraints on violence, I hypothesized that violence in 2000 would
look more similar to violence in 1950 than, for example, religious processions in 2000 and
religious processions in 1950. The results bear out this hypothesis, but certain features of
the English language media environment in India–in particular a tendency to run bland and
uninformative stories about collective violence in order to keep from triggering additional
collective violence–require us to treat this conclusion with caution.
If the first two studies focus on one of the most persistent social problems of the world’s
largest democracy, the third paper does likewise for the world’s second largest democracy.
Mass shootings, though not exclusively an American phenomenon, are more prevalant in
the US than in most other countries. This paper takes an exceptional case in which an
incident that initially appeared to follow the script for a mass shooting took an unexpected
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turn as the school bookkeeper, one of the first people to encounter the gunman, worked to
bring about a nonviolent resolution to the crisis. I draw off of an extensive literature in
the field of crisis negotiation, and argue that the traditional themes of that field–identity,
relational rapport, and bargaining over outcomes–while present, were subordinate to a pair
of emotional processes which jointly determined the turning point of the interaction. Using an audio recording captured during the incident, video from the school’s surveillance
cameras, and the bookkeeper’s memoir, I argue that the bookkeeper, who at the start of
the episode was terrified by the gunman gradually grew in confidence as she oriented to
scripture quotations which arose in her mind as sources of emotional calming, situational
interpretation, and tactical inspiration. Meanwhile, the gunman found himself unable to
escape a confrontational situation that quickly drained his emotional resources. At a key
moment, the bookkeeper was able to use an expression of kindness and solidarity to take
charge of the interaction and steer it through processes of deliberation, identity repair, and
banal rapport-building to a non-violent conclusion.
As noted in the introduction, each of these papers draws off of the “micro-first” general
sociology of violence, and brings insights from this emerging area of research back to wellestablished subfields studying forms of violent interaction. The papers also contribute to
attempts to consider the implications of the micro-dynamics of violence for larger-scale
processes of violence production.
These studies may also serve as prolegomena for future research. In the study of India’s
ethno-religious violence, the corpus of ethno-religious-violence-related articles gathered for
the first paper is a powerful tool. On one hand, it provides a tool for synthesizing “deeper”
qualitative methods commmonly used by Historians and Anthropologists with “broader”
comparative methods favored by political scientists and economists. On the other, combining
this corpus with new computational methods for measuring the similarities between texts
may allow for new ways of comparing reportedly religious violence with similar phemonena–
with caste-based violence as a particularly high priority. There is also a need to more closely
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integrate the study of ethno-religious violence with the study of other social movements, as
my paper bringing diffusion methods to ethno-religious violence has shown. Large newspaper
archives, while by no means an ideal source of information on social movements, can serve
as important tools to assess the reach and status of different social movements over time.
An additional, and more ambitious project could also be built using elements of all three
papers. Questions about averted events and close calls are always tricky to ask, though they
are inordinately analytically useful, as the third paper in this dissertation demonstrates. A
project specifically studying the different ways in which ethno-religious violence is averted
presents extreme challenges, as averted violence is hard to identify and rarely reported. An
often overlooked use for statistical models like the one that forms the second chapter of this
dissertation is to use it as a retrospective predictive tool, using false positive predictions to
narrow the search for averted or close-call events. When (or if) found, the results of the third
chapter suggest placing a priority on turning points and situational and emotional dynamics.
In sum, then, the papers in this dissertation, by combining a “micro-first” orientation toward
violence with studies of both micro- and macro-scale violent phenomena, open up a wide
variety of frontiers for future research.
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